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ABSTRACT 
West Asia has been economical ly and s t r a t e g i c a l l y 
s i g n i f i c a n t r eg ion for t h e t t i i t e d S t a t e s and i t s p o l i c y towards 
t h e reg ion was p r i m a r i l y d i r e c t e d towards t h e promotion of i t s 
p o l i t i c a l / economic and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in t h e a r e a . The 
US-Soviet r i v a l r y and t h e t h r u s t of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o l i c i e s 
conducted in t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i n s t a b i l i t y 
in t h e r e g i o n . The mutual h o s t i l i t y between t h e Arabs and Jews 
as a r e s u l t of t h e creati<Mi of t h e Jewish s t a t e , I s r a e l in 1948 
and t h e d e p r i v a t i o n and d iaspora of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s p e r p e t u a t e d 
t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i imbrogl io in West A s i a . Th i s paved t h e way 
for t h e p e r s i s t e n t c r i s i s in t h e r e g i o n . 
The main t h r u s t of t h e t h e s i s i s t o exp lo re t h e p ros 
and oons of t h e Anerican p o l i c y towards West Asia# p a r t i c u l a r l y 
t h e US sponsored Camp David Accords of 19 78 and t h e subsequent 
E g y p t - I s r a e l i Peace Trea ty concluded in 1979 and i t s r epe rcus s ions 
Chapter I i s an a t tempt t o t r a c e out t h e American 
a c t u a l involvement in t h e Middle East a f t e r t h e World War I I 
which no t on ly paved t h e way for the formation of US economic 
p o l i c y but i t a l s o prompted t h e US A d n i n i s t r a t i o n t o develop 
t h e p o l i t i c a l and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in the region in o r d e r 
t o thwar t t h e Sovie t expans ion i s t tendency and t o p r o t e c t 
t h e newly e s t a b l i s h e d Jewish s t a t e from i t s Arab ne ighbours 
which were opposed t o t h e c r e a t i o n of I s r a e l and the r e s u l t a n t 
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Pales t in ian deprivation and diaspora from t h e i r homeland. 
At the same time, the United States es tabl ished close contacts 
with the o i l r i ch Arab Sta tes in pursui t of the promotion of 
i t s o i l i n t e r e s t s in the region. 
In Chapter I I US policy tovjards the Arab- Is rae l i war 
of 1973 is discussed which a l so has wide coverage of the 
reasons and consequences of the war, Egypt which played an 
Important r o l e as the leader of the Arab world has been a focal 
po in t of US pol icy/ p a r t i c u l a r l y due t o Egypt's patronage of 
t he soviet Union. But president Anwar Al-Sadat 's apathy 
towards the Russians as a r e su l t of i t s i n i t i a l f a i lu re to 
sc^jply Egypt with seme of the sophis t ica ted weapons and the 
1973 Arab-Israe l i war paved the way for the decline of Soviet 
influence in Egypt and the e n t i r e Middle Eas t . 
In fact / president Sadat was determined to find a so lu -
t i o n t o the stalemate in the Arab-Israe l i conf l ic t as the 
I s r a e l i occupation contained v i t a l pa r t s of Egypt and fur ther 
t he maintenance of a large Egyptian mi l i t a ry force adversely 
affected the Egyptian economy, president Sadat had declared 
1971 as the "year of decision** and in order to mate r ia l i se his 
declarat ion/ he sought the "offensive weapcHis" from the Sovie ts . 
But the soviet Union did not fu l f i l the Egyptian demands as i t 
sought the peaceful solut ion of the Arab problem in view of the 
process of detenl;e with the United S ta t e s . 
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Hence/ Sadat wanted t o abandon the Soviet patronage and 
normalise the diplomatic relaticais with the United S ta tes . 
In piarsuance of such pol icy, Sadat expelled 20,000 Russian 
advisers and personnel on July 8, 19 72. But the US vnrespon-
s ive a t t i t u d e to Sadat ' s act ion disappointed the Egyptian 
president as the us Administration did not want t o a l i ena t e the 
most s ign i f ican t p r o - I s r a e l i Jewish lobby in America. 
President Sadat was passing through a crucia l period 
as his c r e d i b i l i t y and posi t ion in the Arab world had begun to 
suffer a setback due to the f a i lu re of his much publ ic ised 
*year of decision". But Sadat had decided to f ight a war with 
t he I s r a e l i s and he ordered his defense department t o engage in 
a thoroi;^h preparat ions fOr possible offensive. At the same 
time/ he constilted President Hafez Al-Assad of Syria to chalk 
out a plan of "operation Badr" in which both Egypt and Syria 
would a t t ack I s r ae l on October 6, 1973, in order to r e s to re 
t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s occupied by the I s r a e l i forces in the 1967 
war. The I n i t i a l Egyptian and Syrian offensives proved 
t o be ef fec t ive and successful . While the Egyptian forces 
crossed the canal and captured most of tlte f o r t i f i ed I s r a e l i 
defense l i n e (The Bar Lev Line) , the Syrian army recaptured 
most of the areas of Golan Heights, 
The Soviet Uhion which did not want t o abandon i t s 
c l i e n t s t a t e due t o i t s regional importance, sent the arms to 
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Egypt. But soon the I s r a e l i s pushed back the Egyptian and 
Syrian forces as a r e s u l t of the massive US mili tary, a s s i s t ance . 
The setback to the warring Arab par tners prompted the organisa-
t i o n of Arab Petroleun countries (OAPEC) t o declare the o i l 
cutback of production and impose the o i l embargo on the Western 
count r ies , Japan* p a r t i c u l a r l y the united States fcr t h e i r 
support t o I s r a e l i s . The «nbargo not only adversely affected 
the united States* econony but cr ippled the vgorld industxies and 
t ranspor ta t ion as well . 
At t h i s junctxire, the West European countr ies and 
Japan reframed' their po l i c i e s in support of the Arab cause. 
At the same time/ the United Sta tes brought a considerable 
change in i t s pol icy , p a r t i c u l a r l y in pursui t of the solut ion 
t o the Arab-Is rae l i imbroglio. The s tep-by-step diplomacy 
played by the US Secretary of S ta te , Henry Kissinger during the 
1973 war led t o the signing of the disengagement of forces 
agreement between Egypt and I s r ae l but Kiss inger ' s s tep-by-step 
approach a lso aimed a t the fragmentation of the Arab world as 
i t coxild not include the other Arab p a r t i e s t o solve the 
Arab- I s rae l i d ispute . 
In fac t / Egypt's quest for regaining i t s t e r r i t o r i e s 
occupied by I s r a e l and the reconstruct ion of i t s economy# 
fur ther paved the way for i t s strong inc l ina t ion towards the 
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Uhited S t a t e s . 
The US sponsored Camp David Accords of 19 78 v*iich almost 
brought a tremendous change in the Middle East p o l i t i c s due 
to the signing of the Accords between the Arab leader Anwar 
Al-Sadat and the I s r a e l i Prime Minister Menachem Begin, i s 
discussed in Chapter I I I . At the same time, the consequences of 
the Camp David Accords have also been explored in the Chapter, 
After the assumption of off ice by Jimmy Carter as the President 
of the Ih i t ed Sta tes in 1977, the US Administration sought to 
solve the Arab- Is rae l i imbroglio by ca l l ing the Geneva Confe-
rence on West Asia, But the differences in approaches and 
p e r c ^ t i o n s of both the Arabs and I s r a e l i s and I s r a e l ' s ccxiten-
t i on for excluding the Pa les t ine Liberation Organisation (PLC) 
from the.Peace Conference as a pre-conditicxi, did not y ie ld 
any concrete r e s u l t s . At the same t ime,President Sadat, in 
order to achieve a breakthrough, v i s i t ed I s rae l which drew 
b i t t e r c r i t i c i sm from the Arab countr ies and the Pa les t in ians . 
Undoubtedly, i t helped the US Adn in i s t r a t i on t o encourage both 
President Sadat of Egypt and Prime Minister Menachem Begin of 
I s r a e l t o patch vp t h e i r differences in order t o sign the Camp 
David Accords in September 1978, The accords which was signed 
in the forni of ''Framework for Peace in the Middle East" and 
the"Framework for the conclusion of Peace t r e a t y between Egypt 
and Israel**, however, was condemned by the Arabs and Soviets 
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equally whereas, the Western couirtries hailed Sadat's and 
Begin's move. 
The framework for Peace provided for the autonomy to 
the Palestinians in the west Bank and Gaza s t r ip but i t did not 
refer to the right of self-determination of the Palestinians. 
The PLO and the other Arabs otrtrlghtly rejected the accorda and 
called i t as Sadat's unilateral action as the PLO and the 
Palestinians never conferred the authority on Sadat to negotiate 
with the Is rae l i s on their behalf. 
Although, President Carter i n i t i a l l y did not adopt 
Kissinger's policy of step-by-step diplomacy, la te r he had to 
follow Kissinger's approach in view of president Sadat's 
Jerusalem v is i t and his desire for peace with the I s r ae l i s . 
Chapter IV which has dealt with the Egypt-Israeli Peace 
Treaty of 1979 is an attempt to highlight the pros and cons of 
the t rea ty . I t also discxjsses how the Israel is had emerged 
as successful in their quest for the recognition from Egypt. 
The Egypt-Israeli Peace Treaty ensured the restoration 
of I s rae l i occupied Sinai and i t s o i l fields in return of 
Egypt's recognition of I s r ae l . I t further called for the 
establishment of normal and friendly t i e s between Egypt and 
Israel* President Carter 's presumpticai that the accords and 
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the Peace Treaty would lead t o the Permanent Peace in the 
region# however/ did not serve the purpose. On the contrary* 
i t was condemned by the Arabs as a p a r t i a l peace which ne i the r 
granted the r ight t o self-determinat ion of the Pales t in ians 
nor gave any reference t o the I s r a e l i occi;pied East Jerusalem 
and the Golan Heights of Syria* 
Consequently, the Baghdad Conference of the Arab Leagvie 
Sta tes and the PLO, imposed cer ta in p o l i t i c a l and economic 
sanct ions on Egypt and fu l ly i so la ted i t in the Middle East 
a f f a i r s . At the same time* the Soviet Uhion s trongly supported 
the PLC cause in order t o influence the events in the region. 
But the Russian in tervent ion in Afghanistan fur ther prompted the 
Arabs t o cast the doubts about the rea l intent ion of the Soviets 
in the Middle Eas t . 
Although/ the European Economic Community (EEC) countr ies 
i n i t i a l l y ha i led the Camp David Accords and the subsequent 
Peace t r e a t y ye t , with the passage of time, the EEC countr ies 
f e l t t ha t peace t r e a t y signed between Egyptian and I s r a e l i 
a u t h o r i t i e s l e f t , an adverse impact on the Arab world and the 
accords did not solve the purpose of the comprehensive peace 
in t he region. As a r e s u l t , the Venice Summit of the EEC 
countr ies issued an statement on June 13, 1980 which ca l l ed for 
" the recognit ion of t he legi t imate r igh t s of the Pales t in ian 
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people", the Palest inians* r ight t o self-determinaticn / p a r t i -
c ipat ion by the Pales t in ians and the PLO in the nego t ia t ions . 
The EEC statement of Venice Sunn i t a t t r i b u t e d t o the 
f a i l u r e of t h e Camp David Accords which had evoked b i t t e r 
c r i t i c i sm ins tead of pos i t i ve response from the Arabs. 
Egypt uidoubtedly los t i t s i den t i t y as the leader of the 
Arab world as i t was suspended from the Arab League and the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). At the same time 
the united Sta tes had to lose i t s c r e d i b i l i t y among the Arab 
powers as a r e s u l t of i t s pol icy t o encourage a p a r t i a l peace 
between Egypt and I s r a e l . 
The th rus t of the Egypt- Is rae l i Peace Treaty was the 
establishment of close f r iendly t i e s a t p o l i t i c a l , cu l tu ra l and 
commercial leve l between Egypt and I s r a e l which paved the way 
for the normalisat ion of Egypt- Is rae l i r e la t ions from 1979. 
At the same t ime, the negot ia t ions t o grant autonomy t o the 
Pa les t in ians in the West Bank and Gaza i s delienated in 
Chapter V. Due t o the conf l ic t ing in t e rp re t a t ion of "Framework 
for peace in the Middle East" which provided for the Pales t in ian 
autonomy, I s r a e l ' s in t rans igent a t t i t u d e towards the s t a tus of 
Jerusalem, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin's sett lement 
po l icy in the West Bank and Gaza s t r i p culminated in the f a i l u r e 
of autcnomy t a l k s between Egypt and I s r a e l . 
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The ccnclusive pa r t of the t h e s i s focuses ,par t i cu la r ly 
on the ana ly t ica l assessment of the Camp David Accords and the 
subsequent Egypt - I s rae l i Peace Treaty. Although/ the accords 
and the Peace t r e a t y benef i t ted both Egypt and I s r a e l yet , the 
e n t i r e documents were l eas t s igni f icant in absence of the PLO 
and the Pa les t in ian r i g h t of self-determination vyfithout which 
the Middle East c r i s i s would further perpetua te . 
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West Asia has been eccnomical ly and s t r a t e g i c a l l y important 
r eg ion fo r t h e un i t ed S t a t e s and i t s p o l i c y was marked by i t s 
de te rmina t ion t o safeguard and promote p o l i t i c a l , economic and 
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s in the r e g i o n . The containment of the Sovie t 
i n f l u e n c e , the r i v a l r i e s of t h e two superpowers and t h e t h r u s t of 
t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o l i c i e s conducted in t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s c o n t r i -
buted t o i n s t a b i l i t y in t h e r e g i o n . F u r t h e r , t h e p e r s i s t e n t 
h o s t i l i t y between the Arabs and t h e Jews and t h e i r i n t r a n s i g e n t 
a t t i t u d e s made t h e reg ion in p e r p e t u a l c r i s e s . This paved t h e 
way for t h e superpowers r i v a l r y which f u r t h e r Impeded t h e p roces s 
of n o r m a l i s a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s between the Arabs and the Jews. 
The beginning of 1970, however, wi tnessed a tremendous 
change in t h e Uhited S t a t e s ' p o l i c y p e r c e p t i o n s and approaches 
towards t h e P a l e s t i n i a n i s s u e and g r a d u a l l y the S t a t e Department 
favourably i n c l i n e d t o f ind an amicable s o l u t i o n t o the Middle 
Eas t c r i s i s . At t h e same t i m e , t he s o v i e t union which had been 
p l a y i n g a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e in t h e Egyptian a f f a i r s , f a i l e d t o 
i n f l uence p r e s i d e n t Anwar Al-Sadat and expressed r e l u c t a n c e t o 
supply s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms t o counter t he I s r a e l i t h r e a t s . This 
u l t i m a t e l y r e s u l t e d in expuls ion of Sov ie t t e c h n i c i a n s from 
Egypt . Equa l ly , Sadat expressed h i s d e s i r e t o i n v i t e t h e Ameri-
can o f f i c i a l s t o rescue t h e dwindling economy of Egypt, Af te r t he 
1973 war, t h e o f f i c i a l s in t h e S t a t e Department responded p o s i t i v e l y 
t o a s s i s t Egypt both m i l i t a r i l y and eoonomical ly. 
i i 
Int ransigent a t t i t udes of I s r a e l i s t o vacate the occupied 
t e r r i t o r i e s of Arabs and non-implementation of Security Council 
Resoluticxis 242 and 338, setback to Egyptian and Syrian forces 
in wars against I s rae l led to the imposition of o i l embargo in 
1973. The world economy in general and in p a r t i c u l a r economies 
of the united S ta t e s , Western Europe and Japan were adversely 
affected by the o i l embargo. 
After assuming the off ice of the presidency, by Jinny 
Carter/ t he re was a serious and s incere thinking in the White 
House t o solve the Middle East c r i s i s amicably which eventually 
led to the conclusion of ^onerican sponsored Camp David Accords 
between president Sadat and the I s r a e l i prime Minister , Menachem 
Begin. This, however, proved to be a p a r t i a l peace and the 
subsequent Egypt - Is rae l i Peace Treaty of 1979 ful ly i so la ted 
Egypt from the Arab world. Both Egypt and I s rae l were mutuallV 
benef i t ted by the t r e a t y . On the other hand, the Camp David 
Accords and the subsequent peace t r e a t y drew strong Arab r eac t ion . 
The accords fur ther a l ienated the Pa les t in ians whose r igh t to 
self-determination was ignored by the s i g n a t o r i e s . Although, the 
Camp David Accords were an ins tant American success yet , the US 
had t o lose i t s c r e d i b i l i t y among i t s t r ad i t i ona l Arab f r iends . 
An attempt i s made in t h i s thes i s t o t r ace oii: the pros 
and cons of American Policy towards West Asia, pa r t i cu l a r l y the 
i i i 
US sponsored Canp David Accords of 19 78 and the subsequent 
Egypt - I s rae l i Peace Treaty concluded in 19 79 and i t s repercussions 
in the region. 
Chapter I discusses chrcnologically the h i s t o r i c a l events 
which l a i d the basic foundation i n i t i a l l y for strengthening the 
fr iendship and to the fur ther reciprocal po l i c i e s between the 
Arabs and Americans. In Chapter I I the reasons and consequences 
of the Arab-Is rae l i war of October 19 73 (jt^ re explored. Chapter I I I 
covers the events leading to the American sponsored Camp David 
Accords of 1978 between Egypt and I s r a e l which brought a d r a s t i c 
change in the Middle East p o l i t i c s . The signing of the f i r s t 
peace t r e a t y between Egypt and I s r a e l i s deal t in Chapter IV. 
The rapprochement between Egypt and Israel following the Peace 
t r e a t y and Egypt - I s rae l i po l i c i e s towards the autonomy for the 
Pa les t in ians of the West Bank and Gaza s t r i p is del ienated in 
Chapter V. The conclusive p a r t i s mainly concerned with the 
ana ly t i ca l assessment of the Camp David Accords which is the 
focal point of s tudy. 
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"The Nation which indulges towards another 
an habitual hatred or an habitual 
fondness i s in some degree a slave" • 
George Washington 
CHAPTER ~ I 
UNITED STATES FOREIGtJ POLICY IN WEST 
ASIA; A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
P r i o r t o t h e World war I^ t h e U h i t e d S t a t e s was 
p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h a c a d e m i c / p h i l a n t h r o p i c / c u l t u r a l 
a n d m i s s i o n a r y works i n wes t A s i a . I n 1820* Amer ica e n t e r e d 
t h e r e g i o n and t h e Amer ican Board of Comtniss ioners f o r F o r e i g n 
M i s s i o n e s t a b l i s h e d t h e i r f i r s t R e l i g i o u s M i s s i o n a r y . As a 
r e s u l t / t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e t h e R o b e r t C o l l e g e of I s t a n b u l 
i n 1 8 6 3 , t h e I s t a n b u l Women's C o l l e g e i n 1 8 7 1 / t h e American 
U n i v e r s i t y of B e i r u t ( S y r i a n P r o t e s t a n t C o l l e g e ) i n 1866 , and 
t h e American U n i v e r s i t y of C a i r o i n 1919 were e s t a b l i s h e d w i t h 
a view t o b r i d g e t h e c u l t u r a l and e d u c a t i o n a l gap Igetween t h e 
1 
new w o r l d and t h e M i d d l e E a s t . Though* t h e Musl ims of t h e 
r e g i o n i n i t i a l l y d i d n o t come under t h e i n f l u e n c e of C h r i s -
t i a n i t y b u t a v a i l e d t h e e d u c a t i o n a l and m e d i c a l s e r v i c e s 
2 
r e n d e r e d t o them by t h e m i s s i o n a r i e s . The American Govermnent 
i n t h e i n i t i a l s t a g e s d i d n o t i n v o l v e i n any c o n t r o v e r s y r a t h e r 
1 . George L e n c z o w s k i , The Middle E a s t i n Wo^ld A f f a i r s 
(New York J C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 1956 ) / p . 529 . 
And a l s o s e e f o r f u r t h e r d e t a i l s H a r r y N. Howard, 
"The U n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e M i d d l e E a s t " i n T a r e q Y. 
I smae l ( E d i t e d ) / The Midd le E a s t i n World P o l i t i c s i 
A St t tdv i n Contempora ry I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s 
(New Yorki S y r a c u s e U n i v e r s i t y p r e s s 7 19 74) , p . 1 1 7 . 
2 . R o b e r t H. F e r r e l l , American Diplomacvt A H i s t o r y (New 
York: W.W. Nor ton & Company, 1975) , p . 736 . 
contr ibuted subs t an t i a l l y towards the educational needs of the 
3 
mi l l ions of Muslims, Christ ians and Jews a l i t e in the region. 
US p o l i t i c a l and Economic Thrust 
The American i n t e r e s t s , however# gradually changed and 
she i nd i r ec t l y expressed the sympathetic a t t i t u d e towards the 
Zionis t cause i n Pa le s t ine . Consequently, the Biritish Foreign 
Secre tary , Lord Arthur Balfour, was encouraged to issue the 
Balfour Declaration in 1917, promising a nat ional home for the 
4 
Jews in Pa le s t ine . He issued the declarat ion on November 2, 
1917, t o Lord Rotshild, the representa t ive of the Z ion i s t s , i n 
the form of a l e t t e r which read as follows: 
"His Majesty's Government view with favotir 
the establishment in Pales t ine of a national 
home for the Jewish people, and wil l use the i r 
best endeavours to f a c i l i t a t e the achiev«nent 
of t h i s object , i t being c l ea r ly understood 
t h a t nothing s h a l l be done which may prejudice 
the c i v i l and re l ig ious r i gh t s of ex i s t ing non-
Jewish communities in Pa les t ine , or t h e i r 
r i gh t s and p o l i t i c a l s t a tus enjoyed by Jews in 
any other country.** 5 
3 . Nadav Safran, The united Sta tes and I s r a e l (Carobridoe: 
Harvard univers i ty Press , 1963), p . 36. 
4 . Faiz S. Abu-Jaber, Aroerican~Arab Rf>latioiqp from Wilson t o 
Nixon (Washington DCs unvy. press of America/ Inc . ,1979) , p . 1 . 
President Woodrow Wilson of the United States showed keen 
i n t e r e s t in Zionism which was fostered by the men who s u r -
rounded him. I t was, p a r t i c u l a r l y , h is long and deep 
friendship with Louis Brandeis, an,ardent Zionis t , t h a t roost 
influenced him towards t h i s s tand. Historians gave c r e d i t 
t o president Wilson for encoxoraging Balfour t o issue his 
famoxis dec la ra t ion . 
Mohammed K. Shadid, The Utiited States and the Pales t in ians (Londoh: Croom Helm, 1981) , p . 25. 
5 . Nadav Safran, I s r a e l : The Erob^ttle^ J^lv (Cambridge: Belknap 
press of Harvard University p re s s , 1978) , p . 24. 
At the same time, president Wilson expounded his 
famous foxarteen points which ensured the r i g h t of national 
se l f -determinat ion t o a l l people and the establishment of 
6 
League of Nations, point twelve was d i r ec t l y r e l a t ed with 
the Arabs and the other minor i t ies in the Ottoman empire as 
i t emphasised t ha t ; 
"The Turkish portions of the present 
Ottoman empire should be assured a secure 
sovereignty/ but other n a t i o n a l i t i e s which 
are now under Turkish ru le should be 
assured an undoubted secur i ty of l i f e and 
an absolutely unmolested opportunity of 
autonomous development." 7 
In the Conference of Versai l les from 1919-1920, i t was 
r e a l i s e d that the r igh t of self-determinat ion proposed by 
Pres ident Wilson would* however* hinder the Zionis t cause in 
Pa les t ine and also thwart the ambitions of imperial powers in 
8 
the Middle East . In order t o avoid the chaos and deadlock 
between the American and French delegation in the Conference, 
Pres ident Wilson proposed a King-Crane Commission to know the 
des i re of the inhabi tants of the region who were d i r e c t l y 
6, Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine (Edited) # p o l i t i c a l 
Dictionary of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century (Jerusalem! Weidenfeld and Nicolson* 1972) / p . 420, 
7, Paiz S. Abu-Jaber, n, 4, p . 4 . 
8, !]?>& 
9 
concerned with t h e i r a r e a . On August 28, 1919 # t h e Cororoission 
r e v e a l e d t h a t both the Arabs of Syr ia and P a l e s t i n e d e s i r e d an 
independent United Arab S t a t e . In ca se , Arabs f a i l e d t o 
ach ieve t h e c a n p l e t e independence/ they were ready t o accep t 
10 
t h e United S t a t e s or B r i t a i n as t h e i r mandatory powers . The 
recommendations of t h e Commission were kept s e c r e t for a long 
11 
t ime i n t h e a r ch ives and made p u b l i c on ly i n 1922" . The 
Commission recommended F a i s a l b in Hussein as the head of United 
Syr i an S t a t e , while favouring the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Arab monarchies, 
F u r t h e r , i t opposed t h e es tab l i shment of a Jewish S t a t e i n 
12 
P a l e s t i n e . The United S t a t e s abandoned i t s Middle East 
p o l i c i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y , a f t e r t h e r e j e c t i o n of Wi lson ' s p roposa l 
t o taJce t h e un i t ed States t o League of Nations and thus paved 
t h e way for t h e B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s t o dominate i n the Middle 
9 . France r e fused t o p a r t i c i p a t e in t h i s Commission and B r i t a i n , 
a f t e r b r i e f h e s i t a t i o n , a l s o decided t o remain aloof from i t . 
Notwithstanding t h i s boycot t and d e s p i t e i n t e n s e Z i o n i s t 
o b j e c t i o n s , Wilson appoin ted a p u r e l y American Commission -
composed of Henry C, King, p r e s i d e n t of Obe r l i n Co l l ege , 
and Char les Crane, a prominent businessman and s t u d e n t of 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . 
George Lenczowski, n . 1, p . 88. 
And a l s o see for d e t a i l s of t h e King-Crane Ccmmission papeys 
Re la t ing t o the Foreign Relatione, of th^ United S t a t e s ; 
The P a r i s Pe^c^ Conference. 1919 (Washington: United S t a t e s 
Government p r i n t i n g Of f i ce , 1947), p p . 745-863. 
10 . I b i d . , pp . 88-89. 
1 1 . ?:bid. / p . 90 
12 . HiX^* p . 89. 
13 
East p o l i t i c s . Once again America confined herself t o the 
missionary a c t i v i t i e s in the region and a t the same time i t 
c i i l t ivated fr iendship with the Arab countr ies as to import 
o i l * needed for i t s indus t r ies and t h i s gradually strengthened 
14 
i t s economic and commercial r e l a t i o n s . American conpanies on 
several occasions appealed t o the US Coverrinent to acquire 
free access t o the new and promising o i l f i e lds of I r an , Iraq/ 
Kuwait* Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as these areas were i n the 
15 
hands of the Br i t i sh , French and Dutch competitors. The US 
Goveriment sought for an open-door pol icy which would not 
discriminate the p r iva te American bxisiness and a lso appjeated 
to the Dutch, French and Br i t i sh concern to promote p r iva te 
13. Nadav Safran, n. 3 , p . 37. 
In a conference held a t San Remo in Apr i l , 19 20, 
Br i ta in obtained the consent of the Al l i es for the 
mandate which came in to force on Septenber 29, 1923 
M.L. Gujral , U.S. Global Involvement: A Study of 
p . 328* 
Apierican Expansionism (New Del hi j Arnold-Heinemann, 
19 75) , 
14. The American Government helped i t s companies t o obtain 
23,75 per cent share in the I raq Petroleum Company. 
15. Ahmad R. Elkashef, United s t a t e s Policy towards the 
Arab- Is rae l i Arms Race. 1950-1966 (Beirut: P.L.O. 
Research Center, 1969)* p . 9» 
16 
entrepreneurship In the region. With the issuance of the 
British White Paper in 1939* the Jev?ish immigration to 
17 
Palestine was restricted. In fact, until 1939,. American 
avoidance of actxial involvement in Palestine problem bore 
certain factors. Firstly, the world Zionism was in the hands 
of Britain and, secondly, Britain, until 1939, had not 
18 
restricted the Jewish immigration to Palestine, 
A^efican RojLe in the Middle East during World War II 
During the Second World war Americans further developed 
their interest in the Middle East for two obvious reasons as 
the entire region was strategically significant and it 
16. In this connection the united States concluded the Anglo-
American Treaty of 1924 which regulated relations between 
the two countries in connection with Palestine mandate and 
secured the protection of business and missionary interests 
of Americans in Palestine. Incidently, the preamble of 
this treaty included a reference to the Balfour Declaration 
inserted at the insistence of the British negotiators, 
which was to be interpreted later by various parties as 
giving the Uhited States the right to have a say in any 
changes in the mandate, 
Nadav Safran, n. 3, pp, 37-38. 
17. Richard P. Stevens, American Zionism ^ n<;j y.S. Foreign 
fp^icy, 1942-1947 (New York: Pageant press, 1962) , p. 2, 
18. George Lenczowski, n. 1# p. 531, 
19 
had vast o i l resoxarces* American troops deployed in Iran t o 
20 
handle the lend-lease simply l i n e to Russia and they a lso 
sv|>plied arms and ammunition to Egypt and Pales t ine to strengthen 
the supply center . Apart from t h i s , the united States also 
concluded lend-lease agreements with the West Asian coimtries 
l i k e I ran , I raq , Egypt and Saudi Arabia in order to e s t ab l i sh 
21 
a chain of bases l inking North Africa and Par East . 
On the other hand, the Pa les t ine problem was r a i sed 
through the Baltimore Program on May 11, 1942, by the Z ion i s t s , 
moulding the American public opinion and seeking the united 
22 
S t a t e s ' support to the Zionist cause. Several pro-Zionist 
reso lu t ions were passed by the s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e s in America 
and president Franklin Delano Roosevelt a l so endorsed the 
23 
Zionis t a sp i r a t ions . i t was on January 27, 1944, tha t 
19. Ahnad R. Elkashef, n. 15, p . 11. 
20. Lend-lease si;pply was the arrangement announced (1941) by 
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in which the united 
States undertook to svpply weapons and equipment t o 
countries f ight ing the Axis. In r e tu rn , the U.S. obtained 
the r igh t to use cer ta in Al l ied bases. 
Owen Watson (Edited) , Lonqnan Moderp Engj.ish p|.ction^rv 
(Londom Longman, 19 76), p . 63o. 
2 1 . Ahmad R. Elkashef, n. 15, pp . 11-12. 
22. Richard P. Stevens, n. 17, p . 12. 
23 . Harry B. E l l i s , Challenge in th^ ^^ i<1^ 1e East (New Yorkt 
The Ronald Press Company, 1960) , p . 88. 
8 
Congress passed t h e r e s o l u t i o n which sa id* 
" . . , the S ix ty-Seventh Congress of t h e 
US on June 30, 1922, unanimously r e s o l v e d 
t h a t the un i t ed S t a t e s favours t h e e s t a -
b l i shment i n P a l e s t i n e of a n a t i o n a l home 
fo r t h e Jewish p e o p l e . . . " 24 
p r e s i d e n t Roosevel t p ledged dur ing the 1944 e l e c t i o n 
caRpaign t h a t he would favour the es tab l i shment of a Jewish 
Commonwealth in P a l e s t i n e . However, he roa«9e amblguovjs promise 
i n a l e t t e r t o King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia t h a t he would do 
n o t h i n g which might prove c o n t r a r y t o the Arabs ' wish without 
25 
t h e p r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n with the Arabs and Jews. In t h e 
meantime, the War Department expressed pessimism over t h e 
Congress ional and p r e s i d e n t i a l s t p p o r t t o the Jewish cause as 
i t would endanger the war e f f o r t s of A l l i e s and a t t h e same 
t ime t h e S t a t e Department p o i n t e d out t h a t B r i t a i n was s o l e l y 
r e s p o n s i b l e for P a l e s t i n e and t h e American Gtovernment main 
26 
concern was t o a l l e v i a t e t h e s u f f e r i n g s of the European Jewry. 
24, un i t ed S t a t e s Congress, House Committee on Foreign 
A f f a i r s , Hearing before t h e Committee on Fore ign 
K^iaUons t un i t ed s t a t e s Senate (Washington: 
Government p r i n t i n g p r e s s , 1944), p . i . 
25. Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , Vol . X I I I , N©. 330, 
October 2 1 , 1945, p . 623. 
2 6 . Nadav Safran , n . 5, p p . 39-40 . 
us post-War Att i tude 
I t appeared af te r the World war tha t the united States 
woxold leave the Middle East considering the area as Br i t i sh 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But Bri ta in was exhausted as a r e s u l t of the 
War and there was a sharp decline in i t s control over the 
27 
Middle East a f f a i r s . The united S t a t e s , however, renewed and 
framed i t s po l i c i e s in the Middle East in order t o p ro tec t 
the Western i n t e r e s t s and t o counter the Russian expansionist 
28 
po l i cy . At the f i r s t ins tance , Russians abruptly attempted 
t o subjugate Iran through s t imulat ing and supporting the 
Azerbaijan rebe l l ion and securing o i l concession by coercive 
measures in 1945-1946. The United Sta tes responded by encoura-
ging Iran t o r e s i s t the Soviet p ressures . Meanwhile, Washington 
29 
f e l t a new Communist t h r e a t in Greece and Turkey. I t was on 
March 12, 1947, President Harry Trunan ^ c l a r e d : 
"One of the primary objectives of the 
foreign pol icy of the United States i s 
the creat ion of conditlexis in which we 
and other nations will be able t o work 
out a way of l i f e free from coe rc ion . . . 
We shal l not r e a l i s e our objec t ives , 
however, unless we are wi l l ing to help 
free peoples . . . against aggressive 
movements t h a t seek t o impose on them 
t o t a l i t a r i a n regimes. ..•* 30 
27. Ahmad R. Elkashef, n. 15, p . 13. 
28, George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (London; Cornell univers i ty Press , 1980) , p . 794. 
29 • IbjLd. 
30. p^ar tment of St.ate Bul le t in , Vol. XVI, t b . 403, March 23, 
1947, pp . 534-53 7. 
10 
p r e s i d e n t Trunan fxirther appealed t o the Congress for 
g r a n t i n g $ 400 m i l l i o n t o Greece and Turkey t o meet t h e Communist 
31 
cha l l enge both f i n a n c i a l l y and m i l i t a r i l y . 
The r i s i n g p e r s e c u t i o n of Jews i n Europe prompted t h e 
Z i o n i s t s t o sp read the movement i n t he United S t a t e s and t h e i r 
p e r p e t u a l p r e s s u r e on Congress and t h e p r e s i d e n t l e d the un i t ed 
32 
S t a t e s t o frame a c l e a r - c u t p o l i c y i n P a l e s t i n e . 
The Z i o n i s t s t r i e d t o secure t h e American sv^por t on two 
p r e t e x t s . F i r s t l y / they quoted t h e B i b l i c a l promises which was 
made t o t h e descendants of Abraham, as i f t h e Jews were h i s 
o n l y descendan t s . Secondly* they expressed t h e i r p a t h e t i c and 
t r a g i c cond i t i ons owing t o t h e Nazi p e r s e c u t i o n of t h e Jews 
du r ing t h e World war I I . Thus, t h e Americans became t h e 
Jewish sympathisers and favoured the Jews a t t h e cos t of t h e 
P a l e s t i n i a n s vftio were q u i t e una t tached with t h e Z i o n i s t c a t a s -
t rophe i n Europe. The Z i o n i s t s f u r t h e r c o n s t i t u t e d a force t o 
be reckoned wi th in t h e un i t ed S t a t e s as t h e "Jewish Vote" 
3 1 . The Trunan Doctr ine proved t o be a succes s t a ided and 
f inanced by the Americans, the Greek Government wiped out 
t h e Communist g u e r i l l a s and# t h u s , saved i t s e l f from 
s h a r i n g t h e f a t e of i t s l e s s fo r tune Balkan ne ighbours . 
S imi la r ly# s t r eng thened in her economy and her m i l i t a r y 
p o s t v r e , Turkey s u c c e s s f u l l y r e s i s t e d Sov ie t p r e s s u r e for 
t h e c o n t r o l of the S t r a i t s and the annexat ion of her 
e a s t e r n p r o v i n c e s . Consequent ly, the Northern T ie r was 
saved. 
George Lenczowski, n . 28, p . 795, 
32 . A.G. Naidu, US p o l i c y towards t ^ e A r a b - I s r a e l i C o n f l i c t 
(New Delhi t T u l s i Pub l i sh ing House, 1981) , p . 5 . 
11 
33 
became a caecisive f a c t o r i n US p o l l s . 
The un i t ed S t a t e s p r e s s u r e on t h e B r i t i s h Government t o 
Secure a l a r g e measure of Jewish immigrat ion t o P a l e s t i n e 
had c r e a t e d a t e n s i o n between B r i t i s h and American Governments 
and u l t i m a t e l y t h e Anglo-American Committee was s e t \3p i n 1946 
34 t o f i n d out a s o l u t i o n . 
The B r i t i s h Goverranent d id not want t o go ahead with 
t h e Jewish immigrat ion, which was c o n t r a r y t o t h e wishes of 
P a l e s t i n i a n s . F u r t h e r , t h e p e r s i s t e n t p r e s s u r e from t h e United 
S t a t e s and a s e r i e s of Z i o n i s t v io lence l e d the B r i t i s h 
Government i n 1947 t o r e f e r t h e P a l e s t i n e problem t o t h e United 
35 
Nations, The General Assembly of the united Nations appointed 
the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOp) which provided 
36 
two p l a n s i n i t s f i n a l r e p o r t i n September, 1947, In f a c t , 
3 3 , Henry C a t t a n , SSlS§USi&* Th^ Ay.^bp ^^ 3;?ffliSl» The Search 
fo r J u s t i c e (Londons Longmans, Green & Co. L t d . , 1969) , 
pp • 23 -24 . 
34 . The Cotranittee found t h a t h o s t i l i t y between Jews and Arabs 
made t h e e s t ab l i shment of an independent P a l e s t i n e imposs ib le 
a t t h e moment and, t h e r e f o r e , adv i sed t h a t t h e B r i t i s h 
Government r e t a i n t h e mandate u n t i l a t r u s t e e s h i p agreement 
under t h e u n i t e d Nations could be a r ranged . Meanwhile, 
t h e Committee reccrranended the admission t o P a l e s t i n e t o 
100,000 European Jews as r e q u e s t e d by p r e s i d e n t Trunan, 
Ifrj-gt^ p . 2 4 . 
35. IP±^, 
36, The eleven member UNSCOP was comprised of Australia, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, the Netherlands, 
Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. 
Bharat Bhushan Gupta, Afah^Js^raf).^ Relations (New Del hi j 
Ashish . Publishing House, 1978) , p. 15. 
12 
37 t h e y were r ega rded as m a j o r i t y p lan and m i n o r i t y P l a n . The 
m a j o r i t y r e p o r t p rov ided t h a t P a l e s t i n e should be p a i r t i t i o n e d 
i n t o t h r e e p a r t s - an Arab S t a t e and a Jewish S t a t e and t h e 
C i t y of Jeriisalem should be kept under t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l regime 
of t h e u n i t e d Na t ions . The m i n o r i t y Plan prov ided for a 
3 8 f e d e r a l s t a t e c o n s i s t i n g of t h e Arab and Jewish u n i t s . The Arabs 
opposed t h e p a r t i t i o n p l an and condemned i t as unlawful , unjus t 
and xmdemocratic a t t i t u d e towards the m a j o r i t y of the i n h a b i -
t a n t s . They cha l l enged t h e l e g a l contpetency of t h e IM reccmmenda-
t i o n of p a r t i t i o n of t h e t h e i r a n c e s t r a l homeland. However, 
t h e i r e f f o r t s t o take t h e help of I n t e r n a t i o n a l Court of 
39 J u s t i c e went i n v a i n . 
On CX:tober 11, 194 7, United S t a t e s Deputy Represen ta t i ve 
t o t h e United Nat ions , Hershal V. Johnson, emphasised i n h i s 
s t a t ement t h a t t 
3 7 . The m a j o r i t y p lan was s igned by t h e Ne ther lands , Canada, 
Czechoslovakia , Sweden, Peru, Guatemala and Uruguay; 
whereas t h e m i n o r i t y r e p o r t was s igned by Ind i a / 
I r a n and Yugoslavia . 
^ 8 . ,It> .^fl,, 
And a l s o see for f u r t h e r d e t a i l s Michael E. Jansen , T ^ 
United S t a t e s and t h e Pale8tip;L^p people ( B e i r u t : The 
I n s t i t u t e fo r P a l e s t i n e S t u d i e s , 197C5 , pp . 18-19. 
3 9 . Henry C a t t a n , n . 3 3 , p . 25, 
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"The united s t a t e s delegation sv:pports the 
basic p r inc ip les of the unanimous recopncnen-
dations and the majority plan which provide 
for p a r t i t i o n and immigration. I t i s of the 
opinion, however, t h a t ce r t a in amendnents 
and modifications would have to be made in 
the majority plan in order more accurately 
to give t o the p r inc ip les on which tha t plan 
i s based. My delegation bel ieves t h a t ce r t a in 
geographical modifications must be made. For 
example - Jaffa should be included in the Arab 
Sta te because i t i s predominantly an Arab c i t y 
. . . Any solut ion which t h i s Committee recoms*. 
mends should not only be Just / but a lso 
workable and of a nature to command the approval 
of world opinion." 40 
Notwifihstanding the Arab opposi t ion, the General Assembly 
passed i t s majority plan with ce r t a in modifications on 
November 29, 1947, by a vote of 33 in favour, 13 against with 
41 10 abs ten t ions . 
40. A p ^ g ^ ^ 9f ^<gricflp F9]:^t<m P.Pl4ffY* B g^JrC pgcvyne^t?, |p4j^-4jp (Washington! prepared by the Staff of the 
Committee and the Department of S t a t e , 1950) , p . 819. 
4 1 . In favoxjr - Aust ra l ia , Belgiun, Bolivia, Braz i l , Byelorussian 
Soviet Soc ia l i s t Republic, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Prance, Guatemala, 
Ha i t i , Iceland, Liber ia , Luxemburgr, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Phi l ipp ines , Poland, Sweden, Ukranian Soviet Soc ia l i s t 
Republic, union of south Africa, USSR, USA, Uruguay and 
Venezuela. 
Against - Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, Greece, India , I ran, I raq , 
Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria , Turkey and Yemen. 
Abstained - Argentina, Chile, China, Columbia, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia , Honduras, Mexico, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. 
Dewan Berindranath. War and P^ftc^ i p W^st ^pi^ (New Delhi: 
Topical Publ ica t ions , 19 47), pp. 3 5-36. 
And a l so see for further de ta i l s o f f i c i a l Rf>ccrd^ of the 
Qen^yal Asse|ipb^v (GAOfi) , Second Session, September-November, 
1947, pp . 131-151. 
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The p a r t i t i o n plan divided Pa les t ine in to s i x principal parts 
of which the three pairts const i tuted the Jewish State and the 
r e s t three with the enclave of Jaffa were given to the Arab 
S t a t e . The City of Jerusalem and i t s adjoining area/ including 
Bethlehen were declared as an internat ional zone under the 
42 banner of the united Nations. When the Pa le s t ine was divided 
i n 194 7, the Jewish population had r i s e n mainly through immi-
grat ion to about 650,000/ whereas the population of the Arabs 
increased via natural growth t o about 1,350,000, Thus, 67.59i 
of populat ion were of the Arabs while the Jews cons t i tu ted 
43 3 2.596 only . I t may be noted that p a r t i t i o n reso lu t ion divi<^d 
44 
the coxmtry discr iminateIf . In f a c t , the united States played 
the most important r o l e in inf luencing the voting pattern in the 
General Assembly i n favour of p a r t i t i o n . Stephen B,L« Penrose, 
42 . An important aspect of t h i s unnatural d iv i s i on was t o 
iiiclxxde within the Jewish s t a t e a l l areas owned and 
inhabited by Jews, even though t h i s meant the inc lus ion 
of large areas owned and inhabited by Arabs. The Arab 
S ta te / on the other hand/ was t o include the l e a s t 
p o s s i b l e number of Jews and the smaller amount of Jewish 
property. 
ibJL^, p . 3 5 . 
43 . I b i d . / p . 36. 
44 . (a) To the Jewish State i t gave more than 56?; of the t o t a l 
area i . e . more than ten times what the Jews owned i n land 
property; 
(b) To the Arab States was given only 4256 of the whole 
country, although the Arabs cons t i tu ted 67*596 of the popu-
l a t i o n , and owned more than 94% of the t o t a l area; 
(c) 497/000 Arabs, who represented 3756 of the t o t a l Arab 
populat ion, were placed under the domination of the Jewish 
S t a t e . 
Ib id . 
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president of the American University of Beirut, criticised the 
American policy and commented thats 
"The political manoeuvring which led to 
the final acceptance of the United Nations 
General Assembly of the majority report of 
UNSCOP provides one of the blacker pages in 
the history of American international 
politics. There can be no question but that 
it was American pressure for partition of 
Palestine with Economic Union voted by the 
General Assembly on November 29# 1947. It 
was this American pressure for partition 
which is largely responsible for the terrific 
drop which American prestige took in all parts 
of the Arab and Muslim world." 45 
Partition plan evoked considerable protest from the 
Palestinians followed by demonstrations and violence. The 
whole Arabs opposed the partition of their country, the Jews, on 
the other hand/ were determined irrespective of the consequences 
46 to establish a Jewish State. 
Strangely enough, in the early part of 1948, the US 
intelligence estimates showed a deep concern of Zionism, which 
of course, dragging the Ifeited States into a dangerous programm© 
47 
of territorial conflict in the Middle East. 
45. Quoted in Henry Cattan, n. 33, p. 27. 
46. Ibid., p, 31. 
4 7. In March, 1948, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Paper on 
"Force requirements for Palestine", anticipating the 
termination of the British Mandate, predicted that the 
Zionist strategy will seek to involve (the United States) 
in a continuously widening and deepening series of opera-
tions intended to secure maximum Jewish objectives. 
The JCS listed the objectives asj "a) initial Jewish 
sovereignty over a portion of Palestine, (b) acceptance 
contd... 16 
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In the meantime/ the Stnte and Defense Departments 
r e a l i s e d that i t s economic and s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s would be 
Jeopardised in case the Uttited States went ahead to approve 
the p a r t i t i o n p lan . The United States wanted t o impress the 
Arabs that i t was a blunder on the part of Americans t o pursue 
the p a r t i t i o n plan. In pursuance of t h i s p o l i c y / on March 19, 
1948/ Warren R, Aust in, the US representat ive t o the united 
Nations* asked the Securi ty Council t o e s t a b l i s h a temporary 
UN Trusteeship over Pa les t ine in view of the non-implementation 
48 
of p lan. The change in American p o l i c y was c r i t i c i s e d by the 
American Z i o n i s t s / p o l i t i c i a n s and other important c i t i z e n s . 
But when the Trusteeship matter was being discussed i n the 
united Nations, the Jews in Pa les t ine were provided with the 
shipment of Russian arms. And on May 14/ 1948, as soon as the 
Br i t i sh forces withdrew from P a l e s t i n e , the Jews launched an 
at tack on Pa les t in ians and occv:^ied most of the areas a l l o t t e d 
by the great powers of the r i g h t t o unlimited immigration, 
(c) the extension of Jewish sovereignty over a l l of 
P a l e s t i n e , (d) the expansion of "Eretz Israel** in Trans-
jordan and i n t o port ions of Lebanon and Syria and (e) 
the es tabl i s lment of a Jewish mi l i t ary and economic 
hegemony over the e n t i r e Middle East* 
Stephen Green, TAKAflfl S l ^ S t Apgrtgfl'8 SegJT.gt Rfilatlgns 
with a Mi l i tant I s r a e l (New Yorkj William Morrow and 
Company, i n c . , 1984), pp. 20-21. 
48 . y,l>? Vp;i1ig<3,jgt;,ftte?. ijR ygc l^ AffflJJ .^?* l?48-,t?4? (New York* 
published for the Council on Foreign Re la t ions , 1950) , 
p p . 381-382. 
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t o them under the plan and then on the very day they proclaimed 
49 the Jewish State c a l l i n g i t as I s r a e l . On the same day a l e t t e r 
was rece ived by president Trunan from the Agent of the 
Provis ional Government of Israel* which s t a t e d t h a t j 
"DEAR PRESIEENT. I have the honor t o no t i fy 
you that the State of I s r a e l has been 
proclaimed as an independent republ ic within 
front iers approved by the General Assembly 
of the united Nations in i t s r e s o l u t i o n of 
November 29# 1947 . . . The act of independence 
w i l l become e f f e c t i v e at one minute a f t er 
s i x O'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948 
Washington t ime. 
With f u l l knowledge of deep bond of 
synpathy which has e x i s t e d and has been s treng-
thened over the past t h i r t y years between the 
government of the united States and the Jewish 
people of P a l e s t i n e . I have been attthorissed 
by the prov inc ia l government of the new s t a t e 
to tender t h i s message and t o express the hope 
that your government w i l l recognize and w i l l 
welcome Israe l in to the community. 
Very r e s p e c t f u l l y yours, 
ELIAHU EPSTEIN 50 
Agent, provincial Government of Israe l" 
The united States was the f i r s t country t o recognize 
51 I s r a e l . Recognition of I srae l by the Truman Aaninis trat ion 
contradicted the e a r l i e r statement of president wherein he had 
49 . Nadav Safran, n. 5, p , 38, 
50. pgp.art;n)ept 9t Stftt^g, Bul3,^Un, Vbl. XVIII, No. 464, 
May 23, 1948, p . 673, 
5 1 . JfrA,<af 
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expressed that p a r t i t i o n was not taking place in exac t ly the 
52 peaceful manner "as he had hoped. His memoirs ind icated the 
fear of some of the State Department experts who would t ry t o 
53 block the recogniticaa of I s r a e l " . In order t o avoid any such 
hindrance* e leven minutes a f t er the proclamation of I s r a e l , 
Charlie Ross, the pres ident ' s Press Secretary, intimated the 
54 
correspondents of the ^ facto recogni t ion . The establishment of 
State was fol lowed by the h o s t i l i t i e s which broke out between 
I srae l and i t s neighbouring Arab S t a t e s , namely, Trans-Jordan, 
Egypt, Syria ana Lebanon. The Arab armies could not face the 
strong I s r a e l i army as i t was f u l l y equipped with s o p h i s t i c a t e d 
weapons s\:pplied by the Western countries and at the same time 
Count Bemadotte , the appointed UN mediator, made h i s e f f o r t s 
55 
and arranged the truce from June 11 t o July 7, 1948. But a f t er 
the expiry of the truce the h o s t i l i t i e s were revived with the 
I s r a e l i se izure of the whole of Western Gal i l ee as well as Lydda, 
Ramleh and a larger part of central Pa le s t ine evacuated by the 
Arab l eg ion of Trans-Jordan. This se izure of Arab land was 
beyond the t e r r i t o r y o r i g i n a l l y a l l o t t e d to Jews according to 
the p a r t i t i o n p lan . 
52. Alfred M. L l l i e n t h a l , There Goes the Middle East (New York: 
The Devin-Adair Company, 1957) , p . 14, 
53. y^i^t 
55« Henry Cattan, n. 33, p. 34. 
56. llaid..* P- 35. 
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After a series of truce conclusion and their subsequent 
violation, the Palestine War ended with the conclusion of four 
Armistice Agreements, which was signed by Israel with Egypt on 
February 24, 1949, with Lebanon on March 23, 1949, with Jordan 
on April 3, 1949, and with Syria on J\ily 2o, 1949?^ 
The total area which was occvpied by the Israelis 
58 
amounted to almost 30 per cent of the territory of the country; 
Before the creation of Israel, the United States involvement 
in the region bore the strategic and economic interests but as 
soon as the State of Israel was established^ USA became the 
59 guardian of the new Jewish State. In early 1950, Israel sought 
arms from the United States to match the British shipments made 
to seme of the Arab states in accordance with the outstanding 
treaties. Although^America was sympathised to the Israeli needs 
yet, it foresaw the threat of renewed war due to the arms race 
60 development in the Middle East. Immediately, the United States 
consulted the United Kingdom and France and afterwards a Tripar-
tite Declaration was issued on May 25, 1950, which stated thats 
57 . IJakAt' P* 3 6 . 
58 . l y ^ * p . 3 7 . 
5 9 . A.G. Naidu, n . 32, p . 6 . 
6 0 . L e i l a S. Kadi , A S^YgY 9f ^gyj^ygn-^lgra^l i RgAfltjona ( B e i r u t : P a l e s t i n e Research Cen te r , 1969), p . 50, 
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"The three Governments recognize; tha t 
the Arab States and I s r a e l a l l need t o 
maintain a ce r t a in level of armed forces 
for . . . t h e i r in ternal secxnrity and 
t h e i r legi t imate self-defense and to 
permit them t o play t h e i r pa r t i n the 
defense of the area as a vjhole. All 
appl icat ions for arms or war mater ial for 
these oovmtries wi l l be considered in the 
l i gh t of these pr inc ip les . . . The three 
Governments take t h i s opportunity to 
promote the establishment and maintenance 
of peace and s t a b i l i t y in the area . . . 
should they find tha t any of these s t a t e s 
was preparing t o v io la te f ront ie rs or 
airmistice linesi^. would . . • immediately 
take action« both within and outside the g. 
united Nations, t o prevent such v io la t ion . " 
The signing of the Declaration imp l i c i t l y made the three 
powers the guardians of the State of I s r ae l and oblige to do 
62 t h e i r best t o maintain the s t a tus quo in the Middle East . But 
t h e declara t ion was v io la ted as a r e su l t of 1954 secret Franco-
I s r a e l i arms arrangement. This had almost become nul l and void 
63 
for both Bri tain and Prance af te r the Suez War in 1956, 
Uhited Sta tes and the Suez Imbroglio 
The Soviet entrance in the Middle East and Egypt's growing 
contacts with the soviet union perturbed the united S t a t e s . In 
6 1 . united S ta tes Department of S ta te / Ameri;Cqn forejLqn pol icy; 
Basic Docupents, 1950-1955 (Washington D.C, j U.S. Government 
Pr in t ing Office * 1957) , p . 2237. 
And a l so see Dep^rtjnent of S^^^e Buj.letiny vol . xxxv» 
NO. 570, June 5, 1956, p . 886. 
62. Lei la S. Kadi, n. 60, p . 50. 
63 . Harry N. Howard, "The United States and the Middle East" in 
Tareq Y. Ismael (Edited) , T^^ nX^<^l9 KU?%, .^ ..-WO^^A f.pJL>^ /.<?.?» 
A Study of Contepiporarv Ip ternat ional Relations (New York: 
Syracxxse univers i ty p res s , 1974) , ?• 123, 
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order to combat the Soviet influence and to pursue its national 
interests in the Middle East/ the Uhited States assured the 
Egyptian authorities to extend financial help to construct the 
64 Aswan High Dam in Egypt. The financial assistance was to be 
65 
shared by the World Bank and the united States, 
The US constraints and its intentions of withdrawing the 
aid was however, indicated by Henry Cabot Lodge, the American 
Ambassador to the United Nations, who told Anthony Nutting, 
British Minister of State of the foreign office in July, 1956 
that J 
64. A.G. Naidu, n. 32, p . 10. 
65 . Negotiations with the Bank president Eugene Black 
were hard but fron Nasser 's perspect ive , successful. 
Egypt agreed to allow the Bank to st^jervise i t s 
foreign currency needed for the p ro jec t , a t the then 
current market r a t e of 5.5 per cent i n t e r e s t . The 
united Sta tes a l so had conditions and these were even 
harder t o meet. Egypt would make no more arms purchases 
from the Soviets , would accept the US and Br i t i sh 
monetary conditions for the loans as they were 
presented, and woiald conclude a peace agreement with 
the I s r a e l i s * Taken together , the various World Bank 
and US conditions for Aswan Dam financing, amounted 
t o a surrender of a considerable amount of nat ional 
sovereignty of control over Egyptian economic and 
foreign po l i cy . 
Stephen Green, n. 47, p . 131. 
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"Dulles in a l l p robab i l i ty shor t ly 
renege on the Aswan Dam loan. This 
was largely t o in ternal p o l i t i c a l 
problems . . . Although, the govemment 
had t r i e d hard t o get back on terms 
with Arab World the damage done by 
president Trunan's p r o - I s r a e l i p o l i c i e s , 
there were powerful anti-Arab, and more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y anti-Egyptian voices in 
Congress. Zionist influences were very 
strong . . . for l e t t i n g Nasser get away 
with his blockade of the Stez Canal 
against I s r a e l i shipping . . . Now the 
Zionist lobby in opposing a id to Egypt, 
and with the p res iden t i a l e l ec t ion coming 
alone in less than four months, i t jus t 
was not p rac t i ca l p o l i t i c s for the 
adoninistration t o go ahead and ask 
Congress t o approve so large a loan t o 
Egypt.** 66 
The American Government pleaded t h a t the united Sta tes 
did not f ind any f e a s i b i l i t y in t h a t circunstances to engage 
in the Aswan p r o j e c t . The Administration further sa id t h a t 
the Nile r i p r i a n States did not accept the pro jec t and Egypt 
was unable t o spend the f inancia l resources as she had already 
exhausted i t s f inancial resoxirces owing t o the arms deal with 
t he Soviet Union. In July, 1956, American Government owing to 
67 the above-said reasons^ withdrew the Aswan Dam a id . I t was 
already presumed by the Egyptian pres ident Garoal Abdul Nasser 
t h a t the a id t o Egypt was being opposed in the Congress and 
the United States as a whole. Notwithstanding t h a t Nasser was 
^ ^ — — — — ^ — — — ^ — — — * — — — — • • _ _ ^ ^ ^ _ _ _ — _ ^ _ i i - ^ i a T — \ — [ — p — I — I - - - • -| i i i i I I I I II I 
66. Anthony Nutting, No End t o a ^egson. The Storv of Suez (London* C. Tingling and Co. L td . , 1967) , p . 44. 
67. Department of S<-ate pul^etin^ Vbl. XXXV, No. 892, July 30, 
1956, p . 188. 
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68 determined to go ahead with the construction of Aswan Dam, and 
made the h i s to r i ca l announcement on July 26, 19 56 t h a t : 
**The universal Suez Maritime Canal 
Company S.A.E. i s hereby na t iona l i sed . 
All fraids and r i gh t s and obl igat ions 
connected therewith are t ransfer red 
to the S t a t e . All bodies and committees 
a t present exis t ing for i t s administra-
t i o n are dissolved. ..**69~' 
The na t iona l i sa t ion of the Suez Canal Company took 
Bri ta in and France with sxxrprise. The Congress members and 
the diplomatic observers viewed i t as the alarming s i t u a t i o n , 
but they did not declare i t i l l e g a l . The 19 56, being the 
p re s iden t i a l e lec t ion year, Suez c r i s i s was the focal point 
and both the Democratic and Republican p a r t i e s knew the 
importance of the c ruc ia l 'Jewish Vote* and thus I s r a e l ' s 
70 fr iendship was favoured by the US Administration. The Br i t i sh 
68« Nasser thought tha t i f he wished t o proceed with 
construct ion: accept Soviet a id and the inev i tab le 
Soviet condi t ions, or find a way t o finance the dam 
with Egyptian funds. At the t ime, Egypt had two major 
sources of foreign currency earnings: cotton exports , 
and the small s t ipend provided by the la rge ly Bri t i sh 
and French owned Suez Canal Company as a t i p of the 
hat t o Egyptian sovereignty. Cotton earnings alone 
would not finance the p ro jec t , and were in any event 
p a r t i a l l y mortgaged to pay for Soviet arms. Nasser 's 
choice of na t iona l i sa t ion of the Suez Canal - the 
Aswan High Dam would be bu i l t with revenues from the 
passage way - through which was ca r r i ed the majority 
of Europe's fuel sv:pplies« 
Stephen Green, n. 47, p . 132« 
69. Iht^t 
70. Alfred M. L i l i e n t h a l , n. 52, pp. 181-182. 
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prime M i n i s t e r / Anthony Eden, was adamant t o vse force* a l though 
f u l l compensation t o the sha re and bond ho lde r s of the Suez 
Canal Company was a s su red by Masser and no s i n g l e a t t empt was 
made t o r e s t r i c t t h e v e s s e l s passage through the Suez Cana l . 
The B r i t i s h prime Min i s t e r expressed h i s view t h a t '*a man with 
N a s s e r ' s r eco rd could not be al lowed t o have h i s thxanb on our 
71 
win(%)ipe." 
The Egyptian P r e s i d e n t / Nasser/ had p layed a v i t a l 
r o l e t o weaken t h e B r i t i s h empire i n the Middle East as the 
B r i t i s h e r s had l o s t t h e i r g r i p i n Jordan and o ther Arab p r i n c i -
p a l i t i e s and a l s o in t h e African c o n t i n e n t . This had indeed 
provoked both the B r i t i s h Prime Min i s t e r / Anthony Eden, and t h e 
French premier* Guy Mol le t , t o wage a war a g a i n s t N a s s e r ' s 
72 
r eg ime . The French were fu r the r angered with the Egypt ians 
73 because of t h e i r s i p p o r t t o Alger ian Revolut ion i n 1954. 
Desp i te Eden 's con t en t i on t o use fo rce / the un i t ed State;s was 
opposed t o such r e s o r t / al though* on August 1* 19 56, i n London 
meeting* t h e US S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e * John Fos te r Dulles* had 
d e c l a r e d t h a t they should use such force as a l a s t r e s o r t . 
However* B r i t a i n and France i n d i r e c t l y sought backing of the 
u n i t e d S t a t e s and they hoped t h a t t he United S t a t e s would t a k e 
c a r e of t h e "Bear**. In t h e r e a l sense* he meeint t h a t America 
7 1 . Quoted in A . J . P . Taylor and Jim Roberts (Edited) * 20th 
Century (London? Pu rne l l Reference Books* 19 79)* p . 2259. 
7 2 . Nadav Safran* n, 3* p» 240. 
7 3 . A. J . P . Taylor and Jim Roberts* n . 71* p . 2254. 
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would impede Russia if i t came to Egypt's rescue. Prijne 
Minister Eden presumed tha t he succeeded in persuading the US 
74 
a u t h o r i t i e s t o come to the i r rescue in the event of a war. But 
t he re were three v i t a l reasons which led the US Administration 
t o deny the use of force t o s e t t l e the Suez c r i s i s . F i r s t l y , 
due t o the pres ident ia l e l ec t ion year America wanted to solve 
the Suez c r i s i s peacefully. Secondly* in no way the US 
i n t e r e s t s were jeopardised in the region as there was a con t i -
nuous flow of o i l t o i t s indus t r ies and Western nations were 
a l so equally provided the needed four per cent crude o i l by the 
Middle East . Las t ly , the united States was suspicio\is of age 
o ld European phenomena - the Eurcpean "colonialism*. Sherman 
Adams, one of president Eisenhower's c loses t advisers , 
indicated such reason in his statement tha ts 
"Oxir firm opposition to colonialism 
made as sympathetic to the s t ruggle 
which Egypt and other Arab Sta tes 
were making t o free themselves of 
the p o l i t i c a l and economic control 
tha t the Br i t i sh f e l t they had t o 
maintain in the Middle East in their, 
own self-interest.**75 
I t was on September 23, 19 56, t h a t Bri tain and France 
brought t h i s matter t o the Securi ty Council fo r the sett lement 
which ensvared the ef fec t ive control of the Canal by the 
74. Ibf^^ 
75• Quoted in Tarun Chandra Bose, The Styerpow^fs ^ / 3 t^he 
Middl,e East (Bombay: Asia publishing House, 19 72) , p . 35. 
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76 Egyptian author i ty through the six p r i n c i p l e s . This was, 
however, resented by the Br i t i sh and French leaders and both 
the countr ies decided t o use force. The planning of invasion 
had already been done and French Defense Ministry had sought 
the c l a r i f i c a t i o n of I s r a e l i Mil i tary Attache regarding the 
willingness of indulging with the Jo in t Anglo-French mi l i t a ry 
77 ac t ion . By mid-August Br i t i sh and French Defense Minis t r ies 
fu l ly prepared the "operation Musketeer" Plan, which aimed a t 
the seizure and holding of the Suez Canal Zone. After the 
contact of the French Defense Ministry with I s r a e l i Defense 
Forces (IDP) on September 1, 19 56, regarding the pa r t i c ipa t ion 
in the "operation Musketeer", a de ta i led discussion was held 
between the host French General Staff from September 29 to 
October 1, in Sevjres, near Par is t o sor t out the mode of "Operation 
Mxisketeer". After returning from Sevres, Moshe Dayan, the 
76, The s ix p r inc ip les weret 
(a) Passage and shipping through the canal should be free 
and open, subject t o no p o l i t i c a l or technical d i s c r i -
mination; 
(b) Egypt 's sovereignty should be respected; 
(c) The operation of the canal should be insula ted from 
the p o l i t i c s of a l l count r ies ; 
(d) Egypt and the users were t o fix t o l l s and charges by 
agreement; 
(e) A fa i r proportion of the dues was t o be se t aside for 
canal development; 
(f) Disputes between the old Suez Canal Company and Egypt 
should be s e t t l e d by negotiat ions or a r b i t r a t i o n , 
Asian Recorder (New Delhi) , Vol, I , No. 95, October 20-26, 
1956, pp. 1088-1089. 
77, Stephen Green, n, 47, p . 135. 
27 
IDF Chief of Staff* informed the General Staff of IDF in a 
meeting tha t I s r ae l would join the Anglo-French mi l i t a ry act ion 
78 
against the Arabs. John Foster Dulles f e l t t ha t Bri tain and 
France were determined t o wage a war with Egypt. Further , the 
Department of Sta te was also apprised by the Central I n t e l l i -
gence Agency (CIA) tha t I s r ae l and France had concluded an 
79 agreement for the s\^ply of French arms to I s r a e l . During the 
l a s t week of October* the Mil i tary In te l l igence informed the 
80 US Government tha t I s r a e l i troops had s t a r t e d mobi l i sa t ion . I t 
was on October 25, 19 56, the same day v*ien I s r a e l i forces mobi l i -
sed Abba Eban^ the I s r a e l i Ambassador t o the l ^ i t ed S t a t e s , 
while speaking before the united Nations Security Council 
proclaimedx 
•*The Government of I s r ae l wil l f a i t h fu l ly 
observe the cease- f i re so long as the 
cease- f i re i s observed by the other s i de . 
I t wi l l i n i t i a t e no violence."81 
Abba Eban while o f f i c i a l l y v i s i t e d Dxilles in h is office 
on Sunday, the 28th of October, 1956, and informed t h a t the report 
gathered by the I s r a e l i In te l l igence showed an Egyptian intent ion 
78. I b i d . , p . 136. 
79. Lei la S. Kadi, n. 60, p , 92. 
80. E.B. Chi lders , The iy)a<^  t o jSuez (London; MacGibbon L. Kee, 
1962) , p . 246. 
81 . Thg yjfiw Y9yk Tipies (New York), October 26, 1956. 
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to a t t ack I s r a e l . But Dulles was aware of the I s r a e l i in tent ion 
and t o l d Abba Eban tha t the Eisenhower Administration would t r y 
to prevent the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s i r respec t ive of the Jewish 
82 influence on the p res iden t ia l e l e c t i on . Though the Pentagon did 
not get any information of Anglo-French-Israeli secre t ta lks 
for a jo int a t t ack a t the f i r s t moment/ yet i t apprised the 
occurrence of a war consequence in the Middle East . In f ac t , 
the Pentagon's Joint In te l l igence Gro^p (JIG) informed the off ice 
of the secre tary of Defense t ha t " in the short term" there might 
be a br ief war " i n i t i a t e d by I s r ae l against Egypt to overthrow 
Nasser ' s Government, to cri^sple his army, and to gain t e r r i t o r i a l 
objectives.•* I t was also informed tha t I s r ae l might mobilise i t s 
83 forces before November, 1956. On October 29, 1956, Sinai was 
invaded by the I s r a e l i troops and i t proceeded rapidly both to 
84 S t r a i t s of Tiran and the Suez Canal. This was followed by the 
Jo in t Anglo-French ultimatun on October 30, 1956, given both to 
Egypt and I s r a e l . This ultimatum ca l l ed for the cessat ion of 
m i l i t a r y act ion by both I s rae l and Egypt and withdrawal of t h e i r 
forces t o a distance of ten miles from the Canal* Egyptian 
Government was also asked t o accept the temporary Anglo-French 
forces ' deployment on the key pos i t ion at Port Said, Ismail la 
and Suez so that the free passage of ships of a l l countr ies 
through the Canal oould be ensured. This ultimatun was to be 
•>»iiwi ^m'^m^ 
82. E.B. Childres , n. 80, p . 246. 
83. Stephen Green, n. 47, p . 134. 
84. yi>p New York Tipie^ (New York), October 30, 19 56. 
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responded within twelve hotars by the two governments. If they 
f a i l ed t o accept the ultimatun, the Anglo-French troops would 
intervene *'in whatever s t rength may be necessary t o secure 
coitpliance." As i t was already planned/ the I s r a e l i troops 
remained ten miles away from the Canal as a follower of the 
ultimatxjn whereas the Egyptian Government refused to accept the 
ultimatum which gave the Anglo-French a i r c r a f t s the opportunity 
t o operate frcm Malta and Cyprus and bombarded the Egyptian 
a i r f i e l d s in the Delta and in the Canal Zone r e su l t i ng in sinking 
of an Egyptian f r iga te in the Gulf of Suez. In order to mater ia-
l i s e a complete Egyptian blockade of the Cainal* president Nasser 
86 
ordered the sinking of 4 7 ships f i l l e d with concrete . 
on the 30th of October, 1956, when Anglo-French ultimatum 
was given t o Egypt and I s r a e l , a reso lu t ion was sponsored by the 
united States in the Securi ty Council urging I s rae l t o cease - f i r e 
87 
and withdraw her forces immediately behind the armist ice l i n o s , in 
an address to the nation through Radio and Television on 
October 31 , 1956, President Dwight D, Eisenhower regarded the 
85. D.C. Watt (Edited) , Docvinents on the Suez C r i s i s . 26 Jiilv 
to 6 Nnvember. 1956 (London: Royal I n s t i t u t e of In te rna-
t i ona l Affa i rs , 1957), p . 25. 
86. Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine (Edited) , n. 6, p . 371. 
87. American..Foreign Policy, Current Pocqnents; 19 56 (Washington D . C : Department of S ta te Publ icat ion, 1959), 
p . 647. 
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invading actions as incompatible with the p r inc ip les and 
88 purposes of the Iftiited Nations* I t was on November 4, 1956, 
t h a t Canada sponsored a resolu t ion in the General Assembly, 
emphasising tha t Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold/ would chalk 
out a plan to s e t cp an emergency in te rna t iona l united Nations 
force/ t o secure and sv;pervise the cessat ion of h o s t i l i t i e s , 
abiding the November 2, 1956 resolu t ion terms, sponsored by the 
89 
united S t a t e s . The next night Hammarskjold proposed the 
establishment of a united Nations Force under General E.L.M* 
Bums, who was already as the Chief of Staff of the United 
88, The president added t h a t j " . . . beyond t h i s , we are forced 
t o doubt even i f r e so r t to war will for long serve the 
permanent i n t e r e s t s of the a t tacking nations . . . There can 
be no peace-without law. And there can be no law - if we 
were t o invoke once code of in te rna t iona l conduct for 
those who oppose us and another for our f r iends ," 
C!SP'gff3?r'^ P]&.,pf g.tS.1^ g. PMlAe^^Ar Vbl. xxxv. No. 907, 
November 12, 1956, pp . 743'-745. 
89. Sami Musallaro (Compiled and Class i f i ed ) , yni te^ ^^tjlons 
R?gPJ-.\&>gitf gaFftAgsUng/ l.?.47.-X?72. (Beirut: i n s t i t u t e for 
Pales t ine Studies , 1972) , p . 32. 
The resolut ion had urged tha t (a) a l l p a r t i e s in h o s t i l i t i e s 
in the area should agree to an immediate cease - f i r e , (b) the 
p a r t i e s to the armist ice agreements promptly to withdraw a l l 
forces behind the armist ice l i n e , (c) a l l member s t a t e s 
should abstain from any act tha t might delay or prevent the 
Implementation of the r e so lu t ion , (d) \:pon the cease - f i r e 
of being e f fec t ive , steps should be taken t o reopen the 
Suez Canal, (e) requested the Secretary-General t o observe 
the report compliance promptly to the Secur i ty Council and 
t o the General Assembly. 
Surendra Bhuttani, The United Nations and the A^a^-Israel i 
Cop|f],ict (Gurgaons Academic Press , 1977) , p . 50 
31 
90 Nations Truce Svpervlsion Organisation in Pa le s t ine . On 
November 5, 1956, when the voting was being ca r r i ed out in the 
General Assembly, the same day Anglo-French paratroops were 
landing a t the north end of the Sxjez Canal, thoiigh f ight ing was 
ceased by both Egypt and I s r a e l . Meanwhile, premier Ni to la i 
Bulganin of the Soviet union sent a s trongly worded message t o 
the a r i t i s h prime Minister Eden, Guy Mollet, the French premier 
and David Ben Gurion of I s r a e l . In his message, Bulganin 
expressed Russian determination to r e so r t to force in order t o 
91 crush the aggressors and res to re peace in the East . 
In the meantime, the United Sta tes Government refused t o 
provide the further f inancial ass is tance to both Britain and 
Prance and also prevented the st^sply of o i l i n order t o p ressu-
92 
r i s e the Anglo-French forces . On November 6, 1956, Britain and 
Prance accepted the cease- f i re and the UN force svpervision in 
93 
t h e war t o r n . I t was a common bel ief t ha t Anglo-Prench h o s t i -
l i t i e s was ceased due to the s incere endeavours of president 
Eisenhower, some scholars , however, a l so gave c red i t to Soviet 
Prenler Bulganin*s warning, which worked as a deterrence to war 
90. surendra Bhutani. The Unitec^ Nations and the Arab-Is rae l i 
Copf 1 i c t (Gurgaoij Academic p r e s s , 19 77) , p . 50. 
9 1 . Lei la S. Kadi, n . 60, p . lOO. 
92. Arthur M. Schlesinger, J r . and John M. Blum (Edited) , The 
Wfit^ OT^ flJl g?^gyJT^BCgf A Histoyv of t ^ united Sta tes (New York: 
Harcovurt Brace & World, I n c . , 1963) , p . 770. 
9 3 . Nadav Safran, n. 3 , p . 243. 
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94 h y s t e r i a In the r e g i o n . 
Engl i sh prime M i n i s t e r Anthony Eden 's f a l l i n g heal th# 
domestic economic cond i t ions* and p o l i t i c a l p r e s s u r e s a l so paved 
95 t h e way for t h e c e s s a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s * 
The S t a t e Department o f f i c i a l s i n d i r e c t l y p leaded fo r a 
s a n c t i o n on I s r a e l through s topping t h e American aid* Three 
days e a r l i e r , on November 5, premier Bulganin had a l s o s e n t a 
l e t t e r t o Ben Gurion accxising the I s r a e l i Government of " c r i m i -
n a l l y and i r r e s p o n s i b l y t o y i n g with the f a t e of t h e world and 
i t s ovvn people** and of " i n c u l c a t i n g such ha t r ed a s b r ing i n t o 
96 
q u e s t i o n the a c t u a l e x i s t e n c e of I s r a e l as a S t a t e . " The Ameri-
can p r e s s tare and t h e Sovie t t h r e a t l e d Prime M i n i s t e r Ben Gurion 
of I s r a e l t o announce I s r a e l ' s r e a d i n e s s t o withdraw from Egyptian 
97 t e r r i t o r y . The withdrawal of B r i t i s h and French forces was 
co t ip le ted on December 23 , 1956, which was s i ^ e r v i s e d by the 
98 Uhited Nat ions Emergency Force (UNEF) , 
9 4 . Thomas A* Bryson, American Diplomatic Re la t ions wi th t h e 
MiddjLe E a s t . 17.8^,-IS7^» A Survey (New J e r s e y J The Scare 
p r e s s , i n c . , 1977), p . 202* 
9 5 . ifeijJa. 
9 6 . Quoted in Winston Burde t t , Encounter with the Middle Eas t t 
An i n t i m a t e Report on What. L ies Behind t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i 
C o n f l i c t (LondonJ Andre Deutsch, 19 70) , p . lOO. 
9 7 . K^PSina'H Contemporary Archives (London), Vbl. X, 1955-1956, 
p . 15208. 
9 8 . William R. Polk , yhe Uhited S t a t e s and t h e Arab World 
(Cambridge! Harvard Uhive r s i ty p r e s s , 19755 , p . 3'8i. 
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However* I s r a e l i s did not m a t e r i a l i s e the d e c l a r a t i o n of 
withdrawal of i t s t roops from Egypt. On November 5, 1956, 
D u l l e s , t h e US S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , i n a p r e s s Conference dec l a red 
t h a t t he United S t a t e s would s e r i o u s l y cons ide r t h e economic 
s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t I s r a e l provided General Assembly would so 
99 d e s i r e . But t h i s move was c r i t i c i s e d by seme s e n a t o r s . In a 
meet ing on February 2o, 19 57, p r e s i d e n t Eisenhower, while 
e x p l a i n i n g the r easons for t h e American p r e s s u r e on I s r a e l for 
t h e acceptance of UN r e s o l u t i o n f o r an uncondi t iona l withdrawal 
of troops^ p o i n t e d out t h a t i f the Export Import (EXIM) Bank d id 
not si;^pport I s r a e l i t would soon face t h e f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s . 
I t should avoid such an e v e n t , p r e s i d e n t Eisenhower cau t ioned 
t h e Congressmen of the Arabs p o s s i b l e i n c l i n a t i o n towards t h e 
190 
Sov i e t s as a r e s u l t of I s r a e l ' s non-compliance t o the LN ordeif. 
He admi t t ed t h a t he was aware of t h e Congressmen oppos i t ion to 
t h e s a n c t i o n s a g a i n s t I s r a e l but he d id not f ind any way t o 
p r o t e c t American i n t e r e s t s . He s t a t e d t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s of 
world peace o r g a n i s a t i o n would be j eopa rd i sed in ca se US f a i l 
101 
t o svppor t i t s r e s o l u t i o n s on I s r a e l . 
I t was on May 1, 1957, IN r e s o l u t i o n of economic s a n c t i o n s 
on I s r a e l was moved in the General Assembly. But immediately t h e 
9 9 . y^ggg^pq'fl ^9n%£S^J?S^^SY Ar.^U^.Y^P, (London), Vol. XI, 
1957-1958, p . 15442. 
100 . L e i l a S. Kadi* n . 60, p . 105. 
101. Ibi^. 
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I s r a e l i a u t h o r i t i e s announced t h e withdrawal of forces from 
Egypt before the r e s o l u t i o n was approved in the General 
102 
Assembly. In f a c t , i t was p r i n c i p a l l y t h e Americans e f f o r t s 
and t h e i r firm s t a n d a g a i n s t B r i t a i n , France and I s r a e l which 
103 
r e s u l t e d in end of war c r i s i s in the Suez. The United S t a t e s 
wanted t o avoid t h e wor ld ' s opiriion of i t s being connived wi th t h e 
t h r e e powers and she was an tagon i sed wi th the A l l i e s s e c r e t 
p l an which was not r e v e a l e d t o her and even the American warnings 
104 
were ignored by the I s r a e l i s . These events e v e n t u a l l y paved 
105 
t h e way for American i n c l i n a t i o n towards Arabs. 
Eisenhower Doct r ine 
I t was a f t e r the two months long span of hear ings t h a t 
t h e US Congress u l t i m a t e l y adopted a j o i n t r e s o l u t i o n on 
March 9/ 1957, b e t t e r known as Eisenhower Doct r ine which emphasised 
t o c o n t a i n the Sovie t i n f l uence in the e n t i r e Middle East and t o 
106 
e s t a b l i s h the US sv:5)remacy in the r e g i o n . The Eisenhower Doct r ine 
was framed t o "promote peace and s t a b i l i t y i n t h e Middle East " . 
and t h e P r e s i d e n t was fuirther confe r red on wi th t h e a u t h o r i t y by 
102. I b i d . , p . 110 
103 . Alf red L. Atheirton, J r . , "The Sov ie t Role in the Middle 
E a s t : An American view". The Middle Bast J o u r n a l , Vbl .39, 
No. 4 , Autumn 1985, p . 690. 
104. Nadav Safran, n. 3, p. 243, 
105. Ibid« 
106 . Tarun Chandra Bose, n . 75, p p , 46-4 7. 
35 
t h e Congress t o " co -ope ra t e with and a s s i s t any n a t i o n or grott> 
of n a t i o n s i n the genera l a r e a of the Middle East d e s i r i n g soch 
a s s i s t a n c e i n the development of economic s t r e n g t h ded ica ted t o 
t h e maintenance of n a t i o n a l independence, undertake m i l i t a r y 
a s s i s t a n c e programs with such na t ions* and use of some $200 
m i l l i o n for implementing t h e p rov i s ions of the Mutual S e c u r i t y 
107 
Act of 19 54.'* 
The m i t e d S t a t e s regarded the d o c t r i n e as v i t a l t o the 
n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t and world peace , t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of indepen-
108 
dence and i n t e g r i t y of the n a t i o n s of t h e Middle E a s t . I t was 
p r o v i d e d t h a t i f t h e p r e s i d e n t so determined, the United S t a t e s 
was p repa red t o use i t s armed forces t o a s s i s t any n a t i o n or 
group of n a t i o n s R e q u e s t i n g a s s i s t a n c e a g a i n s t armed aggress ion 
from any co\jntry c o n t r o l l e d by i n t e r n a t i o n a l Communism, consonant 
109 
w i th i t s t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s and wi th the US c o n s t i t u t i o n . " 
This d o c t r i n e , however, r e c e i v e d a poor response abroad, 
and a t t h e same time d iv ided t h e Arab world i n t o two camps« 
Though, t h e B r i t i s h Government d id not fo resee any . danger 
of Sov i e t armed a t t a c k , i t mainly foresaw t h e t h r e a t of Middle 
Eas t arms r a c e due t o the Eisenhower Doctr ine and i t s i n t e n t i o n s 
t o d r i v e undue advantages of power vacuvro and p r o t e c t i n g i t s o i l 
107. Departrpent of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , Vbl. XXXVI, No. 926, 
March 25, 1957, p , 4 8 1 , 
1 0 8 . I b i d . 
109 . i M d x 
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I n t e r e s t s in the region were fur ther in tens i f i ed in the 
110 
name of doctr ine . 
When the US Ambassador, p . Richards was sent t o the Middle 
East t o seciire adherence t o the doctr ine , a l l the Arab countr ies 
111 
except Lebanon, Greece^ Turkey and I ran , exposed the pol icy . The 
Eisenhower Dectrine was f i r s t applied in Jordan in Apr i l , 19 57, 
when Jordanian monarchy was jo l t ed by an attempt a t a coi^ staged 
by the pro-Nasser fact ion in the army and sv;pported by a c i v i l i a n 
c o a l i t i o n comprising the Baathists and the Communists. Washington 
reacted by sending the US Sixth-Fleet to eas te rn Mediterranean 
waters and Dulles declared "the independence and i n t e g r i t y of 
112 
Jordan as v i t a l " t o i t s nat ional i n t e r e s t s . Fortunately, King 
Hussein Ibn Tala l of Jordan was able t o defeat h is enemies and 
r e t a i n control over his Kingdom by dissolving the parliament and 
p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , a r res t ing the dismissed Prime Minis ter , 
Suleiman Nebulsi, and imposing mart ia l law. This was followed 
by the united States announcement of an emergency grant of $10 
113 
mi l l ion t o the Jordanian Government. 
During the sunmer of 1957, pro-Nasser and pro-Soviet 
groups in the army control led the Syrian Government followed by 
110. Tarun Chandra Bose, n . 75, p . 47. 
111. Harry N. Howard* n . 63, p . 126, 
112. George Lenczowski, n . 28, p . 798. 
113. John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East : problems of 
American Policy (New York* Frederick A. Praeger, 1960) , p . l30 . 
And also see for fur ther de t a i l s Th^ New York Times 
(New York), April 30, 1957. 
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considerable Soviet mi l i t a ry and econoroic aid t o Syria . In 
view of t h i s new development, the United States speculated 
t h a t the Soviet union might s t imulate Syria against Turkey and 
warned the Soviet union to des i s t herself from intervent ion i n 
the Middle East and r e i t e r a t e d i t s stand t o defend Turkey. 
For tunate ly , the th rea t of war soon disappeared and Egypt and 
Syria formally joined together and fotmed the United Arab 
Republic (UAR) which was hai led as a prelude t o Arab uni ty . 
This was a great blow to the US influence in the region and 
soon the au thor i t i e s in the White House r ea l i s ed tha t the pro~ 
Nasser grov^js and Egyptian Agents were creat ing hindrances f cr 
114 
the US pol icy in the Middle East . 
In May, 19 58, an armed rebe l l ion broke out in Lebanon 
following president Camille Chamoun's pro-4*festern po l i c i e s and 
his st^jport to Eisenhower Doctrine, president Chamoun al leged 
t h a t the foreign agents were responsible for the revol t and he 
sought the united States ass is tance to overcome the c r i s i s in 
Lebanon. Once again, the US Sixth Fleet was sent t o Mediterranean 
and Lebanon was provided with US mi l i t a ry aid t o sij^jpress the 
r e v o l t . Lebanon and Jordan became more apprehensive when the 
I r aq i Government was overthrown on Ju ly 14, 19 58, by the p r o -
Nasser fact ion under the leadership of General Abdul Karim Qasim 
115 
and they Immediately sought the US help . 
114. Tarun Chandra Bose, n. 75, p . 51. 
115. M.L. Gujral, U.S. Global Involvement s A Study of 
;ynerican Expansionism (New Delhi; Arnold-Heinemann,1975) , 
p . 349. 
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In fact» on July 15, 1958, 14,000 marines were ordered 
to put ashore in Lebanon by president Eisenhower ignnoring a l l 
t h e Congressmen's contention of the inapp l i cab i l i t y of Eisenhower 
Doctrine and the opposition from Pentagon, On July 17, t h e 
Br i t i sh paratroops and the American land forces were sent t o 
Jordan and t h i s act of the united States and Br i ta in was con-
demned by the Soviet Union as an ** aggress ion" and t h e i r 
withdrawal was demanded. In October, 1958, the US forces 
were withdrawn from Lebanon followed by the Bri t ish withdrawal 
of i t s forces from Jordan a month l a t e r . This intervent ion was 
brought d i sc red i t to the US po l i c i e s and adversely affected i t s 
goodwill earned in the Middle East during the Suez c r i s i s . 
This , of coturse, paved the way for Russian entry in the 
region and a t the same time they f e l t t h a t some of the Arab 
countr ies were i n t e r e s t ed in sharing the Soviet technology 
117 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , in the mi l i t a ry a f f a i r s . 
Assupnption of the office of the presidency in 19 61 by 
John F. Kennedy brought considerable changes both in thinking 
and pol icy posture which, howerver, inc l ined favourably t o those 
progressive s t a t e s l i k e Egypt, Syria, I raq e t c . as these s t a t e s 
had a decisive ro le in the Middle East p o l i c i e s , apart from 
116. i&ifiU.* PP* 349-350. 
117. Robert E. Hunter, "The Dilemma in the Middle East , Part IJ 
problems of Commitment", A<^lphi papers . No. 59, 
September, 1969, p . 7. * 
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t h e i r broader approach in the in te rna t iona l a f f a i r s . Soon t h i s 
po l icy was encountered with a nunber of problems l i ke the c i v i l 
war in Yemen and followed by massive intervent ion by the 
Egyptian forces with the sc^jply of mi l i t a ry aid e t c . Though the 
uni ted States intended t o c u l t i v a t e good r e l a t ions with Egypt 
yet the US Adninistrat ion could not ignore Nasser 's aggressive 
post lore towards Saudi Arabia which had fr iendly r e l a t i ons with 
the Americans, The new pol icy i n i t i a t i v e s spel t out by the 
Kennedy Adninis t rat ion for the Arabs remained far from implemen-
t a t i o n because of the untimely death of President i n November, 
118 
1963. 
US and the War of 1967 
A r e l a t i v e peace was apparently witnessed between the 
Arabs and I s r a e l i s for almost a decade af ter the Suez c r i s i s . 
119 
But i n t e r n a l l y the massive war preparat ions were on both s ide s . 
pres ident Lyndon B. Johnson Adininistration did not formulate any 
new po l i c i e s for the Arabs but perpetuated the previoi;js foreign 
po l i cy programmes of Kennedy Adninis t rat ion ensuring economic 
and m i l i t a r y supplies regular ly t o I s rae l and to keep working 
r e l a t i o n s with revolutionary s t a t e s l ike Egypt, I raq and Syria. 
The fr iendly r e l a t ions with Saudi Arabia and Sultanate of Oman 
118. George Lenczowski, n . 28, p . 803. 
119. The Arabs, p a r t i c u l a r l y the UAR, had received considerable 
amount of economic and mi l i t a ry aid from the Soviet Union 
which had grea t ly undermined US influence in the Arab 
count r ies . The I s r a e l i s had, on the other hand, received 
a much larger amount of a id and mi l i t a ry equipment from the 
United S t a t e s . 
M.L. Gujral, n . 115, p . 351. 
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120 
also continued undisturbed. 
Due to the past conflicts the problem of displaced 
Palestinian Arabs became intractable and this led to the emer-
gence of a number of militant movements like Al-Fatah and 
Palestine Liberation Army apart from the Palestine Liberation 
Organisation (PLO) to counter the Israeli aggression in the 
121 
region. Both the Palestinians and Israelis involved in attack-
ing each other and the Palestinians faced a nimber of 
casualties/ particularly of those residing in the Arab terri-
122 
tories. The border incidents and clashes frequently occurred 
123 
between the Arabs ana Israelis. 
120. George Lenczowski, n. 28# pp. 803-804. 
121. In early sixties, the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) was established with the active support of Egypt. 
It was headed by Ahmad Shukairy, a barrister from 
Cambridge, who was a Palestinian refugee himself. 
Simultaneously, a front organisation named the Palestine 
Liberation Army (PLA) was forrned to free the Holyland 
frao the "Zionist occupation". About the same time, 
Al-Fatah, another liberation movement, came into lime-
light. This organisation was founded in late sixtees 
by Yasser Arafat, an Arab refugee, with the aim of 
liberating Palestine from the Jewish usurpers. 
Arab refugees were recruited to the PLA and 
Al-Fatah, and they carried guerrilla raids inside 
Israel. 
A.G. Naidu, n. 32, p. 20. 
122. Ifei^ 
1 2 3 . Jfr;L<^ t 
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I t was i n May, 1967, t h a t Soviet Union informed Syr i a of 
heavy deployment of I s r a e l i f Qrces a t i t s border and Syr i a commu-
n i c a t e d t h i s informat ion t o Egypt. I n i t i a l l y , p r e s i d e n t Nasser 
thought t h a t t h e massing of t h e I s r a e l i t r o o p s was s i n g l y a 
d e t e r r a n c e t o t h e fedayeen ( P a l e s t i n i a n g u e r r i l l a s ) ^ ^ d e r r a i d s . 
But he l a t e r b e l i e v e d the Syr ians about the p o s s i b l e I s r a e l i 
a t t a c k on t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . As Nasser got t h e message fron 
Colonel Anwar a l - S a d a t who headed a par l i an ien ta ry d e l e g a t i o n t o 
North Korea v i a Moscow from A p r i l 27 t o May, 1967, and was t o l d 
124 
by podgorny about t h e I s r a e l i p l an t o a t t a c k on S y r i a . 
This was marked by t h e proc lamat ion of S t a t e of emergency 
in Egypt and the m o b i l i s a t i o n of Egyptian f c rces i n t o S i n a i 
fol lowed by p r e s i d e n t N a s s e r ' s r e q u e s t on May 18, to the UN 
Sec re t a ry -Gene ra l U Thant t o withdraw t h e un i t ed Nations Emergency 
125 
Force (UNEF) which was duly complied. On May 22, 1967, p r e s i d e n t 
Nasse r , whi le announcing t h e closxare of the Gulf of Aqaba t o 
I s r a e l i s h i p p i n g , s t a t e d : 
" . . . under no c i rcumstances can we permi t t h e 
I s r a e l i f l ag t o pass through the Gulf of Aqaba. 
The Jews t h r e a t e n war. We say they a r e welcome 
t o war, . . . bu t under no c i rcumstances s h a l l we 
abandon any of our r i g h t s . These a r e our waters 
. . . " 1 2 6 
124. Aftab Karoal Pasha# Egypt ' s R e l a t i o n s with Soviet Uhiont 
The Nasser and ^adat Pe r iod (Al iga rh : Centre for West 
Asian S t u d i e s , Al igarh Muslim Unive r s i ty , 1986) , p . 38 . 
125. J ^ i ^ , p . 39 . 
126. Faud A. Jaber (Edited) , I in ternat ional Docunents on 
pa3.eptjLpe, Jg<^7 (Be i ru t j The I n s t i t u t e for P a l e s t i n e 
S t u d i e s , 19 70) , p p . 538 and 540, 
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React ing t o the blockade of t h e Gulf of Aqaba, on May 23, 
1967/ prime Min i s t e r Levi Eshkol of I s r a e l s t a t e d in the Knesset 
t h a t : 
"An i n t e r f e r e n c e with and in the S t r a i t s 
(of Tiran) c o n s t i t u t e s a g ross v i o l a t i o n 
of i n t e r n a t i o n a l law, a blow a t t he sove-
r e i g n r i g h t s of o t h e r n a t i o n s and an a c t • 
of agg res s ion a g a i n s t I s r a e l " . 127 
On t h e same day, i n a b roadcas t t o the n a t i o n the US 
p r e s i d e n t Lyndon B. Johnson regarded i t as t h e "grave demonst ra t ions 
t o the c r i s i s " . He dec la red t h a t t h e United S t a t e s cons ide red 
t h e Gulf as an " i n t e r n a t i o n a l waterway" and f e l t t h e blockade 
of I s r a e l i sh ipp ing " i l l e g a l and p o t e n t i a l l y d i s a s t r o u s t o the 
cause of p e a c e . " He fu r the r committed t o the " p o l i t i c a l indepen-
dence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y " of a l l the na t ions i n the 
r eg ion and pledged t h a t he would support the UN e f f o r t s t o 
128 d i f fu se t h e t e n s i o n in the a r e a . The Soviet Union f e l t t h e 
g r a v i t y of t h e s i t u a t i o n and a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t i t might r e s u l t 
i n t o d i r e c t c o n f l i c t . Nasser was adv ised to avoid o v e r - r e a c t i o n 
and keep r e s t r a i n t . But he was annoyed with t h e Sovie t sugges -
t i o n as t h e Sovie t Union h e r s e l f gave informat ion about the 
129 
massing of I s r a e l i t roops on t h e Syrian and Egyptian b o r d e r s . 
However, on May 3o# 1967, in a s p e c t a c u l a r move a J o i n t 
Defense Agreement was s igned between p r e s i d e n t Nasser of UAR and 
127. The New York Times (New York) , May 24, 1967. 
128. Department of s^^^te B u l l e t i n , \t>l. LVI, No. 1459. 
June 12, 1967, p p . 870-871, 
129. Aftab Kamal Pasha, n . 124, p . 3 9 . 
43 
130 
King Hxissein of Jordan. On June A, 1967, I raq a lso joined the 
131 
Defence pact o r i g i n a l l y signed between the UAR and Jordan. 
These developments paved the way for a d i rec t conf l ic t between 
the Arabs and I s r a e l i s . I t was on June 5 , 1967, t h a t I s r a e l 
launched a major a t tack on Egypt, Syria and Jordan leading t o 
132 
the destruction of a i r forces of these count r ies . I t took 
Nasser and other Arab leaders by su rp r i se , pres ident Nasser 
requested the Soviet union to intervene but due to the fear of 
superpower confrontation in the con f l i c t , the Soviet Union 
went only t o the extent of condemning the I s r a e l i Government 
and demanding the I s r a e l i withdrawal and cessat ion of conf l ic t . 
This was followed by the Soviet and American e f fo r t s in UN to 
133 
pass a resolut ion for the cease - f i r e . The war was stopped with 
the conclusion of cease- f i re agreement on June 10, 19 67. But 
I s r ae l occupied Sinai peninsula of Egypt, West Bank of Jordan and 
Golan Heights of Syria after defeating the t h r ee countries in 
134 
the six-day war. The war no doubt, gave a j o l t and shock to 
the Arabs in general and Nasser in p a r t i c u l a r . Mohamed Heikal 
pointed out t ha t three fundamental facts had contributed to the 
swift and massive I s r a e l i v i c to r i e s - F i r s t l y , the Arabs were 
facing an enemy in rece ip t of massive a id . Secondly, I s rae l 
130. Al-Ahrapi (Cairo) , May 31, 1967. 
131. l ^ i d i ' Juno 5, 1967. 
132. Kfiesinq,',.s.-Pft,i7,tgTipQyacy l^.<i\iX:£Si& (London), Vol. XVI, 
1967-1968, p . 22108. 
133. Aftab Kamal Pasha, n. 124, pp. 41-42. 
134. Ib id . , p . 43. 
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had u t i l i s e d t h e r e sou rce s she received* with excep t iona l s k i l l . 
Thi rd ly* in t a c k l i n g I s r a e l with the r e sources - which were not 
136 
i n c o n s i d e r a b l e , t h e Arabs ac t ed wi th excep t iona l i n a p t i t u d e . 
No doubt/ t h e Arabs were q u i t e unhappy wi th the Russians 
for t h e i r i n a b i l i t y t o render m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e during war. 
Yet t h e Arab dependence on the Soviet union was i nc r ea sed as 
p r e s i d e n t Nasser had exp res sed f a i t h in the Sovie t a u t h o r i t i e s 
t o r e c e i v e m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e and t o st imvilate h i s own s o c i a -
l i s t p o l i c i e s a t t he home f r o n t . On the o ther hand* the Uhited 
S t a t e s e q u a l l y extended t h e massive m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o 
136 
I s r a e l . 
The Arab Sunmit which was commenced on August 29 # 1967/ 
in Khartouu/ Sudan* approved unanimoxisly t h a t I s r a e l i s should 
137 
withdraw t o the e x i s t i n g l i n e before June 5* 1967. On June 19, 
1967/ address ing a t the Department of S t a t e Foreign Pol icy 
Conference for Educa to r s , p r e s i d e n t Johnson gave the f ive g r e a t 
p r i n c i p l e s for peace se t t l emen t in the Middle E a s t . The f i r s t 
p r i n c i p l e was t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e r i g h t of n a t i o n a l l i f e ; 
second/ j u s t i c e for a l l t h e r e fugees ; t h i r d / opening of innocent 
mar i t ime passage t o a l l n a t i o n s ; fou r th / l i m i t s on the wasteful 
135« Quoted in A.G. NaidU/ n . 32 , p^. 40 , 
136. U.S. Foreign p o l i c v : Future Di rec t ions (Washington D.C. : 
Congress ional Qua r t e r ly I n c . * 1979)/ p» ICo. 
137. Fuad A. J abe r (Edited) / n . 126* pp . 655-656. 
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and d e s t r u c t i v e arms r a c e and f i f t h , p o l i t i c a l independence 
138 
and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y fcr a l l . 
The grave concern was expressed about the Middle East in 
t h e Sumtnit meeting which was he ld between P re s iden t Johnson and 
Sov ie t premier Alex ie Kbsygin on June 23, 1967, a t Glassboro , 
New J e r s e y , and approved t h a t both t h e powers would coopera te 
t o ensure peace in t h e r e g i o n . This# however, gave a new impetus 
t o t h e p o l i c y p e r c e p t i o n of both the powers i n the r eg ion 
because of t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s and t h i s g r a d u a l l y l a i d founda-
139 
t i o n for rapprochement. 
I t was on November 22, 1967, t h a t the UJiited Kingdom 
sponsored S e c u r i t y Council Reso lu t ion 242, for peacefu l 
s o l u t i o n of t h e Middle East c o n f l i c t which was unanimously 
140 
approved. In f a c t , t h i s o u t l i n e d the p r i n c i p l e s and measures 
given by p r e s i d e n t Johnson on Jxoie 19 and a l s o dur ing the t a l k s 
141 
wi th Premier Kosygin on June 23, 1967, a t Glassbore Sunmit. 
138. American Foreign Pn l l cv ; Current Docunents, .1?6J 
(Washington D.C.s Department of S t a t e P u b l i c a t i o n , 
1969) , p p . 532 and 534, 
139 . . P R p ^ ^ g n t of S^ate B i l l e t i n . Vol. L V I T , NO. 1463, 
J u l y 10, 1967, p p . 37-38 . 
140. Puad A. J abe r ( E d i t e d ) , n . 126, p . 268. 
1 4 1 . M.L. Gu j r a l , n . 115. p . 359. 
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The r e s o l u t i o n 24 2 urged : 
" I WithcJrawal of I s r a e l i armed forces from 
t e r r i t o r i e s occv:^ied i n the r ecen t con-
f l i c t , 
I I Terminat ion of a l l c la ims or s t a t e s of 
b e l l i g e r e n c y and r e s p e c t f cr and acknow-
ledgement of t he s o v e r e i g n t y , t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l independence of 
every s t a t e i n the a r ea and t h e i r r i g h t 
t o l i v e in peace wi th in secured and r e c o g -
n i s e d boundar ies f ree from t h r e a t s or a c t s 
of f o r c e . " 142 
After the passage of r e s o l u t i o n 242, the UN S e c r e t a r y -
General U Thant, appoin ted Gunnar J a r r i n g , the Swedish Ambassador, 
t o Sov ie t Uhion as Spec ia l Rep resen ta t i ve t o b r ing about agreement 
between t h e Arabs and t h e I s r a e l i s . Though^ he s h u t t l e d 
between t h e Arab S t a t e s and I s r a e l for more than two yea r s but 
a l l e f f o r t s went in vain due t o t h e c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r e s t s of the 
sv:^er powers and t o t h e c o n f l i c t i n g views expres sed by both 
143 
t h e Arabs and I s r a e l i s . 
As a r e s u l t of the Egyptian de fea t in 1967 war, 
Nasser launched a "War of A t t r i t i o n " a g a i n s t the I s r a e l i s 
14 2. I t f u r t he r aff i rmed t h e n e c e s s i t y " (a) for g r a n t i n g freedom 
of n a v i g a t i o n through i n t e r n a t i o n a l watervvays in t h e a r e a ; 
(b) for achieving a j u s t s e t t l emen t of the re fugees problem; 
(c) for guaran tee ing t h e t e r r i t o r i a l i n v i o l a b i l i t y and p o l i -
t i c a l independence of every s t a t e in t h e a r e a , through 
measures inc lud ing the es tab l i shment of d e m i l i t e r i z e d zones ." 
Yearbook of t h e un i t ed Na t ions . 1967 (New Yorks Off ice of 
P u b l i c In format ion , United Na t ions , 1969) , pp . 257-258. 
143 . M#L. G u j r a l , n . 115, p . 360. 
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near the f ron t ie r along the Suez Canal in March, 1969, in order 
to achieve three airosj 
•*(a) To enable the Egyptian army to confront the 
I s r a e l i Defense forces in a l imi ted war under 
favourable condi t ions. 
(b) To dijninish the I s r a e l i forces and erode 
I s r a e l ' s staying power, and 
(c) To get the Americans t o pressur ize I s rae l to 
withdraw from the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s without 
any meaningful change in the mi l i t a ry -- — 
balance." 144 
In the beginning of the "War of A t t r i t i on" , the Egyptian 
145 
forces i n f l i c t e d heavy casua l t i e s on the I s r a e l i s . At t h i s 
juncture , the US Secretary of Sta te , William Rogers, on Decanber 9, 
1969, came forward with a se t of proposals known as "Rogers 
Plan** which aimed at the cessat ion of h o s t i l i t i e s between Egyptian 
146 
and I s r a e l i forces. The plan, however, did not draw any 
144. johny Mehta, Tl^ ^ A^ab-Israeli War, 2,973? Strategy Tactics & 
Lesi^ons (New Delhi: Himalayan Book, 1984) , p . 7. 
14 5. William R. polk. The Ej.usive Peace tThe Middle East in the 
Twentieth Ceptury (London: Croom Helm, 19 79) , p . 105. 
146. Michael Adams, "The Arab-Israe l i Confrontation, 1967-75" in 
The Middle East and North Africa, 1215.r7.§-, (London: Europa 
Publicat ions Limited, 19 75), p . 37. 
The Rogers Plan provided Is rae l t o withdraw to the in te rna-
t i ona l boundary with Egypt ( that of the mandate period) , 
Gaza S t r ip and Sharm al-Sheikh, to remain subjects for nego-
t i a t i o n , on the assumption tha t they will not remain under 
I s r a e l i control , I s rae l t o withdraw to the 1949 armist ice 
l i nes with Jordan with s l igh t rev is ions , the Arab refugees 
t o be accorded a s t a tus equal to tha t of I s rae l in the 
r e l i g i o u s , economic and c i v i l spheres . 
Yaacov Shimoni and Evyatar Levine (Edited) , n. 6, p . 3 29. 
And a l so see for further de t a i l s The New York Times (New 
York) , December 10, 1969. 
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147 
favourab le response from Egypt and I s r a e l . 
Meanwhile« t h e war took a new t u r n due t o the I s r a e l ' s 
success and i t s massive a i r r a i d s a g a i n s t Egypt involv ing 
148 
heavy c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t i e s . This paved t h e way fo r the Russians 
t o come c l o s e r t o Egypt with fu r the r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e t o i t s 
149 
army. I t worked as a d e t e r r a n t t o t h e I s r a e l i s whereas t h e 
United S t a t e s go t alarmed by a new form of Sovie t p resence in 
150 
t h e r e g i o n . On Juno 19# 1970, in a renewed d ip lomat ic i n i t i a t i v e 
t h e r e v i s e d Rogers Plan for c e s s a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s was launched 
151 
by the u n i t e d S t a t e s , p r e s i d e n t Nasser , on J u l y 23 , 1970, 
152 
accep ted t h e US p r o p o s a l . This was fol lowed by t h e I s r a e l i 
147. I b i d . , p . 37 . 
148. William R. Polk , n . 98 , p . 396. 
149 . Michael Adams, n , 146, p» 37 . 
The Sovie t union had begun t o commit not only a d v i s e r s 
but o p e r a t i o n a l t r o o p s and a i r defense un i t s for 
t h e f i r s t t ime ou t s ide Warsaw Pact c o u n t r i e s . 
iPX^ > p . 173. 
150. I b i d . , p . 397. 
1 5 1 . Yair Evron, yhe f^i<^dle E^st ; R a t i o n s , S^peiTpowers 
apd wars (New York; Praeger P u b l i s h e r s , 19 73) , p . ' l l S . 
152. Walid Khadduri (Edited) , Ir^ternat;j.opal Docuppepts on 
P a l e s t i n e 1^70^ (Bei ru t t The I n s t i t u t e of P a l e s t i n e 
S t u d i e s , 1973) , p . 864. 
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approval of t h e Rogers Plan on J u l y 30, 1970, and 
153 
u l t i m a t e l y a c e a s e - f i r e was dec l a r ed . The 90 days c e a s e -
f i r e agreement became e f f e c t i v e on August 1, 1970, which 
was renewed on November 6, 1970, and aga in i n February, 1971 . 
Though^the c e a s e - t i r e was allowed t o e x p i r e on March 7, 19 7 1 , 
t h e dfi' fact© c e a s e - f i r e was continited u n t i l October , 19 73 Arab-
154 
I s r ae l i war. 
153, Yair Evron, n . 151, p . 120. 
154. William R. po lk , n . 98 , p . 398, 
CHAPTER - I I 
EGYPT - ISRAEL : 1973 WAR 
•HI 11 M i l l • -II II' i"f'i "^ •"•'nir-Ti—1 f—r^ii-T- • •••• m ~ i— 
After the death of president Gamal Abdul Nasser on 
Sept«nber 28, 1970, vice-president Anwar Al-3adat became the 
pres ident of Egypt and brought a sudden and dras t i c change in 
the de l i ca te ly balanced positicxi of Egypt, previously maintained 
by Nasser in p o l i t i c a l and economic spheres both in in te rna l 
and external p o l i c i e s , president Sadat, with the help of 
Nasserian r ight and the Egyptian army, l iqu ida ted the l e f t i s t 
group of Ali Sabri-Gomaa and a lso incl ined towards Colonel 
Muaromar Al-Qaddhafi of Libya, who had developed ant i -Soviet 
s tand, 
president Sadat had made ip his mind to combat the Arab-
I s r a e l i con f l i c t . I t was in ear ly 19 71 t h a t he declared the 
1. President Nasser had made repeated economic and p o l i t i c a l 
concessions t o the entrenched bourgeoisie and a more 
demanding "new c l a s s " as well as t o Anglo-American i n t e r e s t s , 
which had ' previously lobbied vainly against his encroa-
chment on t h e i r areas of influence. At the end of 19 67/ he 
reca l led the Egyptian forces which were helping to stem the 
Royalist and Saudi Arabian influence in Noirth Yemen, and 
he withdrew his support from the South Yemen n a t i o n a l i s t s 
and insurgents in the Persian Gulf o i l Emirates. He, in 
fac t , suspended a l l and to Arab revolutionary movements 
and drew closer t o the reactionary monarchies, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and to King Id r i s in Libya, which 
poured subs tan t ia l money in to the Egyptian t reasury . 
M.L. Gujral, US Global inyoivetnept t A Study of Apierican 
Expansiopaistn (New Delhit Arnold Heinemanh, 1975) , p . 364. 
2. Ib id« , p . 365, 
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"year of Decision** t o resolve the conf l ic t and r e s to re t o 
3 
Egypt i t s t e r r i t o r y occupied by the I s r a e l i s . During the 
f i r s t v i s i t to the Soviet Union in March, 1971, Sadat proposed 
the conclusion of a t r e a t y between Egypt and the Soviet Union. 
The factors which led t o pursue such a policy were : F i r s t l y , 
both Nasser and Sadat thought tha t in any event of conf l ic t 
with I s r ae l which would na tu ra l ly involve the Soviets due to 
t h e i r physical presence in Egypt, I s r a e l i s would go back due to the 
undesirable risk, of confrontation with the Soviet Union. 
Secondly, Sadat ' s apprehension was that any in ternal power 
s t ruggle or opposition or change in the leadership might cause 
a change in the Soviet policy thereby affecting the Egypt's 
m i l i t a r y plans and s t ra tegy with I s r a e l . Thirdly, Sadat su s -
pected tha t ce r t a in in ternal or external po l i c i e s might shake 
Soviet confidence in him. He wanted t o pacify the Soviets by 
proposing a t r e a t y . Last ly , Sadat thought t h a t the t r e a t y would 
strengthen his hands t o recover the captured t e r r i t o r i e s through 
negot ia t ions e i t he r with Is rael or the United States which would 
be helpful to boost his bargaining pos i t ion and would be quite 
4 
worthy. On March 31 , 19 71, president Sadat sent a specia l l e t t e r 
through Sami Sharaf, Minister for Pres ident ia l Affa i rs , who led 
one delegation to the twenty-fourth Congress of the CpSU to 
3 . George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Londonj Cornell University Press , 1980), p . 565. 
4. Aftab Kamal Pasha, Egypt's Relations with Soviet union; T,he 
Nasser and Sa^^t pf^riod (Aligarh : Centre for West Asian 
Studies, Aligarh Muslim univers i ty , 1986) , pp . 68-69. 
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Moscow. The l e t t e r , which contained the proposal for an 
Egyptian-Soviet Treaty, was accepted in p r inc ip le by the Soviets 
and they communicated t h e i r inc l ina t ion towards signing a 
t r e a t y in ea r ly May tha t was before the dismissal of the 
l e f t i s t Al i Sabri Gomaa. By the t ime, however, the Soviet 
5 leaders learnt about the b i t t e r power s truggle in Egypt. The 
Soviet President Nikolai podgomy arr ived in Cairo on May 2 5# 
19 71, one week a f te r the dismissal of Sabri Gomaa to assess the 
confused s i t u a t i o n in Egypt and i t was on May 27, 19 71, t ha t 
a f i f teen year Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation was signed 
between Egypt and the Soviet union. The t r e a t y pledged Soviet 
sImport to the united Arab Republic (UAR) in i t s s t ruggle t o 
transform Egypt into s o c i a l i s t soc ie ty , and bound each of the 
two p a r t i e s not to make any a l l i ance or act against the o t t e r 
par ty or conclude any in ternat ional accord which would be 
7 defiance of the terms of the t r e a t y . The t r e a t y , however, seemed 
t o be one-sided and re f lec ted the Egypt's fu l l dependence on 
Soviet union. The t r e a ty vhich was only j u s t i f i e d from the 
Egyptian point of view, contained the secre t mi l i t a ry clauses 
(as Sadat pointed out in his speech before the people 's Assembly 
on July 2, 19 71) "added new guarantees which had not been 
g 
defined previously". 
5. I b i d . , p . 69. 
6. Ib id . 
7. Walter Laquexjr, Confrontatipn : The Mi^^le East apd i/tovld 
P o l i t i c s (New Yorks Quadrangle/The New York Time Book 
C&mpany, 1974) , p . i 3 . 
8. I b i d . / pp . 13-14. 
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Egypt's Apathy towards the Soviet union 
The Soviet-Egyptian friendship went through a b i t t e r 
9 
experience as a r e su l t of the Communist coup in Sudan, president 
Sadat of Egypt and Muammar Al-Qaddhafi of Libya were making t h e i r 
e f for t s t o help Colonel Jaafar Al-Nimeiry of Sudan, in his cam-
paign against the Communist despite the Soviet denunciation 
of repress ion. Immediate ins t ruc t ions were given t o Sudanese 
brigade on Suez t o re turn t o Khartoun to help Nimeiry in his 
10 
counter-coqp. Natiarally/ the Soviets were unhappy with Egypt's 
pa r t i c i pa t i on in r e in s t a t i ng Nlmeiry which caused Soviets 
re luctance t o further delivery of arras. The Soviet promise of 
1971 t o supply arms to Egypt/ did not f u l f i l and on the contrary 
9 . In February, the Sudanese Colonel Jaafar Al-Nimeiry had 
announced his in ten t ion to "crush" the local Communists 
from key pos i t ions in the army, the pol ice and the Sta te 
apparatus. The Communists then staged a coup on July 19, 
19 71, but within three days, Nimeiry was back in power. 
The mi l i t a ry p l o t t e r s as well as many leading Communists, 
including the Secretary"General of the par ty , were exe-
cuted. Pravada denounced the "mass-scale bloody reign 
of t e r ro r " in the Sudan, while Nimeiry proceeded to expel 
the Bulgarian Ambassador as well as a Soviet Counsellor 
and t o describe r e l a t ions with the Soviet Uhion as "ex t re -
mely bad". Subsequently, i t t ranspi red t h a t , as in Egypt, 
Soviet leaders had not been informed, l e t alone consulted, 
about the intended cot^ perhaps, because the conspirators 
feared they would veto i t . 
i k i i t ' p . 14. 
And a l so see for furtlier de ta i l s Lawrence L. Whetten, yhe 
c.afial ,wyr « .your pg^^y (;9ii^:^iqt; x^ the ni<^<A\^ s^st 
(Cambridge: The MIT press, 1979) , pp. 316-317. 
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11 
the arms were diverted t o India during 19 71 Indo-pak war. 
This had indeed affected the honour and pres t ige of president 
Sadat in Egypt and the beginning of 19 72 witnessed considerable 
12 
de te r io ra t ion in the Egypt--Soviet r e l a t i o n s . 
Immediately, Sadat sought the "offensive weapons'* l ike 
medium or long range ground t o ground m i s s i l e s , and MIG-23 
Foxbats, the most advanced Soviet Plane. The Russians surpassed 
his request and to ld diplomatically t ha t s t i l l Egyptian army was 
too inadequate t o win a war against I s r a e l . Moreover, Moscow 
kept cool t o the Egyptian request due to the s igni f icant p o l i -
t i c a l development such as signing of detente between the Soviet 
lAiion and the united States in February, 197 2, and at the same 
time the Soviet au tho r i t i e s f e l t that the s p i r i t of detente 
13 
might pave the way for peace in the region. Sadat f e l t t ha t 
Soviet leaders had accorded top p r i o r i t y t o the detente with 
the Uiited S t a t e s , as a r e s u l t there would be r i s k of formation 
of Soviet and the united States condominium which might prevent 
14 
an emergence of war in the region. Sadat ' s request for 
"offensive weapons** had already been refused by the Soviets and 
there was a lso some tension between the Soviet advisers and the 
11. Karen Dawisha, soviet Foreign PQ^ i,cv towart^ Egypt (New 
York* S t . Mart in ' s Press , 1979) , p . 62. 
12. George Lenczowski, n. 3 , p . 565. 
13 . Walter Laqueur, n . 7* p . 16. 
14. Karen Dawisha, n. 11, p . 63. 
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Egyptian forces and these developments were v i r t u a l l y resu l ted 
in to expvdsion of a l l Soviet forces from Egypt by president 
Sadat . I t was on July 8, 1972/ t h a t president Sadat informed the 
Soviet Ambassador tha t the services of Soviet technicianss 
"to be terminated from 17 Ju ly , Soviet arms 
which were in Egypt should e i t he r be sold t o 
Egypt and Egyptians be t ra ined t o use them or 
should be withdrawn . . . Any remaining soviet 
forces should be placed under Egyptians cotnmand 
or be withdrawn." 15 
The expulsion of Soviet advisers was however, taken calmly 
16 
by the Russians. I t was a c ruc ia l question for the Americans t o 
i n i t i a t e a new diplomatic t i e s with Egypt a f t e r having understood 
Sada t ' s apathy towards the Sovie ts . In f ac t , i t was Saudi Arabia, 
which encouraged Sadat t o re l i eve from the Soviet hold and assured 
17 
to convince the United States to reduce i t s sx:pport t o I s r a e l . 
Though, sane American o f f i c i a l s were of the view that time had 
come to approach both Egypt and I s r a e l , yet^the State Department 
f e l t t h a t the time was not congenial to replace Soviet airms with 
the American weapons in Egypt. The Uhited States o f f i c i a l s , 
however, could have encouraged some European countr ies to supply 
weapons and regain i t s los t c r e d i b i l i t y in Egypt. But 1972 was 
the e lec t ion year in America. President Richard Milhous Nixon 
15. Quoted in Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramdhan (London: 
Fontana, 1975), pp . 171-172. 
16. Walter Laqueur, n. 1, p . 19. 
17. John C. Campbell, "American ef for t s for Peace", in Malcom H. 
Kerr (Edited) , The Elusive Peace in the Middle East (Albany: 
Sta te universi ty of New York Press , 19 75) , pp. 299-300. 
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did not l ike t o displease Jewish lobby by talcing a favourable 
stand for Middle Eastern po l i c i e s as to diffuse tension in the 
18 
Middle East or for Egypt. Sadat was not pos i t ive ly responded 
19 
which made both Saudis and Egyptians unhappy. 
The gap between the Soviet union and Egypt was bridged 
and the October* 1972 v i s i t of the Egyptian prime Minis ter , 
Aziz Sidky, t o Soviet union was followed by the resumption of 
20 
anus supply t o Egypt. A top level Soviet Committee was set i^ 
in December* 1972, to review the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s . I t was 
followed by the res to ra t ion of r e l a t i ons between the two countr ies , 
a f t e r the National Security Adviser of President Sadat, Hafez 
Ismael, v i s i t e d Moscow. In te res t ing ly enough, the Soviet union 
began t o del iver a huge quanti ty of arms which a lso included the 
21. 
sophis t i ca ted "offensive weapons". Soviet union also continued 
18. I b i d . , p . 299 
19. Georgiana G. Stevens, "1967-1977 » America's Moment in the 
Middle East** ,The Middle East Journal , Vbl.31 ,No. 1,Winter, 
1977, p . 9 . 
20, Jon D. Glassman, Anns for the Arabs? The Soviet Union and War 
i,p the Middle East (Baltimore: John Hopkins University 
Press , 19 75) , p . 103. 
21 , These included an addit ional nunber TU 16 Bombers, armed 
with Kelt stand off miss i les and, much more important, a 
l imited nunber of scud surface-to-surface mi s s i l e s . The 
Egyptians had long been ca l l ing for a "deterrant** weapon 
against I s r a e l i a t tack and the provision of the scuds, some 
t h i r t y of which were sent t o Egypt, where they were placed 
under Egyptian operational command while being p a r t i a l l y 
serviced and operated by Soviet personnel, was an important 
factor in the Egyptian decision to go to war. A3 well as 
increasing the s t r a t e g i c threa t t o I s r a e l , the Soviet Union 
a lso augmented Egypt's t a c t i c a l offensive c a p a b i l i t i e s . 
Soviet de l iver ies included some 600 addit ional tanks, over 
c o n t d . . . 
57 
t h e supply <^ f arms t o Syr ia and I t was during the summer of 1973 
t h a t i n pursuance of Sovie t promise t o P r e s i d e n t Hafez Al-Assad 
of Sy r i a dur ing h i s v i s i t t o Russia in A p r i l / a complete a i r 
22 
defense system was e s t a b l i s h e d . 
The Clouds of War 
By 1973, t h e Egyptian economy v-as in doldrun . F u r t h e r , 
S a d a t ' a "year of d e c i s i o n " l e d t o unres t because t h e Russians 
f a i l e d t o d e l i v e r the needed weapons and the e n t i r e Egypt-Sovie t 
a f f a i r s t o counter t h e I s r a e l i s wi th the Sovie t weapons became 
a b ig joke in t h e Arab world. Mohamed Heika l , the then e d i t o r 
of t he Egyptian newspaper, j^;-A|hram, po in t ed outs "One of the 
UL__..^Jwi_-l .. t - " 1 — M i*-! «* ^ « i i » ' i — ^ a w t w ^ i — I 1^1 iM ILIUM* • > iL B III! II • M I ••—r~~r—^~~r - ~ i - - i 1—i i r i - wi • M^ •>•• • "— • « i» "— • w w » ^ p r ^ » » y — i w " y '^». •"' m'^a.wf 
c o n t d . . . 
250 new armoured personne l c a r r i e r s , a n t i - t a n k and a n t i -
a i r c r a f t m i s s i l e s . 
P e t e r Mangold, Superpower ly^terviention in the f i d d l e tZtst 
(London* Crocm HeIro/ 1978) / p . 126. 
22 . This gave S y r i a n s , m i s s i l e coverage of a i r - s p a c e over 
I s r a e l i - o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r y of Golan. 
i b i ^ , p . 127. 
2 3 . I n d u s t r i a l development, t h e High Dam, and the burden of 
war in the Yemen had made the e a r l y and middle s i x t i e s a 
p e r i o d of extreme d i f f i c u l t y . Then had come t h e 19 67 
defeat and the need fo r an almost complete r e b u i l d i n g and 
reequ ipp ing of t h e army. In f ive years between 19 68 and 
1973, Egypt spent $ 8-9,OoO m i l l i o n on the war e f f o r t . 
Th .^ nX^^^, .fiagt ^nd.jjgf.t^h AfrAgfiUi 122Szi23§ (London; 
Europa p u b l i c a t i o n s Limi ted , 19 7 5 ) , p . 2 9 1 . 
And a l so see for fu r the r d e t a i l s Mohamed Heika l , 
n . 15, p . 204. 
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most p o t e n t fo rces a c t i n g on Pres iden t Sadat was t h e a t t i t u d e 
of I s r a e l . The almost i n c r e d i b l e a r rogance of I s r a e l i p o l i t i -
c i a n s in pub l i c reached i t s peak as t h e general e l e c t i o n , due on 
31 Octover 1973, came n e a r . Dxaring t h e sp r ing and sunmer/ 
p a r t i e s and cand ida tes were o u t - b i d d i r ^ each o ther in t h e i r p l a n s 
for what t o do wi th conquered Arab t e r r i t o r y . The Labour 
Alignment/ under p r e s s u r e from General Moshe Dayan changed i t s 
p o s i t i o n over annexa t ion . Creeping annexa t ion , or " c r e a t i n g 
facts**/ as i t was ca l l ed* ga the red momentun. Dayan t a l k e d openly 
of h i s des igns for t h e new p o r t of Yamit a t Rafah which was t o 
24 
i s o l a t e Egypt fo r ever from c o n t a c t with the Gaza S t r i p . 
I t was i n the end of June , 19 73, t h a t a rough p lan of 
" o p e r a t i o n Badr" was prepared by both Egyptian p r e s i d e n t , Sadat 
and h i s Syrian c o u n t e r p a r t , Kafez Al-Assad. The p l a n envisaged 
Egypt as t h e s en io r p a r t n e r and Syria was t o a c t i n accordance 
w i th C a i r o . The Egyptian dec i s ion t o f ix October 6, 1973, as 
t h e i r "D-Day" bore c e r t a i n f a c t o r s l i k e t h e n i g h t in which t h e 
weather and moon cond i t ions were expected t o be the b e s t s u i t e d 
fo r t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e i r p lan and the symbolic r e l i g i o u s 
impor tance which was also s i g n i f i c a n t for t h e i r p l a n . No doubt , 
p r e s i d e n t Sadat must have been i n s p i r e d by the t e n t h day of t h e 
Muslim month of Ramdhan (which corresponded t o October 6 in 1973) , 
t h e day on which t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s for the most s i g n i f i c a n t e a r l y 
24. Sadat took i t as an i n s u l t t o h i s "se l f - respec t** . 
Mohained Heika l , n . 15* p p . 204-205. 
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I s l a m i c b a t t l e , the " b a t t l e of Badr**, was s t a r t e d by prophet 
MohairSmed. The b a t t l e l e d t o the conquest of Mecca which was 
taken as d iv ine approbat ion of h i s small and p e r s e c u t e d commu-
n i t y . F u r t h e r , October 5, 1973, was a l s o the Jewish f e s t i v a l 
of Yom Kippur, which was t h e most congenial t ime t o launch an 
o f f e n s i v e . 
o u t b r e a k of War 
On October 6, 1973, Egypt launched a powerful o f f ens ive 
across t h e Sxiez Canal while Syrian t a r g e t of a t t a c k was t h e 
Golan Heigh ts . Though, Jordan did not confront I s r a e l w i th 
m i l i t a r y f ron t ye t i t sen t t h e army t o the Syrian command to 
indu lge i n t h e f i g h t i n g . The Syrian army diminished the I s r a e l i 
27 defense l i n e and reocci^j ied most of t h e p a r t s of Golan. 
25. William R. po lk . The un i t ed S t a t e s and t h e Arab World 
(Carobridges Harvard Univers i ty p r e s s , 19 75 ) , p . 297. 
26. Keggtnq'^ C9nt;.anpp.yArY,.. .AyP^iyea (London), v o l . XIX, 19 73, 
p . 26173. 
One of t h e impor tan t elements of t h e p lan was t h a t "Jordan 
should be brought i n as a p o t e n t i a l a s s o c i a t e i n o rde r t o 
help p in down enemy forces . 
Nadav Safran , I s r a e l : The Em]oytttle<^ AJ^ J-Y, (Cambridges 
The Belknap p r e s s of Harvard u n i v e r s i t y PresP , 1982) , 
p . 280, 
(Edited) , 
27 . I tamar Rab inov ich / "The October War, October 5-22, 
1973", in Alvin Z. R u b i n s t e i n , The A r a b - I s r a e l i 
Conf l i c t s P e r s p e c t i v e (New York: praeger p u b l i s h e r s , 
1984) , p . 57. 
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On t h e Egyptian f ron t , i t s fo rces gained a remarkable 
success in c ro s s ing t h e Suez Canal and des t roy ing the defenees 
28 
of the Bar-Lev L ine . 
When t h i s news reached US Sec re t a ry of S t a t e , Kenry 
Kiss inger* he found i t very s u r p r i s i n g as on ly a day be fo re , t h e 
Egyptian Foreign M i n i s t e r , Mohammed H. a l - Z a y a t , met him but 
did not g ive any s l i g h t e s t idea about the p o s s i b i l i t y of sudden 
development r ega rd ing t h e ou tbreak of war. Moreover, i t was a 
week e a r l i e r t h a t a c o n t r a c t worth hundreds of m i l l i o n s of 
d o l l a r s was s igned between t h e Egyptian Government and American 
f i n a n c i a l grovp for the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a major o i l p i p e l i n e in 
Egypt. The S t a t e Department spokesman, Robert J . Mcclosky, a l so 
showed s u r p r i s e and s a i d : "We never had any i n d i c a t i o n t h e r e 
29 
was m i l i t a r y a c t i o n i n t e n d e d . . . " 
28 . Kees inq ' s Conteynporarv Archives^ n . 26, p . 26173. 
Bar-Lev l i n e was t h e u n o f f i c i a l name of system of I s r a e l i 
f o r t r e s s e r e c t e d a t t he Suez Canal between October 1968 
and March 1969/ as a means of defense in t h e Egyptian "War 
of a t t r i t i o n " l au i ched i n breach of t h e Jv*ie, 1967 c e a s e - f i r e . 
Yaacov Shimoni & Evyatar Levine (Edited) , ^ ;^ i t ica^l , piqtj lpn^ry 
gfi .the Middle fia,g.t. Mi %h9 ^9Vh .<?.eJtt.\Br.Y„ ( Je rusa l en t Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson , 1972) , p . 67, 
2 9 . The New York Tiipnes (New York) , October 7, 1973. 
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In the Senate, a resolu t ion was introduced by the 
majority leader* Senator Mike Mansfield (Democrat) and the 
Republican minority leader . Senator Hugh Scott on October 8, 
1973. The Senate resolved tha t i t condemned the outbreak of 
war in the Middle East region and urged the US President and 
Secretary of Sta te to use t h e i r good o f f i ces : 
"to bring about a cease - f i r e and a re turn of 
the p a r t i e s involved to l ines and pos i t ions 
occupied by them pr io r t o the outbreak of cur -
rent h o s t i l i t i e s / and, fxarther, t ha t the Senate 
expresses i t s hope for a more s tab le condit ion 
leading to peace in the region". 30 
In the Uhited Nations, the Security Council meeting was 
held on October 8< 1973. i t was, however, adjourned and again 
i t met on October 9, without any concrete decision. I s rae l 
blamed the Soviet union for current tension in the area whereas 
the Soviet union ca l led Yosef Tekoah, the I s r a e l i representa t ive 
as a " representa t ive of murderous gangsters ." On the other l^nd, 
Yosef Tekoah expressed tha t the Russians were responsible for 
the encouragement of hatred of I s r ae l and t h e i r presence in the 
Middle East further jeopardised the chances of res to ra t ion of 
peace. 
The war was on and in the f i r s t week about one-fourth of 
I s r a e l i a i r force was l o s t as most of the planes were shot down 
30. Congressional Rf>cor^  (Daily). October 8, 1973, 
pp. S18753-18764. 
3 1 . The Times (London), October 10, 1973. 
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32 by E g y p t i a n s ' Soviet b u i l t SAMS. S i m i l a r l y , from October 6 t o 
10, 1973, Syrian f o r c e s , while ga in ing an upper hand on t h e 
I s r a e l i s had achieved a remarkable success in p e n e t r a t i n g more 
than f i f t e e n mi les i n t o I s r a e l i occupied t e r r i t o r y and r eoccu -
p i e d Kuneitra which was l o s t by t h e Syr ians in the war of 19 67. 
They d r ived t h e i r forces ac ros s the Golan Heights wi th in a 
33 few mi l e s of t h e 1949 Armis t i ce demarcation l i n e . I t was on 
October 10, 1973, t h a t Sov ie t Union de l i ve r ed a l a r g e amount of 
weapons t o both Egypt and S y r i a . The l a s t I s r a e l i f o r t i f i e d 
p o s i t i o n on the e a s t bank of the Suez Canal was a l s o su r rendered 
between October 10 and 13, 19 73 , Many I s r a e l i a i r c r a f t s and 
arms were des t royed during the f ive days of the war . The United 
S t a t e s was alarmed and f i n a l l y decided t o s t a b l i s e t h e c r i s i s by 
supply ing more m i l i t a r y personnel and arms t o I s r a e l so t h a t t h e 
34 Sovie t backed v i c t o r y could not occur aga ins t I s r a e l i s . 
In a p r e s s Conference held on October 12, 19 73, t h e US 
S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , K i s s i n g e r , dec la red t h a t ; 
"AS fa r as we a re concerned, you a l l know t h a t 
we do have an ongoing m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
I s r a e l , which we a re c o n t i n u i n g . . . " 3 5 
• ' - - - - - — • - ' - _ • - , . . , , . . ^ . ^ I I I I I I . • - - . . . 
3 2 . Time (New York) , October 29, 1973, p .6 . 
3 3 . j . R . Gainsborough, The A r a b - I s r a e l i C o n f l i c t ; A p o l i t i c o -
]^eaal Analys is (Vgrmoot s Gower, 1986), p . 187. 
34 . I b i d * , p . 188. 
3 5 . Department of s t a t e Bul le t i ,n . Vol. LXIX, No. 1792, 
October 29, 1973, p p . 534 and 538. 
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I t was already on October 9, 1973^ that Moshe Dayan, the 
I s r a e l i Defence Minister, in a corLfidential briefing to newspapers 
ed i to r s sa id t h a t : 
**... We decided f i r s t of a l l to throw out the 
Syrians, t o r ea l ly get a t them. Nobody r e t r e a t s 
from the re . We wil l f in i sh with Syrians and not 
withdraw. This i s our approach to the Syrians 
now, because we want to shorten the front and 
because there i s a l so the p o s s i b i l i t y that the 
Jordanians and the I raq is may join the Syrian 
f ront . As far as Egypt i s concerned, the view i s 
t h a t we should not allow forces to be worn down. 
That would be f u t i l e . We must redeploy and e s t a -
b l i sh defense l ines . "36 
The I s r a e l i leadership under prime Minister Golda Meir 
decided t o address f i r s t the Syrian front as Golan front ser iously 
threatened I s rae l and where the I s r a e l i s could get fast success* 
on October 12, 1973, the I s r a e l i s pushed back the Syrian amiy 
behind the 19 67 cease- f i re l i ne and they penetrated beyond i t and 
37 i n t o the Syrian t e r r i t o r y . Syria, however, pressur ised Egypt 
t h a t Egyptian army should launch a major offensive if i t wanted 
t o continue the war. Under such pressure Egyptian army launched 
38 
a major offensive on October 14, 1973. The I s r a e l i s launched a 
counter-offensive and as a r e s u l t , they crossed the Suez Canal. 
An Egyptian army, tha t crossed the Canal in the southern s t r e t ch 
of the front was encircled by the I s r a e l i forces. The i n i t i a l 
achievements of Egypt were ^pset and eventually I s r a e l i s succeeded 
36. The Jerusalem p^st (Jerusalem) February 15, 1974. 
37. Itamar Rabinovich, n. 27, p . 57. 
38. I b i d . , p . 58. 
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in halting the Egyptian offensive and achieved the military 
39 
s uccess , 
President Sadat« in an address to the people 's Assembly, 
on October 16, ca l l ed for the cease- f i re on the basis of I s r a e l i 
withdrawal "from a l l occupied t e r r i t o r i e s / under in ternat ional 
sijpervision, t o the pre-5th June, 1967 l i n e s . " He also proposed 
40 
an in te rna t iona l peace conference at the United Nations. 
Oil Embargo an<^  Kissinger 's Shut t le Diplomacy 
With the outbreak of the war, the world witnessed the 
most crucia l energy and currency c r i s i s which threatened the 
world economy/ t ranspor ta t ion and commerce which adversely 
affected not only Europe but even the Third World as well . Petrol 
as an o i l weapon in the hands of Arabs made the Europeans and 
Japanese feel tha t in order t o safeguard t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s , 
the peaceful settlement of the Midc'le East problem became inpe-
r a t i v e . The Arabs earned b i l l i o n s of dol lars due t o energy 
c r i s i s and even they decided t o influence the world events by 
41-
using o i l as t he i r weapon. Thus, the Arabs demonstrated tha t 
39. George Lenczowski, n. 3 , p , 567. 
4 0. The Egyptian president declared tha t "we are prepared as 
soon as withdrawal from a l l these t e r r i t o r i e s has been 
completed, to at tend an in ternat ional peace conference at 
the united Nations.** 
B8C Monitoring Service, SunnmarY of the World Broadcasts, 
ME/44 27/A/7-9. 
4 1 . Col. B.K.Narayan, Lesson and Consequences of the October Wai;-
(New Delhi; VLkas Publishing House Pvt. L td . , 1977) , p . 25. 
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t h e y were a l s o a s i x t h power a f t e r the Uhited S t a t e s * Sovie t 
42 Union, Europe, China and Jap^x. 
In f a c t , i t was on January 6, 1973, t h a t a r e s o l u t i o n 
was passed in t h e Kuwait National Assembly which emphasised t o 
use " o i l as a weapon" a g a i n s t t he I s r a e l i s . The reso lu t ica i 
p o i n t e d out t h a t t 
" . . . a major c o n f l i c t can be expected t o break 
out a t any moment between t h e fo rces of I s r a e l i -
Z i o n i s t aggress ion and t h e mains tay of t h e Arab 
forces - t h e Arab Republic of Egypt - We propose 
t h a t the Government should unambiguously recommend 
t h a t as soon as t h e f i g h t i n g breaks ou t , i f not 
be fo re , a l l our o i l r e s o u r c e s be immediately 
brought i n t o t h e b a t t l e by suspending our l i n k s 
wi th the Western o i l c o u n t r i e s . . , " 4 3 
On October 17, 1973, t he o i l m i n i s t e r s of t he member 
s t a t e s of t h e Organ i sa t i on of Arab Pe t ro leun Export ing Count r ies 
(OAPEC) , he ld i n the c i t y of Kuwait t o cu t the o i l p roduc t ion by 
5 p e r cen t every month u n t i l "such a t ime as t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
community compels I s r a e l t o r e l i n q u i s h " t h e i r occupied 
44 t e r r i t o r i e s . The un i t ed S t a t e s came under t h e same s p e l l 
4 2 , I b i d * , p , 26 . 
4 3 , Jorgen s . Nielsen (Edited) , I n t e r n a t i o n a l pocunents on 
P a l e s t i n e , 1973 (Be i ru t : The I n s t i t u t e for P a l e s t i n e 
S t u d i e s , 1976) , p . 403, 
And a l s o see for fiorther d e t a i l s BBC Monitoring S e r v i c e , 
Sxmmarv of World Broadcasts^ ME/4188/A/10. 
44 , Middle Eas t Ecopomic Siyvev (Beirut) , Vbl, XVII, No. 4 
November 16, l9 7 3 , p , i i i . 
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as i t was a l so resolved thats 
"The United States be subjected to the most 
severe cut propor t ional ly with the quan t i t i e s 
of crude o i l / o i l der ivat ives and hydrocarbons 
tha t i t imports from every exporting country. 
The pa r t i c ipan t s a l so recommended tha t t h i s 
progressive reduction leads t o the t o t a l hal t of 
o i l supplies t o the Iftiited States from every 
individual country party to the resolut ion.*45 
The resolut ion further pointed out tha t the fr iendly 
46 
nat ions/ however/ would not be affected by the embargo. Iniv 
t i a l l y , the o i l as a weapon did not adversely affect the 
countr ies of Europe but with the passage of time i t became more 
powerful and devastating as Saudi Arabia, by far one of the 
l a rges t Arab o i l producers/ decided to cut i t s production uni la-
t e r a l l y by lO per cent . Naturally, the West suffered the loss 
of the be t t e r par t of mill ion barre ls a day. Qatar followed 
the s u i t , Abu Dhabi went in to new action and announced a t o t a l 
ban on shipments t o America, and Libya a l so followed i t . This 
was in addition to the general o i l cutback throughout the Arab 
Exporting coun t r i e s . I t may be noted tha t in the Kuwait meeting 
of. October 17, 1973/ the pressure of t o t a l embargo was r e s i s t ed 
by Saudi Arabia as she did not want t o break close fr iendly 
r e l a t ionsh ip with the uni ted S t a t e s . In order t o pursue the 
o f f i c i a l s in the Sta te Department t o s e t t l e the Middle Eastern 
d i spu te . King Faisal of Saudi Arabia sent his Foreign Minister , 
45 . jyiidx 
46. I b i d . 
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Omar Saqqaf t o Washington t o meet p r e s i d e n t Nixon on October 
47 
n , 1973. But on October 19, a f t e r Foreign Min i s t e r Saqqaf 
and P res iden t Nixon meet ing , t h e US p r e s i d e n t r eques t ed t h e 
48 Congress for $2 .2 b i l l i o n emergency m i l i t a r y a i d t o I s r a e l . 
Though, the United S t a t e s had a l r eady s t a r t e d a huge arms 
a i r l i f t t o I s r a e l yet i t was a formal conf i rmat ion . American 
heavy rearmament and p r e s i d e n t Nixon 's d e c l a r a t i o n a t t h i s 
c r u c i a l s t a g e made King F a i s a l t o t h i n k t h a t i t was an American 
49 b e t r a y a l and i n s u l t t o t h e Arabs . On October 20, 1973, Saudi 
Arabia announced t h e complete o i l ©nbargo t o t h e 
4 7 . Saqqaf informed King Fa i sa l t h a t Nixon had given 
him c e r t a i n a s su rances , on t h e s t r e n g t h of which 
King F a i s a l was p repared t o p e r s i s t in e x e r c i s i n g 
h i s enormous in f luence on t h e s i d e of modera t ion . 
Michael Adams & Chr i s topher Mayhew, p u b l i s h i t not 
. . . The Midfglg _East Cover-up { London : Longman~19 75) , 
p . 135. 
4 8 . The US p r e s i d e n t expressed t h a t " I am r e q u e s t i n g 
t h a t the Congress a u t h o r i z e emergency s e c u r i t y 
a s s i s t a n c e of $ 2 .2 b i l l i o n for I s r a e l . . . This 
r e q u e s t i s necessa ry t o permi t t h e United S t a t e s 
t o follow a r e s p o n s i b l e course of a c t i o n . . . i f 
we a r e t o b u i l d a g loba l s t r u c t u r e of peace . " 
Weekly Conn i l a t ion of Prep;L^^f^pt;La1 pocqnent;s. Vol. 9 , 
No. 42, October 22, 19 73, p . l 264. 
And a l so see Depaftment pf_Sj-ate Bui.letj^pf Vol. LXIX, 
November 12, 1973, p p . 596-597. 
49 . Michael Adams &c Chr i s topher Mayhew, n . 47, p . 136. 
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50 
united S t a t e s . 
During tha t period, the American diplcmacy was di rected 
by the Secretary of s t a t e . Kissinger, and aimed at several 
diver^^fent ends as he wanted t o combat the Soviet t h rea t s in the 
Middle East and also wanted the United s t a t e s t o exert conside-
rab le influence in the region. The united S t a t e s , however, 
sought t o give the Soviets a sense of pa r t i c ipa t ion instead of 
exclusion from the diplomatic negot ia t ions and at the same time 
t o re ta in an tpper hand in the a f f a i r s . Further, the American 
o f f i c c i a l s did not want to ensure the image of victory t o I s rae l 
51 over Egypt. A3 there was a danger of d i rec t Soviet-American 
confrontatl^on due t o the support to t h e i r respect ive c l i e n t 
s t a t e s , the Secretary of S ta te , Kissinger, proceeded t o Moscow 
on October 20, 1973, a t the i nv i t a t i on of Lecxiid Brezhnev, 
General Secretary of the Communist par ty of Soviet Union, t o 
50. In a statement Issued by the Saudi Government, i t was 
announced tha t " . . . in view of the increase in American 
mi l i t a ry aid to I s r a e l , the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
decided to hal t o i l exports to the United States of 
America for taking t h i s pos i t i on . " 
Middle East Economic ^urv^y (Beirut) . Vol. XVII, No. i , 
October 26, 1973, p . 3 . 
Also see BBC Minitoring Service, Summary pf World Broadcasts^ 
ME/4430/A/6. 
And a lso see for further de t a i l s Middle East Economic 
Digest (London) , October 26, 1973, p . 1261. 
5 1 . Itamar Rabinovich, n. 27, p . 60. 
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52 discuss the Middle East c r i s i s , in order t o divert the a t tent ion 
from the Watergate problems# Nixon v;anted t o achieve a landnark 
success in i^er ican foreign policy and in a message to Brezhnev 
he indicated t h a t he had conferred on Kissinger the " fu l l 
author i ty" and he would fully support the commitments of Kissinger 
during the course of h i s discussion. The fovur hours of intensive 
discussion between Kissinger and Brezhnev resul ted in draft ing 
53 
of the t ex t of a cease- f i re r e so lu t ion . I t was passed as Resolu-
t i o n 338 by the Securi ty Council, on October 22, 19 73, ca l l ing 
54 for a cease - f i r e . The statement issued by the Goverrunent of 
52. The same day President Nixon f i red Watergate Special 
Persecutor, Archibold Cox, an act ion t h a t led t o the 
res ignat ions of Attorney General E l l i o t Richardson and 
Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus, 
Dan Caldwell (Edited) , Henry Kissiijiger s His Personali ty 
and p o l i t i e s (Durham, N . C : Duke Press policy Studies, 1983) , 
p . 121. 
53. I b id . 
54. The Security Council Resolution declared tha t i t s 
" 1 . Cal ls (^ jon a l l p a r t i e s to the present f ighting to cease 
a l l f i r ing and terminate a l l m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t y immediately 
not l a t e r than 12 hours a f t e r the moment of the adoption 
of the decision, in the pos i t ions they now occxpy; 
2. Calls \ipon the p a r t i e s concerned to s t a r t immediately 
a f t e r the cease- f i re the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 242 (1967) in a l l of i t s parts7 
3 . Decides t h a t , immediately and concurrently with the 
cease - f i r e , negot ia t ions s t a r t between the p a r t i e s 
concerned under appropriate auspices aimed a t e s t a b l i -
shing a jus t and durable peace in the Middle East ," 
Yearbook of the united Nations, 1973, Vol. 27 (New York: 
Office of the Public Information, united Nations, 1976) , 
p . 213. 
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Egypt confirmed i t s acceptance of the UN Security Council 
55 Resolution. The I s r a e l i Cabinet, a l so decided t o accept the 
56 
c e a s e - f i r e . Notwithstanding the b i l a t e r a l agreement of cease-
f i r e resolut ion* fighting e r ip ted on the Suez front from 
October 23 to 24 and both the p a r t i e s blamed each other for 
57 
such v i o l a t i o n s . The Securi ty Council again met cai October 
22, 1973, and passed a resolut ion 339 which r e i t e r a t e d the 
c a l l for cease- f i re and requested the Secretary-General t o send 
observers t o si:^ervise ""the cease - f i re between the forces of 
58 I s r a e l and the Arab Reptiblic of Egypt". The I s r a e l i f a rces , 
however/ had entered the town of Suez by October 25, and the 
59 Egyptian Third Army was enci rc led , president Sadat requested 
both. General-Secretary, Brezhnev, and President Nixon to despatch 
a j o i n t Soviet-American Peace Keeping Force t o the Middle East 
t o po l ice the cease-f i re impar t i a l ly . But as soon as t he 
proposal was tturned down by Kissinger and Nixon, Brezhnev sent 
55 . A^-^i^a^ (Cairo), October 23, 1973. 
56. yi^^ .^efusalem Pfi^t (Jerusalem), October 23, 1973. 
57. This f ight ing, which took place on both banks of 
the Canal, was p a r t i c u l a r l y heavy for the belea-
giiered Egyptian Third Army t o break out of the 
encirclement and recross the Canal. 
J .R. Gainsborough, n. 33, p . 189 • 
58. Off ic ia l Records of the Securi ty Council (SCOR) . 
Twenty-eight Ye^r. R^solutjions an^ Decisions, i973^ 
p . 11* 
59 • J .R. Gainsborough, n . 33, p . 189. 
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a m e s s a g e v i a Ambassador Dobrynin t o Wash ing ton t h a t : 
" I f you f i n d i t i m p o s s i b l e t o a c t j o i n t l y w i t h 
us in t h i s m a t t e r * we s h o u l d be f a c e d w i t h t h e 
n e c e s s i t y u r g e n t l y t o c o n s i d e r t h e q u e s t i o n of 
t a k i n g a p p r o p r i a t e s t e p s u n i l a t e r a l l y . We c a n n o t 
a l l o w a r b i t r a r i n e s s on t h e p a r t of I s r a e l . " 6 0 
T h i s was t a k e n by K i s s i n g e r a s a s e r i o u s c h a l l e n g e t o 
t h e Amer icans a s t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e S o v i e t programme 
would c e r t a i n l y once a g a i n draw Egypt i n t o t h e S o v i e t o r b i t and 
r e e s t a b l i s h t h e S o v i e t p r e s e n c e i n t h e r e g i o n . Even i f b o t h 
Amer ican and S o v i e t f o r c e s s i ; ^ e r v i s e d t h e c e a s e - f i r e # t h e 
a c t i o n would be p r e s u n e d a s t h e s e t t i n g \xp of US-Sovie t c o n d o -
< < 61 min ium. 
I t was on O c t o b e r 25* 19 7 3 , t h a t P r e s i d e n t Nixon and 
S e c r e t a r y K i s s i n g e r d e c l a r e d a w o r l d - w i d e a l e r t of t h e American 
f o r c e s . In t h e morning when K i s s i n g e r h e l d a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e 
and o u t l i n e d t h e meaning of t h e US a l e r t and i t s r e a s o n s * a 
r e p o r t e r a s k e d i f t h e w o r l d - w i d e a l e r t was " p r o m p t e d a s much 
p e r h a p s by Amer ican d o m e s t i c r e q u i r e m e n t s (Wate rga te ) a s by t h e 
r e a l r e q u i r e m e n t s of d ip lomacy i n t h e M i d d l e E a s t " . K i s s i n g e r / 
however , r u l e d o u t any s u c h s p e c u l a t i o n s and went on t o e x p l a i n 
6 0 . Quoted i n Dan C a l d w e l l ( E d i t e d ) * n . 52* p . 1 2 1 . 
6 1 . I b i d . 
6 2 . I b i d . * p . 1 2 2 . 
Fo r d e t a i l e d s t u d y of r e a s o n s f o r US a l e r t s e e Shlomo Aronson , 
C o n f l i c t and B a r a ^ i n i n o in t h e Midd le E a s t : An I s r a e l i P e r s p e c -
t i v g ( B a l t i m o r e : J o h n HOpkins U n i v e r s i t y * 1978)T p p . 1 9 2 - 1 9 6 , 
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t h e S o v i e t n o n - c o m p l i a n c e of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of c o - e x i s t e n c e . 
On t h e same d a y , t h e S e c u r i t y Courici l p a s s e d a r e s o l u t i o n 3 4 0 , 
which c a l l e d t h e d i s p u t i n g p a r t i e s t o r e t u r n t o t h e c e a s e - f i r e 
l i n e s of O c t o b e r 22, 1973 , and a l s o d e c i d e d t o e s t a b l i s h a 
u n i t e d N a t i o n s Emergency Force (UNEF) which would be c o m p r i s e d 
of p e r s o n n e l drawn' from member s t a t e s of t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s 
w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n of t h e permanent members of t h e UN S e c u r i t y 
C o u n c i l . 
F u r t h e r , t h e S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n 341 p a s s e d on 
O c t o b e r 27 , 1973 , l i m i t e d t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e UN Emergency 
F o r c e t o 7 ,000 men and f i x e d t h e d e p u t a t i o n p e r i o d i n i t i a l l y t o 
t h e s i x m o n t h s . The main t a s k of t h i s f o r c e was t o s u p e r v i s e 
t h e o b s e r v a n c e of c e a s e - f i r e on t h e Suez Canal f r o n t and t o 
make a r r a n g e m e n t s so t h a t b o t h Egypt and I s r a e l r e t u r n t o 
65 O c t o b e r 22 p o s i t i o n s h e l d by bo th s i d e . There was , however , no 
p e a c e k e e p i n g f o r c e on t h e S y r i a n - I s r a e l i f r o n t b u t t h e r e was 
a l r e a d y a l o n g e s t a b l i s h e d UN t r u c e - o b s e r v e r s who were o p e r a t i n g 
on t h e E g y p t i a n - I s r a e l i f r o n t s . 
I t was by O c t o b e r 3 0 , 1973, t h a t t h e o i l e x p o r t s t o t h e 
U n i t e d S t a t e s was t o t a l l y s t o p p e d by t e n Arab c o u n t r i e s name ly , 
6 3 . I b i d . 
And a l s o s e e f o r f u r t h e r d e t a i l s Depar tment of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , 
V o l . LXIX, No. 1794 , November 1 2 , l ' 973 ,pp . 585-589 & 5 9 3 - 5 9 4 . 
6 4 . O f f i c i a l Records of t h e Secur i t^y Council(SCOR) , i 9 _ 7 3 , n . 5 8 , p . 1 1 . 
6 5 . S u r e n d r a B h u t a n i , The U n i t e d N a t i o n s and t h e J \ r a b - I s r a e l i 
C o n f l i c t (Gurgaoni The Academic P r e s s , 1977) , p . 1 0 7 . 
6 6 . J . R . G a i n s b o r o u g h , n . 3 3 , p . 1 9 0 . 
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Saudi Arabia/ Abu Dhabi, Libya, Alger ia* Bahrain, Kuwait, Qata r , 
Dubai and Oman, and n ine of them with except ion to Saudi Arab ia , 
Spe l t t h i s dec i s ion t o Netherlands a l s o , with I r a q opt ing for 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n of American and Dutch o i l i n t e r e s t s in the Basra 
Pe t ro leun Company. I t was again from November 4 t o 5, 1973, 
t h a t t h e Arab o i l expor t ing c o u n t r i e s met in Kuwait and decided 
t o cut t h e o i l p roduc t ion by 25% and reduce t h e o i l expor t s wi th 
5% cu tback t o the impoirting c o u n t r i e s and a l s o provided t h a t the 
f r i e n d l y c o u n t r i e s would be exempted from such cutback . I t was 
f u r t h e r decided t o send a miss ion c o n s i s t e d of " t h e Alger ian 
M i n i s t e r of Energy and t h e Saudi Arabian Min i s t e r of pe t ro l eun 
and Mineral Resources t o expla in the Arab po in t of view 
68 
rega rd ing" the cutback in o i l p r o d u c t i o n . 
This announcement of o i l cutback had a profound impact 
on the i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s and on btovember 6, t he nine 
Governments of Eurc^ean Economic Community (EEC) c o u n t r i e s d e c i -
ded t o demand the I s r a e l i withdrawal from t h e occupied Arab 
t e r r i t o r i e s and t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s ' l e g i t i m a t e 
69 
r i g h t s , on t h e same day* Kiss inger reached Ca i ro and c a r r i e d 
on n e g o t i a t i o n s with p r e s i d e n t Sada t . This was r e s u l t e d in the 
6 7 . Hussein S i r r i y e h , US p o l i c y i n the Gulf, 1968-1977?Aft;erm^th 
of B r i t i s h Withdrawal (London j I t h a c a P r e s s , 1984), p . 179. 
68 . Middle Eas t Economic Survey (Beirut) , S\j|>plement/ 
Vol. XVII, NO, 2 , Ifevember 2, 1973, p p . 4 - 5 . 
6 9 . Hussein s i r r i y e h , n . 67, p , 180. 
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decision to resume the diplomatic r e l a t ions between the united 
70 Sta tes and Egypt on Nomverober 1, 1973. Assis tant Secretary 
of S t a t e , Joseph Sisco, was a l so sent t o I s r ae l as "anchorman** 
of the armist ice team. The ta lks between Egyptian and I s r a e l i 
mi l i ra ry representa t ives under the aegis of the United Nations 
was held in order to discuss and negot ia te the de ta i l s of the 
cease - f i r e and supply of food and water t o the encircled Third 
Army. As a r e su l t of the strong US pressure , the I s r a e l i s agreed 
t o allow food si:pply t o the Army. The following day, Egyptian 
act ing Fpreign Minister , Ismael Fahmi, who was l a t e r confirmed 
as Foreign Minister , was sent by Sadat. President Sadat 's 
i nc l i na t i on towards the United States ushered an era of impro-
v«nent in the Cairo-Washington r e l a t i o n s . Although* the 
Egyptian and I s r a e l i Generals who met a t 101 kilometres on the 
Cairo-Suez Road, they did not find a concrete solut ion to the 
problems of exchange of prisoners of War (POW), disengagement of 
forces e t c . , and d\ie t o the r i s i n g tension, a renewed war seemed 
t o be in the offing. Secretary Kissinger, howerver, had been 
successful in arranging a cease- f i re Implementation agreement 
70, In a Joint US-Egyptian announcement on November 7, 1973, 
i t was s t a t ed t h a t "The Governments of the united States 
and of Egypt have agreed in p r inc ip le to resume diploma-
t i c r e l a t i ons a t an ear ly date . The two Governments have 
also agreed tha t in the meantime the respect ive i n t e r e s t s 
sect ions (s ic . ) of the two countries wil l be ra i sed 
immediately to the Ambassadorial level.** 
Weekly Cc^ipilation of Pres ident ia l Documents, Vol. 9, 
No. 45, November 12, 1973, pp. 1310-1311. 
And also see Department of Sf^te Bul le t in , Vol. LXDC, 
NO. 1798, December 10, 1973, p . 712. 
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dviring the f i r s t of a se r i es of his l ightening Middle East 
v i s i t s . The s ix point agreement which was ult imately signed 
by the Egyptian Lt . General Mohainmad el-Gamasi, and his I s r a e l i 
counterpar t . Major General Ahaton Yariv on November 11, 1973, 
a t 101 Kilometres on the Cairo-Suez Road, provided for an 
exchange of pr isoners (7,000 Egyptian pr isoners were held by 
I s r a e l i s and 450 I s r a e l i s were held by Egyptians) , regular 
sipplles to the Egyptian Third Army under the UN sipervis ion^ 
negot ia t ions on a more sa t i s f ac to ry cease- f i re l ine to be followed 
71 by general peace negot ia t ion. 
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia c r i t i c i s e d American perpetual 
svj^port t o Israel and King PaiSal was not convinced by Kissinger 
t h a t the o i l embargo should be l i f t e d . Kind Faisal stuck t o the 
demand of I s r a e l i withdrawal from a l l occupied t e r r i t o r i e s inc lu -
72 ding E a s t ' Jerusalem. On November 18, 19 73, the Arab o i l 
Minis ters who met in Vienna, decided t o cancel the cutback 
scheduled for December, against the European community. The 
decis ion was in pursuance of the pro-Arab stance by the Euro-
pean Common Market Countries regarding the Middle East c r i s i s . 
The embargo, however, was to be continued on the united 
71 . Peter Mansfield, "The Middle East in 1973", Middle East 
AfiRV l^ ReyA.SW (Essex) , 1974, pp. 13 and 15. 
And also see for further de ta i l s Keesina's Contemporary 
Archives, n. 26, p . 26203. 
72. I b i d . , p . 15. 
76 
73 S t a t e s and Ne the r l ands . On Nov«iiber 21* 1973* while speaking 
a t a p r e s s conference* Kiss inger a s s e r t e d t h a t "economic 
p r e s s u r e s " a g a i n s t t h e Uhited S t a t e s were **inappropriate" when 
t h e peace was being n e g o t i a t e d . But t h e embargo p r e s s u r e would 
not in f luence t h e US p o l i c y . He a l s o t h r e a t e n e d t h a t c o u n t e r -
74 
measures might be taken a g a i n s t t h e Arabs . The next day* Saudi 
Oi l Min is te r* Shaikh 2aki Yamani, t h r e a t e n e d t o blow vp t h e o i l 
75 f i e l d s in t h e event of any US m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . Due t o t h e o i l 
embargo* the s i t u a t i o n in Japan was becoming worse as t h e 
Japanese economy wholly depended on import of o i l from the Middle 
Eas t and i t s d a i l y consumption of o i l was 6.2 m i l l i o n b a r r e l s . 
For ty pe r cent of o i l needed by t h e Japanese i n d u s t r i e s was 
imported from t h e Middle E a s t . These f igu res were q u i t e s i g n i -
f i c a n t when i t was r e a l i s e d t h a t 70 p e r cent of J a p a n ' s t o t a l 
76 
energy consumption was der ived from o i l . While renouncing t h e 
n e u t r a l s t a n c e , Japan* on November 22, announced i t s f u l l sv:5)port 
t o the Aral3 c a u s e . Later* the Japanese prime Min is te r* Takeo , 
Mik i , whi le t o u r i n g var ious Arab c o u n t r i e s in mid-De<i:ember* 
exp l a ined t h e Japanese s t and and s i t u a t i o n , as a r e s u l t t h e 
7 3 . Middle East Economic Survey ( B e i r u t ) , Vol. X v i l , No. 5 , 
November 23* 1973, p . 5. 
74. yhe New York Times (New York)* November 22, 1973. 
7 5 . I b i d . # November 23* 1973, 
76 . William R. polk* n . 25* p . 404. 
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cutback S p e l l on Japan was l i f t e d . 
The s i g n i n g of t h e c e a s e - f i r e agreement on November 2 1 , 
19 73 , f u r t h e r paved t h e way fo r t h e Geneva Conference under t h e 
s h u t l i n g guidance of S e c r e t a r y K i s s i n g e r . I t would be noted 
t h a t in order t o b r ing I s r a e l t o t h e n e g o t i a t i n g t a b l e for 
f u r t h e r disengagement of fo rces along the Suez f r o n t , K i s s inge r 
promised t h e I s r a e l i s wi th t h e supply of more arms and s e c u r i t y . 
Equa l ly , i t was obvious t h a t Sec re ta ry Kiss inger i n h i s f i r s t 
t r i p t o t h e Middle Eas t e rn c o u n t r i e s had premised t h a t t h e 
f i r s t s t e p towards the I s r a e l i p u l l back would disengagement 
which would l ead t o the t o t a l I s r a e l i withdrawal from occupied 
t e r r i t o r i e s . While P re s iden t Sadat had a l r eady agreed t o a t t e n d 
t h e Geneva Conference, Kiss inger could not s i m i l a r l y i n f l u e n c e 
78 t h e Syrian p r e s i d e n t , Hafez Al-Assad. On December 3 1 , 19 73, t h e 
Peace Conference opened in Geneva in t h e P l a i s de N a t i o n s , which 
77. Hussein S i r r i y e h , n . 67, p p . 181-182. 
While meeting in Kuwait on December 25, 19 73, t h e Arab Oi l 
M i n i s t e r s "decided t o accord Japan s p e c i a l t r ea tment which 
would no t s u b j e c t i t t o t h e f u l l ex t en t of t h e a c r o s s - t h e -
board cutback measures , out of a d e s i r e t o p r o t e c t t h e 
Japanese economy and in the hope t h a t the Japanese Govern-
ment, i n a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h i s s t a n d , w i l l cont inue t o 
adopt j u s t and f a i r p o s i t i o n s v i s - a - v i s t h e Arab c a u s e . 
The assembled m i n i s t e r s , i n r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e p o l i t i c a l 
s t a n d on Belgium, a l s o decided t o l i f t t h e cut -back on 
o i l 8vppli€B t o t h a t c o u n t r y . . . " 
H4<34l9 ^,^s\ 69on<W]4.<S .gyg^^gX ( B e i r u t ) , v o l . x v i l . No. 10, 
December 28 ; 19 73, p . 11 • 
78. Alf red M. Lilienthal/>^^Kg~^f6nTgt>Cg^^ : What P r i c e 
Peace? (New York: D c ^ ^ e a d & Compan^^^l9>78) , pp . 627-628. 
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was a t t e n d e d by t h e F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r s o f t h e u n i t e d S t a t e s , 
S o v i e t Uhion/ Egyp t , J o r d a n and I s r a e l , w i t h o u t S y r i a n r e p r e -
s e n t a t i o n . The C o n f e r e n c e , which was a d j o u r n e d t h e n e x t d a y , 
p a v e d t h e way f o r f u r t h e r n e g o t i a t i o n s between Egypt and I s r a e l 
79 
which was c o n d u c t e d by K i s s i n g e r be tween Aswan and J e r u s a l e m , 
Dur ing t h e o i l embargo , S a u d i O i l M i n i s t e r , Zak i Yamani, 
p o i n t e d i o u t t h a t d e s p i t e t h e c u t i n o i l p r o d u c t i o n , A r a b s 
c o u l d e a r n more money t h a n c o u l d a b s o r b . C o n s e q u e n t l y , o i l 
p r i c e s s o a r e d . I t was on December 1 1 , 19 7 3 , t h a t I r a n announced 
t h e o i l p r i c e h i k e t ^ t o $ 1 7 . 4 0 b a r r e l . The Gulf O i l M i n i s t e r s , 
however , f i x e d t h e p r i c e s f o r t h e i r c r u d e o i l $ 11 .65 p e r b a r r e l . 
A l t h o u g h , t h e p r i c e s s o f t e n e d somewhat d u r i n g t h e e n s u i n g 
months y e t i t was obviovis t h a t p e t r o l e u m would be two o r t h r e e 
t i m e s a s e x p e n s i v e a s i n p r e v i o u s y e a r s and t h i s would n o t o n l y 
a f f e c t t h e p r i c e of goods which would be p r o d u c e d by t h e 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d c o u n t r i e s o r t h e funds f o r deve lopment p u r p o s e s 
t o t h e p o o r c o u n t r i e s but a m a s s i v e s h i f t of t h e wor ld m o n e t a r y 
80 
s t r u c t u r e would a l s o be w i t n e s s e d . These f a c t o r s were c e r t a i n l y 
r e c o g n i s e d d u r i n g t h e Midd le £ a s t c r i s i s a s most i m p o r t a n t 
f a c t o r s t h a t l e d t h e Uh i t ed S t a t e s t o i n t e r v e n e d r a m a t i c a l l y 
and r e p e a t e d l y i n p u r s u a n c e of a c h i e v i n g a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n t o 
81 t h e Middle E a s t c r i s i s . On December 27 , 1 9 7 3 , K i s s i n g e r , i n 
7 9 . I b i d * , p . 6 2 8 . 
8 0 . W i l l i a m R. P o l k , n . 25, p . 406 . 
8 1 . I b i d . 
79 
a news Conference in Washington r e i t e r a t e d his disappointment 
82 
with the o i l embargo imposed on the united S t a t e s . 
I t was, however, in December 1973, that Saudi Oil 
Minis ter , Zakl Yaroani, in a meeting with Kissinger in 
Washington, indicated that i f I s r a e l i withdrawal began, the 
embargo and cutback would be modified. This was, in f a c t , a 
s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t from the or ig ina l c a l l for the unconditional 
83 I s r a e l i withdrawal. No doubt, Kiss inger ' s ear ly success 
t o bring about a c e a s e - f i r e agreement between Egypt and Israe l 
which l e d the Egyptian and I s r a e l i troops on each s i d e of the 
84 Canal# was considered to be a major breakthrough. This peace 
e f for t made by the United States was a l s o recognised by the 
Arab Oil Ministers meeting on December 25,19 73 and i t was s a i d 
82 . Secretary Kissinger expressed that "I am expressing 
the view that the Uhited States has c o n s i s t e n t l y taken 
and which I have expressed at every previous press 
Conference; namely, that discriminatory ac t ion against 
the united States becomes Increas ingly inapprcpriate when 
the united States i s the principal covntry engaging 
I t s e l f in search for a just and durable peace i n the 
Middle East . This i s a p o s i t i o n that has been taken by 
t h i s aanln i s trat ion from the beginning". 
•Pfflg.»r^gnt, of §p^^% fiva,;fi^.;^p, vo l . LXX, NO. 1804, 
January 21 , 1974, pp. 51-52. 
8 3 . Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Cr i s i s (New Yorkj 
Monthly Review p r e s s , 1975) , p . 227» 
84 . Ib id . , p . 228. 
80 
in communique t h a t s 
"The Min i s t e r s noted wi th s a t i s f a c t i o n t h e 
g radua l change which has begun t o become ev ident 
in American pub l i c opin ion/ s i g n i f i c a n t segment 
of i t has begun t o r ecogn ize t h e r e a l i t y of t h e 
Arab problem and I s r a e l ' s expans ion i s t p o l i c y . 
The assembled M i n i s t e r s hope t h a t t h e d e s i r e of 
t h e U.S. Government to p a r t i c i p a t e in the sea rch 
for a j u s t peaceful s e t t l e m e n t of t h e problem 
w i l l be f r u i t f u l and wi l l l e ad t o r e s u l t s b e n e f i -
c i a l t o the peoples of t h e world and in p a r t i c u l a r 
t o b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s between the Arab and 
American peop le s . "85 
On January 11* 1974, S e c r e t a r y Ki s s inge r s t a r t e d h i s 
t h i r d Middle Eas t t o u r and flew t o Aswan t o meet p r e s i d e n t 
Sadat of Egypt in pursuance of t h e peace s e t t l emen t p r o c e s s . 
The fol lowing day, he s h u t t l e d t o I s r a e l t o meet t h e I s r a e l i 
Cabine t and r e t u r n e d back t o Egypt on the 13th of January . 
Again he flew t o I s r a e l on 14th, and on 16th of Januairy, 1974, 
he went both t o Egypt and I s r a e l . Agreement between both 
c o u n t r i e s regarding disengagement of forces was secured by 
K i s s i n g e r so t h a t i t could be announced s imul taneous ly in Egypt, 
86 
I s r a e l and t h e un i t ed S t a t e s on January 17, 1974. 
8 5 . Middle East Economic Survey (Beirut) , Vol. XVII, No. 10, 
December 28, 1973, p . n , 
8 6 . William R. po lk , n . 25, p p . 406-407. 
The US P r e s i d e n t , Nixon, on January 17, 19 74, expressed 
t h a t he had an announcement r e g a r d i n g Middle East which 
s t a t e d t h a t "In accordance with t h e dec i s i on of t h e 
Geneva Conference, the Governments of Egypt and I s r a e l , 
wi th t h e a s s i s t a n c e of t h e Goverrment of t he un i t ed 
S t a t e s , have reached agreement on t h e disengagement and 
s e p a r a t i o n of t h e i r m i l i t a r y f o r c e s . The agreement i s 
c o n t d . . . . . 
81 
The agreement was divioecl i n to two p a r t s : The f i r s t 
p a r t provided with the ac tual pullback of troops and the 
c rea t ion of disengagement aones. The second p a r t deal t with 
the arins and troops l imi t a t ion in t he zones. Details of the 
second p a r t were kept secre t and t h i s was signed ty president 
Sadat in Aswan and Premier Golda Meir in Jerusalem. The t r e a t y 
which contained the withdrawal of forces was signed at lOl 
kilometre on the Suez-Cairo Road. Kissinger at tended both the 
signing ceremonies. While the signing ceremony of the f i r s t 
p a r t was presided over by the Commander of the United Nations 
Emergency Force (UMEF) , L t . General Ensio Siil&svxio, the 
Egyptian and the I s r a e l i Chiefs of Staff-Major General 
Mohammad el-Gamasi and Lt . General David Elazar became the 
cont d.« • • 
scheduled t o be signed by the Chiefs of Staff of Egypt 
and I s rae l a t noon Egypt-Israel time^ Friday, January 
18, a t Kilanetre (sic) lOl on the Cairo-Suez Road. The 
Commander of the Ubited Natiions Emergency Force, General 
Si i lasvuo/ has been asked by the p a r t i e s t o witness 
signing*. 
Department of s t a t e Bulletfnf Vbl. LXX, No. I8O7, 
February 11, 19 74, pp. 145-146. 
And a l so see for ftjcther d e t a i l s , Thomas A. Bryson, 
^>nigrt9fln IttP3.9fP^U.g .Rei^^i^gn? >flv.l:i.^fag..M^^ltiae ¥i^§Xi 
;i784-1,?75 J A Suryev (New Jersey , The Scarecrow press , 
i n o 1977) , p . 289. 
82 
87 
s i g n a t o r i e s of t h e t r e a t y . 
I t would be noted t h a t Sadat regime was now committed 
t o the cause of peac^ which t h e I s r a e l Government recognized so 
c l e a r l y t h a t i t had demobi l i sed „ large chunk o f . i t s a r m y immexiia— 
t e l y . But p r e s iden t S a d a t ' s p o l i c y of r e l y i n g heav i ly on 
K i s s i n g e r ' s goodwill was c r i t i c i s e d by most of h i s c l o s e f r i ends 
and s u p p o r t e r s , inc l uding Mohamed He ika l , t he i n f l u e n t i a l e d i t o r 
of Egyptian Newspaper J^|„-A h^retm« He was a l s o c r i t i c i s e d for h i s 
f a i l u r e to secure t h e r e t u r n of t h e o i l f i e l d s in the S i n a i 
p e n i n s u l a / which was Egyp t ' s major economic a s s e t . Sadat 
unheeded t h e c r i t i c i s m and went t o t h e ex ten t t o work wi th firm 
88 
commitments with the un i t ed S t a t e s , on Janizary 22, 19 74, while 
87 . The t e x t of t h e agreement was accompanied by a map 
d e l i n e a t i n g the zones of disengagement. I s r a e l was t o 
abandon i t s bridgehead on t h e west bank of t h e Suez 
Canal and withdraw i t s forces on the e a s t bank 14-2© 
m i l e s 'fron t h e waterway. In the Southern S e c t o r , t h e 
I s r a e l i s would be deployed immediately west of t h e Mi t l a 
and Giddi p a s s e s , which c o n t r o l l e d t h e r o u t e s i n t o t h e 
h e a r t of t he S i n a i p e n i n s u l a . The Egyptians were t o remain 
on t h e e a s t bank i n a 5-7*5 mi le wide zone. The I s r a e l i 
zone was t o be of equal s i z e . Both f a r ce s were t o be 
s e p a r a t e d by a buffer zone 3 * 5 - 5 mi les deep p a t r o l l e d by 
UNEF t r o o p s . 
L e s t e r A. Sobel (Edited) , Peace-makinq in the Middle Eas t 
(New YorKs Fac ts on F i l e , I n c . , 1980), p . 7 . 
8 8 . Various rumours c i r c u l a t e d through the Middle East about a 
quid p ro -quo- the amount of a i d which the Uhited S t a t e s 
would g ive t o Egypt fol lowing a ccanclusion of peace . No 
a u t h o r i t a t i v e f i gu re were brought forward b u t , in May, t h e 
a d n i n i s t r a t i o n put a r eques t t o the Congress for an approp-
r i a t i o n of $ 250 m i l l i o n t o a s s i s t i n the r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e 
Suez Canal and o the r p r o j e c t s . 
William R. poik , n . 25, p . 407, 
83 
r e p l y i n g t h e q u e s t i o n of c o n t i n u a t i o n of o i l embargo a t t h e 
t i m e of American p e a c e e f f o r t s , K i s s i n g e r r e s p o n d e d t h a t t h e 
d i s engagemen t ag reemen t would l e a d t o t h e end of o i l embargo 
89 
a s i n d i c a t e d by c e r t a i n Arab l e a d e r s . 
On J a n u a r y 2 3 , 1974, p r e s i d e n t S a d a t made a d e c l a r a t i o n 
i n t h e p r e s s C o n f e r e n c e t h a t U n i t e d S t a t e s ' a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s t h e 
9 0 A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t had s i g n i f i c a n t l y changed , p r e s i d e n t 
S a d a t / d u r i n g h i s s i x - d a y t o u r t o t h e Arab c a p i t a l s * i n c l u d i n g 
t h e o i l p r o d u c e r s , e x p l a i n e d t h e d i sengagemen t ag reement and 
t r i e d t o mould p u b l i c o p i n i o n f o r t h e end of o i l embargo on 
A m e r i c a . At t h e same t i m e . King F a i s a l a l s o showed i n c l i n a t i o n 
in f a v o u r o f l i f t i n g t h e embargo . I t was , however , opposed 
91 
s h a r p l y by A l g e r i a , I r a q , L ibya and S y r i a . 
Meanwhi le , S o v i e t un ion f e l t i t s e l f q u i t e a l o o f and 
u p s t a g e d by American d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s and deve lopment s 
8 9 . J o e S t o r k , n . 8 3 , p . 2 3 9 . 
9 0 . -y^ f^ e New York Times (New Y o r k ) , J a n \ : a r y 2 4 , 1 9 7 4 . 
9 1 . S y r i a was o p e n l y c r i t i c a l of S a d a t ' s w i l l i n g n e s s t o 
d i s e n g a g e t h e Suez f r o n t w i t h o u t any n e g o t i a t i o n s on 
t h e Golan , p e r m i t t i n g t h e I s r a e l i s t o c o n c e n t r a t e f o r c e s 
t h e r e . Any p r o p o s a l t o weaken o r end t h e embargo would 
t h u s have s m a l l chance of a c c e p t a n c e of a good number of 
Arab S t a t e s w i t h o u t S y r i a n conc\xr rence o r a t l e a s t v i s i b l e 
p r o g r e s s on t h e Golan d i s e n g a g e m e n t . 
J o e S t o r k , n . 8 3 , p . 2 3 9 . 
84 
in t h e r e g i o n . At t h e same t i m e , she sought t o prove h e r s e l f 
as the major f a c t o r i n the Middle Eas t p o l i t i c s . In pursuance 
of such p o l i c y , i t appeared t h a t t h e Sov ie t s s t i m u l a t e d the 
Syr ians t o ca r ry on the war and in Janua ry , 1974, supp l i ed then 
wi th the ni ic lear capable Scud-B m i s s i l e which had a range of 
92 165 m i l e s . I t was a t t h i s moment t h a t whi le r ecogn i s ing t h e 
Sovie t antagonism. S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , K i s s inge r , a r ranged 
meet ing with t h e Soviet Foreign M i n i s t e r , Andrei Grcmyoko, in 
Cyprus, and a l so in var ious p u b l i c s t a t emen t s r e a s s u r e d t h e 
S o v i e t s t h a t America d id not in tend for t h e i r exc lus ion from 
93 t h e i n f l u e n t i a l p o s i t i o n in t h e Middle Eas t r e g i o n . While 
t h e implementat ion of t h e E g y p t - I s r a e l i disengagement agreement 
was-, on, t h e un i t ed S t a t e s and the Sovie t Uhion were making 
e f f o r t s by mutual c o n s u l t a t i o n s t o ach ieve a disengagement 
94 agreement between Syr ia and I s r a e l . 
I t was dur ing the meetings of the o i l m i n i s t e r s he ld in 
T r i p o l i and Vienna from March 13 t o 18, 1974, t h a t t h e m i n i s t e r s 
dec ided t o l i f t t h e o i l embargo on t h e un i t ed S t a t e s . 
9 2 . William R. Polk , n . 25 , p . 409. 
9 3 . I b i d . , p . 410. 
9 4 . Surendra Bhutani , n . 65 # p . 1 1 1 . 
9 5 . The communique which was i s s u e d in Vienna on March 18, 
s t a t e d t h a t * . . . t h e r e were s igns of man i fe s t ing t h e m s e l -
ves in many American c i r c l e s of a more even handed US 
p o l i c y in t h e Middle East v i s - a - v i s t h e Arab world. The 
Oi l M i n i s t e r s a r e aware t h a t o i l i s a weapon t h a t can be 
employed in a p o s i t i v e manner t o y i e l d more e f f e c t i v e 
r e s u l t s than may be ob ta ined from i t s use in a n e g a t i v e 
f a s h i o n . There fo re , they came out of t h e meet ings with 
contd 
85 
Meanwhile* Kissinger once again shut t led between Damascus 
and Jerusalem, During the course* he explained the demand of 
each s ide t o the other and made ef for ts t o find a solut ion to 
96 
s a t i s f y both the Syrians and the I s r a e l i s . Finally* on May 29, 
1974* Nixon announced tha t the negot ia t ions between Syria and 
I s r a e l ca r r ied by Secretary Kissinger had successfully r e su l t ed 
in "an agreement on the disengag«T\ent of Syrian and I s r a e l i 
97 
forces'** which would be signed on May 31* 1974. The disengage-
ment agreement between Syria and I s rae l was signed on May 3 i , 
I 
under the UN auspices. I t provided for the withdrawal of 
I s r a e l i troops from t h e i r advanced pos i t ions in the Golan Heights. 
The bulk of the Heights was* however* l e f t under the I s r a e l i 
con t ro l . A neu t ra l zone which was es tabl i shed , was t o be super-
98 vised by the UN Disengag«inent observer Force (UNDOF); This 
force, which was simposed t o be consisted of 1*250 men did not 
c o n t d . . . 
the decisions for the enployment of the o i l weapon in a 
pos i t ive manner with a view to encouraging those countr ies 
which showed will ingness and determination to s t r i v e for a jiist solut ion t o the Arab question leading t o the complete 
termination 6£ the occi:pation and res to ra t ion of the 
legi t imate r igh t s of the Pa le s t in i ans . " 
f i dd le East Economic Survey (Beirut) , \t>l. XVII* No. 22, 
March 22, 19 74, pp^ 6-7. 
And a l so see for fur ther d e t a i l s The New York Times (New York)* March 19, 1974. 
96. William R. polk* n. 25* p . 410. 
97 . Department of Shate Bulletin* V< 
1974* p . 679. 
98 . George Lenczowski* n. 3* p . 568. 
Vol. LXX, No. 1826, June 24 
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belong to the five permanent members of the Security Council, 
According to the Agreement* prisoners of war were exchanged 
between Syria and Israel on June 1, 1974, and on June 5, 1974, 
99 
disengagement of forces began. 
In June , 1974, P r e s i d e n t Nixon t ou red t h e Middle Eas t 
c o u n t r i e s and Egyptian p r e s i d e n t Sadat announced t h a t t h e s o l u -
t i o n of P a l e s t i n i a n i s s u e could be found without harming the 
I s r a e l i e x i s t e n c e and i t was indeed a welcome g e s t u r e . While 
o f f e r i n g t h e American nuc lea r technology for power p l a n t s in 
Egypt and I s r a e l , Nixon i n r e t u r n sought t h a t both t h e r e c i p i e n t 
c o u n t r i e s would agree t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s p e c t i o n . Th i s was 
s t i l l r e j e c t e d by I s r a e l whereas Sadat was cons ide r ing t h e o f f e r 
100 
as a s i g n of P a l e s t i n i a n s t a t e on t h e west bank and Ga2a S t r i p , 
During h i s v i s i t t o Riyadh, p r e s i d e n t Nixon h i g h l i g h t e d 
Saudi A r a b i a ' s c r u c i a l r o l e ijn the US Peace e f f o r t s . As a r e s u l t , 
t h e US t e c h n o l o g i c a l help was confirmed as a p o s i t i v e response 
t o t h e moderat ing r o l e , p layed by Saudi Arabia among the o i l 
101 
p roduce r s during the embargo. 
9 9 . Surendra Bhutani , h . 65, p . I l l , 
100 . Georgiana G. Stevens , n, 19, p . 12. 
101. Ibid. 
Faisal controlled the largest single source of crude oil, 
in the context of the confrontation with Israel, questions 
of how to use oil resources as a lever and a weapon were 
unavoidable. Before the War, it was sufficient for Faisal 
merely to talk about not raising production. Once the War 
contd.. «, 
87 
On October 28, 19 74, heads of twenty Arab Governments 
decided in Arab Sunroit Conference at Rabat that any Pa les t in ian 
t e r r i t o r y , which would be re l inquished by the I s r a e l i s should be 
taken over by the Pa les t ine Liberation Organisation (FLO), the 
102 
s o l e representat ive of t h e Pa les t in ian people . I srae l outr ight ly 
r e j e c t e d the of fer t o deal with the PLO and the decis ions for a 
103 
peaceful se t t l ement , however, became impossible . In March, 1975, 
pres ident sadat sa id that he would not object to an extension 
of the peace keeping mandate. The Suez Canal was reopened 
t o t r a f f i c in J \ne , 1975, and Sadat rebuilded the c i t i e s in the 
contd. 
broke out, Faisal had t o a c t . At the f i r s t meeting of the 
Arab Oil-producing s t a t e s , held more than ten days a f t er 
the f ight ing broke out and then only as a re su l t of publ ic 
pressure frcxn Sddat, Faisal i n i t i a l l y blocked strong pro-
posals for an embargo of the United S t a t e s , and, of course, 
refused t o fol low the Iraqi example of n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . 
Only af ter president Nixon proposed $ 2 .2 b i l l i o n in arms 
a id t o Israe l did Faisal consent t o the embargo. Faisal 
c e r t a i n l y wanted t o pressure the united States i n t o taking 
a more **pro-Arab" stand, but he was a l s o convened t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e in the embargo or face a l o s s of inf luence in 
the Arab world, and, perhaps, even his throne, 
Joe Stork, n . 83 , pp. 237-233. 
102. See for the t e x t of the summit dec i s ions Journal of 
Pa le s t ine StU(^l^s, Vol, IV. NO. 3 , Spring, 1975, pp.177-178. 
The subsequent period between 1967 and 19 73 was marked by 
new type of confrontat ion. The Arab Pales t in ians under the 
leadership of pLO had been trying through diplomatic and 
p o l i t i c a l means t o achis ve t h e i r ina l i enab le r ight t o return 
to t h e i r homeland. 
Faisal Odeh Matlag Al Rfough, Quest for Pea^ce s United 
Nations and Pa les t ine (New Delhij National Book 
Organisation, 1986) , p . 13 5. 




AS a r e s u l t of K i s s i n g e r ' s s h u t t l e diplomacy, another 
i n t e r i m E g y p t - I s r a e l Agreement was proavx:ed on September 1,19 75 . 
Th i s Agreement was regarded as S i n a i I I , in which i t s t a t e d t h a t 
t h e Egypt ians would advance t o the I s r a e l i l i n e and I s r a e l would 
withdraw t o the e a s t of Mi t la and Gicdl pas se s which would be 
ma in t a ined as a n e u t r a l zone by the UN Force s t a t i o n e d in t h e 
a r e a . I s r a e l would r e t u r n Egypt t h e Abu Rodies o i l f i e l d s wi th 
a connected road t o them. I t was agreed t h a t n o n - m i l i t a r y 
ca rgoes d e s t i n e d t o I s r a e l would pass through the Suez Cana l . 
They f u r t h e r agreed t o avoid using fo rce or t h r e a t t o them. 
I t was a l s o provided t h a t t h e r e would be ope ra t i on of Radar 
Warning Systems in the Mi t l a and Giddi pas se s which vould be 
105 
manned by American t e c h n i c i a n s . On September 4 , 19 7 5, t h i s 
agreement was s igned in Geneva. Saudi Arabia and Kuvfait endorsed 
i t a f t e r Kiss inger p ledged t h a t he vould con t inue h i s e f f o r t s on 
106 
t h e Golan f ront as w e l l . 
104 . .Ibi.<lt, p . 1 3 . 
105. iMsii 
See for f u r t h e r d e t a i l s Michael Comay, " UN peace Keepings 
The I s r a e l i Experience** in Henry Wiseman (Edited) , £eace 
,K?epi^qt Appra i sa l s & Proposals (New Yorks pergamon p r e s s . 
1983) , p . 9 8 . 
And a l s o see for f u l l t e x t of the Agreement, Department 
of Sta^e pujLletin, Vbl. LXXIII, No. 189 2, September 29, 
1975, p p . 466-470. 
106. Ibid», 
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The Sovie t r o l e in the Middle East was adve r se ly a f f e c t e d , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r the October 1973 war as t h e a u t h o r i t i e s in 
Kremlin d id not foresee the events and wi thheld i n i t i a l l y the 
supp ly of s o p h i s t i c a t e d weapons t o Egypt in s p i t e of p r e s i d e n t 
107 
S a d a t ' s r e q u e s t s for weaponry. Consequent ly, Egypt ians were 
i n c l i n e d towards the un i t ed S t a t e s both in ecoiomic and p o l i t i c a l 
a f f a i r s . The war, however, r ed iced t h e Sovie t i n f luence and 
108 
r e p l a c e d t h e Sovie t s by t h e -Americans in t h e r e g i o n . 
The October war indeed pa id good dividends t o t h e Arabs 
as a l l t h e Arab c o u n t r i e s unanimously r a i s e d the voice a g a i n s t 
I s r a e l i s and became un i t ed for t h e f i r s t t ime to face t h e 
109 
I s r a e l i cha l l enge d e s p i t e d i f f e rences and d i sco rd among them. 
Secondly , for t h e f i r s t t i m e , OPEC Arabs r e a l i s e d t h a t o i l 
107. surendra Bhutani , "Egypt ian-Sovie t Encounter Since the 
War of October , 1973: The I s r a e l i Eva lua t i on" , in 
Surendra Bhutani (Edited) , Arab E^^ -^ t Tod^y (New Delh i : 
Kalamkar prakashan (P) L t d . , 1981), p . 6 8 . 
And a l s o see for f u r t h e r d e t a i l s F ranc i s Fukayama, 
".New D i r e c t i o n s fo r Soviet Middle Eas t p o l i c y in 
t h e 1980s t Imp l i ca t i on for the A t l a n t i c A l l i ance" 
in Steven L. Spiegel (Edited) , The Middle East and 
t h e Weste^rp A l l i a n c e (London : George Allen & Unwin 
(pub l i shers ) L t d . , 1982), p . 132. 
108 . I b i d ^ 
109. Harold M. Wal ler , **Some Measures of Co-exis tence 
with Arab World, I s r a e l Goal" , I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
fe^rspec t ives . March/Apr i l , 1974, p . 24. 
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could be used as a p o l i t i c a l weapon t o bargain t h e i r i n t e r e s t s 
in the in te rna t iona l fora and eventual ly the OAPEC decided to 
play a s ign i f ican t ro le in production and reduction of o i l and 
in manipulation of i t s pr ice / which of coiurse/ would affect the 
110 
e n t i r e economy of the world* The united States f i n a l l y r e a l i s e d 
the importance of o i l which could be instrumental t o influence 
and mould the p o l i t i c s in the region. Sadat asser ted tha t the 
October War had marked the emergence of Arab as the s i x t h power 
111 
in the world. 
Although the " shu t t l e diplomacy" pursued by Kissinger, 
was p a r t i a l l y successful as he had secured Egypt- Is rae l i agreement 
on troop disengagement on January 18/ 19 74, but i t f a i l ed t o 
112 
include the other Arab countries in t h i s peace process . Further, 
Kiss inger ' s s tep-by-step approach aimed at fragmenting the Arab 
113 
camp and s o l i d a r i t y . 
110, "Yom Kippur War provided OAPEC with p o l i t i c a l Motivation", 
In ternat ional Perspect ives. November/December, 19 75# p . 5, 
111. Col. B.K. Narayan/ n . 41 , p . 35 . 
112, Cecil V. Crabb, J r . , Inv i ta t ion t o Struggle : <;tonqresa. 
the president and Foreign Poliev (Washington, D . C : 
Congress Quarterly p ress , 1984), p , 112. 
113. William R. Polk, The Elusive Peace s The Middle East in 
the Twentieth Century (London t Croom Helm* 19 79) , p . 126. 
91 
The 1973 War proved to be extremely cos t ly for I s r a e l 
as i t sxifferecl heavy casua l t i e s apart from the heavy financial 
expenditure* I t impaired I s r a e l ' s economic v i a b i l i t y and 
increased the dependence vpon the united S t a t e s . Similarly# 
Egypt had been f inanc ia l ly exhausted due t o the 25 years confron-
t a t i o n with I s rae l and i t had neglected the country 's domestic 
problems. President Sadat contended t h a t the s t r a i n in Egypt-
I s r a e l i r e l a t i o n s m\ist be paci f ied in order t o devote the 
114 Egyptian Government's a t t en t ion pr imar i ly t o i n t e r n a l needs. 
114. Cecil V. Crabb, J r . , n, 112, p . 112. 
CHAPTER - I I I 
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AMD ITS IMPACT ON MIDDLE EAST POLITICS 
With t h e a s s u m p t i o n of o f f i c e a s t h e US p r e s i d e n t / 
Jimmy C a r t e r d e c i d e d t o l a u n c h n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e p a r t i e s 
i n v o l v e d in t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t and t o r e s o l v e t h e 
1 
c r i s i s b e f o r e t h e end of 1977 . p r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s a p p r o a c h 
t o t h e Midd le E a s t c r i s i s was i n s h a r p c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e 
fo rmer S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e # Henry K i s s i n g e r and former p r e s i -
d e n t G e r a l d Rudolph Ford , in t h r e e r e s p e c t - (a) u n l i k e t h e 
s t e p - b y - s t e p a p p r o a c h of K i s s i n g e r # C a r t e r a imed a t a compre -
h e n s i v e s e t t l e m e n t , (b) he s o u g h t t o b r i n g t h e S o v i e t Union 
i n t o t h e Peace- tnaking p r o c e s s , (c) C a r t e r r e g a r d e d t h e p a l e s t i -
2 
n i a n r o l e a s s i g n i f i c a n t in any s e t t l e m e n t . 
American I n i t i a t i v e 
In p u r s u a n c e of h i s p o l i c y of a m i c a b l e s o l u t i o n t o t h e 
M i d d l e E a s t p roblem* P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r s e n t t h e S e c r e t a r y of 
1 . E l a i n e p Adam ( E d i t e d ) , Amer ican F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s , 1222' 
A Docvinentarv Record (New York: New York U h i v e r s i t y p r e s s , 
1979) / p . 4 7 . 
And a l s o s e e f o r f u r t h e r d e t a i l s I s r a e l A l tman , "The 
E g y p t i a u m - I s r a e l i N e g o t i a t i o n s ' * i n C o l i n Legun ( E d i t e d ) / 
Midd le E a s t Contemporary S u r v e y . Vol . I I , 1977-78 
(New York J Holmes & Meieir- P u b l i s h e r s , I n c . , 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 8 5 . 
2 . R o b e r t S t e p h e n s , "US Thoughts T u r n i n g Back t o Geneva" , 
M i d d l e E a s t i n t e r n a t i o n a l (London) , N Q . 8 6 , A u g u s t , 
1978 , p . 4 . 
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State, Cyrus vance on a fact finding mission to Israel and some 
3 
Arab s t a t e s in February 1977. on the conclusion of h i s tour on 
February 21, 1977, Vance noted t h a t the Arabs and I s r a e l i s were 
4 
"sharply divided" on the peace process , president Carter d iscus-
sed the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Geneva Conference with the I s r a e l i 
prime Minister , n t z h a k Rabin from March 7 - 8, 19 77 in 
Washington. Carter , howerer, proposed a new sor t of settlement 
and in order t o please Rabin, he refer red t o I s r a e l ' s need for 
5 
"defensible borders". The recognised borders would be mutual 
and permanent and they would be accepted by the Arabs and 
I s r a e l i s a l i ke . Carter further maintained tha t I s r a e l i withdra-
wal from the occvpied areas with some "minor adjustments" was 
3 . The Arab s t a t e s to which Secretary Vance was expected t o 
v i s i t were Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Saudi Arabia, 
public papers of the Presidents of the United S ta tes ; 
Jimmy Carter , January 20 t o June 2A. 1977 (Washington: 
United States Government pr in t ing o'ffice, 1977) , p . 17. 
4 . Secretairy ^Ance further expressed tha t "on the other hand, 
there are areas of common ground which provide a basis 
for some encouragement in the fact tha t a l l of them r e a l l y 
do, s incere ly in my judgement believe tha t t he re i s a 
desperate need for peace. That i s a pos i t i ve factor ." 
Dep^rtffient .of s t a t e fivilletjjLL vol . LXXVI, NO. i968, 
March 14, 1977, p . 222. 
5. Michael Adams, "The Arab-Is rae l i Confrontation, 1967-8<y*, In 
The Middle East and Nnrth Africa. 1980-.81 (London-. Europa 
publicat ions Limited, 1980) , p . 47. 
This stand was in contras t with the United Nations Security 
council Resolution 24 2, which referred to the "secure and 
recognised borders ." 
See for de t a i l s o f f i c i a l Records of the Security Council(SCOR) 
Twenty Second Year, Reso:\utions and Decisions, 1967, p . 8. 
94 
also necessary, president Sadat of Egypt c r i t i c i s e d C a r t e r ' s 
proposal during his address a t the opening of the t h i r t e en th 
session of the Pales t ine National Council (PNC) on March 12, 
7 
1977, 
Bxjt i t was on March 16, 19 77, t h a t president Carter made 
a h i s t o r i c statement ca l l ing for a "homeland" for the P a l e s t i -
g 
n ians . At the same time he observed t h a t : 
"Pales t in ians claim t i l l t h i s mcment tha t 
I s rae l has no r i g h t t o be t h e r e . . . and they 've 
never yet given up the i r publ ic ly professed 
commitment t o destroy I s r a e l . This has to be 
overcome". 9 
6. president Carter explained tha t " t h i s would involve 
subs tan t ia l withdrawal of I s r a e l ' s present control over 
t e r r i t o r i e s . Now^  where t h a t withdrawal might end, I 
don ' t know. I would guess i t would be seme minor 
adjustments in the 1967 borders. But that s t i l l remains 
to be negot ia ted . . . I think there might be minor 
adjustments ^^ ^he 1967-pre-1967 borders'*. 
Department of State Bul le t in , Vol. LXXVI, No. 1971, 
April 4, 1977. pp . 306 and 307. 
7. president Sadat asser ted t h a t the i ssue of secure borders 
was "nothing but a fantasy. I t i s not admissible tha t any-
body should speak of secure boundaries as pa r t of the 
I s r a e l i c o n c ^ t i o n ; i t i s absolutely unjust and uiacceptable. 
Al-Ahram (Cairo), March 13, 1977. 
8. president Carter in a speech to a town hal l meeting in 
Clinton, Massachusetts, declared tha t " there has t o be 
homeland provided for the Pa les t in ian refugees who have 
suffered for many years . " 
Pfipartment of Stpat^ e Bul le t in , \tol. LXXVI, NO. 1972, 
April 11, 1977, p . 335. 
9 . Ibl<?.i 
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I t -was the f i r s t time in the h i s to ry of American d ip lo-
macy tha t the Uiited States president piiblicly ca l led for a 
"homeland" for the Pales t in ians which automatically meant t ha t 
the Pa les t in ians had legi t imate r i gh t s t o Pa les t ine . The 
Pales t ine Liberation Organisation (PLO) leader , Yasser Arafat 
remarked t h a t : 
" I t i s a progressive step becaxase i t means he 
has f ina l ly put h is hand on the heart of the 
problem of the Middle East C r i s i s . I t helps the 
whole s i t u a t i on" . 10 
Whereas president Car t e r ' s ca l l came as a great shock 
and dismay in I s r a e l i c i r c l e and I s rae l suspected Carter of 
being influenced by the Brookings Report of 1975, t ha t contained 
11 
a blueprint for a Middle Eastern se t t lement . In fac t , i t was 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Ca r t e r ' s National Security Advisor who 
12 
contr ibuted t o the document as one of i t s framers. president 
Sadat of Egypt who reached Washington on April 4, 19 7 7, t o 
confer with his counterpart in the l^iited S ta tes , re jec ted 
10. Quoted in '*Code Words from an Oracle", Time (New York) , 
March 28, 19 77, p . 22, 
1 1 . I f e i ^ , • ',-
The repoi;t provided for the resolut ion of Palest ine question 
and urged the Arab p a r t i e s to work for the normalisation of 
in te rna t iona l and regional p o l i t i c a l and economic r e l a t i o n s , 
which would be in exchange for the withdrawal of Is rae l t o 
the June 5, 1967 l i n e s , with some mutually accepted modifi-
cat ions. 
Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , Towards Peace in the Middle East? 
fieport of a study Grovjg) (Washington: Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , 
1975) , p . 2. 
1 2 . J.fe4,<a,t,.. 
96 
13 
C a r t e r ' s plan of "defensible borders". He, however, appreciated 
the US p re s iden t ' s move fcr a Pales t in ian homeland. He further 
expressed t h a t the Pa l e s t i n i an ' s pa r t i c ipa t ion was indespensible 
t o bring about the peace in the region and he sought us help in 
• 14 
convening t h e Geneva Conference. 
Meanwhile George W. B a l l , a former US Under-Secretary of 
Sta t e , <ireated a sensation by writ ing an a r t i c l e in the April 
issue of Foreign Affairs e n t i t l e d "How to save Is rae l in sp i t e of 
herself" and Ball suggested t h a t the united States should asser t 
i t s e l f as to protec t t he sovereignty of I s r a e l . He contended 
t h a t : 
" I t i s not whether we should t r y to force an unpa-
l a t a b l e peace on the I s r a e l i people, but r a the r 
. how much longer we should continue to support 
po l i c i e s t h a t impede progress toward p e a c e . . . 
With a l l the dangers t h a t holds not enly for 
the i ndus t r i a l i s ed democraties of Western • 
Europe and Japan . . . " 15 
' • " ' J , . I I I I . I I. - . - . - . . I . - I I II I. • 
13. Sadat contended tha t "Sovereignty is i n d i v i s i b l e , and we 
cannot have two borders - each country has one border." 
AJ.-Ahram (Cairo) , April 8, 1977. 
14. Ib id . 
15. Ball further observed t h a t "The unhappy dilemma of I s rae l 
i s t h a t so long as she refuses t o give up the t e r r i t o r i a l 
gains from her 19 67 conquest and thus prevents poss ib le 
progress toward peace, she must continue as a ward of the 
united S ta t e s . " 
George W. Wall, "How to Save I s r ae l in Spite of herself" , 
Foreign ^ f f a i r s . Vol. 55, No. 3 , April 1977, p . 464. 
97 
Thus, Ball urged the United States t o take a firin stand 
to "save I s rae l from herself". George Ba l l ' s a r t i c l e r a i s ed 
an I s r a e l i fear of American imposed solut ion t o the Middle East 
problem/ although Carter Adnninistration regarded his views as 
17 
unconducive. 
In a Jo in t press interview in London, on May 11, 19 77, 
the US Secretary of Stete^ ^fence soxight t o assure the I s r a e l i 
Foreign Minister , Yigal Allon t h a t the United States would 
maintain i t s "special re la t ionsh ip" and the I s r a e l i jsecurity would 
be ensured through perpetual m i l i t a ry and technological a s s i s -
. 18 
tance in futixre. The I s r a e l i Foreign Minister , Allon, t«)wever, 
was convinced and he appreciated Cyrus V&nce for having 
reassured the American pos i t ive role in the process of 
16. Ball asser ted t h a t "Thus the time i s r ipe for the united 
States t o take a strong hand t o save I s rae l from herself 
and in process t r y to prevent a t r ag i c war tha t could en-
danger the economies of the major n on-Communist powers, 
separate the united States from i t s a l l i e s and p r e c i p i -
t a t e enormous in ternal debate, and pose a serious danger 
of a clash with the Soviet Union,** 
Ib id . , p . 470. 
17. Bernard Reich, "The Continued Quest for Peace t The United 
States and the Mididle East", in Colin Legum (Edited) 
Cont^pprarv Survey, \fol. 1/ 1976-77 (New York: Holmes & 
Meier Publ ishers , I n c . , 1978), p . 27. 
18. Department of Sta te Bullet in, Vol. LXXVI, NQ. 1980, 
June 6, 1977, pp. 607-608. 
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19 
e s t a b l i s h i n g durable peace in t h e r e g i o n . I s r a e l i s were 
f u r t h e r assured of the American s i ^ p o r t by p r e s i d e n t Car t e r 
on May 12, 1977, when a t a news Conference, he s t r e s s e d t h e 
s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p and American '*special s e c u r i t y r e s p o n s i -
20 
b i l i t i e s " to I s r a e l . 
21 
The r e t u r n of Likud Pa r ty of Menachem Begin in May 
General e l e c t i o n , t o Knesset , worr ied t h e US Admin i s t r a t ion as 
prime Min i s t e r Begin was expected t o main ta in a r i g i d s t and on 
t h e ques t ion of I s r a e l i occupied a reas of t h e 
West Bank and Gaza s t r i p . C a r t e r thought t h a t Begin ' s d e c l a r a -
t i o n of the o c c i ^ i e d t e r r i t o r i e s as " l i b e r a t e d t e r r i t o r i e s "and 
22 
r e f u s a l t o withdraw from t h e s e a r e a s , was hard nut t o c r ack . 
In f a c t , a narrow v ic to ry for the Labour Party was p r e d i c t e d by 
t h e S t a t e Department and White House e x p e r t s . The Car t e r 
Admin i s t r a t ion had hoped t o deal wi th Shimon Peres - who had 
19 . Allon hoped t h a t '*the United S t a t e s w i l l f a c i l i t a t e wi th 
i t s good o f f i c e s t h e p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n f l i c t i n such a 
way t h a t t h e hope for peace w i l l be implemented and 
r e a l i s e d . " 
Ib idf , p . 606. 
20. Arab Report an^ t^ecprd (London) . No. 9 , May 1-15, 1977,p. 375. 
2 1 . Menachem Begin jo ined t h e m i l l i t a n t Irgun Zvai Leuni 
(National M i l i t a r y Organisa t ion) and was a Commander of 
t h a t grov^ from 1943 - 1948. He jo ined the National 
Unity Government (1967-70) as a Min i s t e r wi thout p o r t f o l i o 
and in 1970 became j o i n t Chairman of the Likud (unity) 
C o a l i t i o n . 
The New Encyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a , Vol. 2 (Chicago: 
Encyclopaedia B r i t a n n i c a , I n c . , 1987/ p . 47 . 
22. "Triumph of a Svperhawk", Timef (New York) , May 30, 1977,p.6 
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expressed once in principle/ his belief that Israel could 
withdraw from the occupied territories in exchange of real 
23 
peace. 
In o rder t o convene t h e Geneva Conference* th« S e c r e t a r y 
of S t a t e , Vance r e v i s i t e d t h e Middle East c o u n t r i e s i nc lud ing 
Egypt* Lebanon/ Sy r i a , Jo rdan , Saudi Arabia and I s r a e l from 
24 
August 1 - 1 1 , 1977« While s t r e s s i n g t h e importance of d i r e c t 
t a l k s betwen the US and t h e PLC, t h e Saudi Foreign S e c r e t a r y 
25 
p r i n c e Saud a l - F a i s a l urged t h a t t h e PLO should be encouraged. 
Vance expressed t h a t t h e United S t a t e s would al low the PLC in 
n e g o t i a t i o n s provided t hey accep t t h e un i t ed Nat ions Secu r i t y J2 
Council Resolu t ion 242, which would a u t c m a t i c a l l y be a r e c o g -
26 
n i t i o n of I s r a e l ' s r i g h t t o e x i s t . 
23 . I b i d . , p . 7 . 
24. Near East Report (Washington D.C.) , Vol. XXI, NO. 3 1 , 
August 3 , 1977, p . 127. 
25 . Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , Vol. LXXVII, No. 1994, 
September 12, 1977, p . 127. 
iteuace.,was'advised f i r s t by Egyptian Foreign M i n i s t e r , 
Ismael Fahmi, and t h e n by Saudi Foreign M i n i s t e r , p r ince 
Saud, t h a t Arafa t , who had been shvA.tling between Aral^ 
S t a t e s almost as r a p i d l y a s vance himself , was " t i n k e r i n g " 
with changes in t h e long-s t and ing PLC stcind a g a i n s t I s r a e l . 
"E lus ive Camelot : Geneva Recedes, and a U.S. - I s r a e l i show-
down looms". Time (New York), August 22, 1977, p . 13 . 
26 . I b i d « , p . 340. 
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Meanwhile, an American educator, Landrum Boiling, the 
then Director of the L i l l y Foundation/ •whom the united States 
was using as intermediary,brought a secret message to Washington 
from the PLO leader , Yasser Arafat who proposed tha t the PLO 
would concede the American stand in return for the US guarantee 
27 
for es tab l i sh ing a PLO s t a t e . But the Carter Administration 
did not want t o grant such promise as i t would mean di rec t 
28 
confrontat ion with I s r a e l i s or i t s American supporters . In an 
e d i t o r i a l of the f idd le Eastf i n t e rna t iona l , i t was expressed 
t h a t : 
"the rea l Confrontation seems imminent between 
on the one hand a strongly based intensely n a t i o -
n a l i s t i c I s r a e l i government, backed by the very 
powerful Jewish lobby in the United S ta tes , with 
i t s g r ip , on the houses of Congress and i t s 
resourceful friends in the press and then t e l e v i -
sion networks and on the other hand the American 
president and his Advisers." 29 
In view of the cold response by the United States the 
PLO argued tha t i t would not accept the Resolution 242 of the 
Securi ty Council unless i t was rewri t ten and the reference of 
the nat ional r i g h t s of the Pales t in ians ins tead of the vagxje 
27, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Pow^r and Pr inc ip le (New York: 
Farrar , S t raus , Giroiw^1983), p« 105. 
28. ;bid»/ p . 106. 
29* f>^ d^dle East International (London), No* 75, September, 
1977, p. 3. 
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30 
r e f e r e n c e of t h e " r e fugees " , was i n c o r p o r a t e d . PLO's p l e a was, 
31 
however/ not cons idered by the United S t a t e s . 
During t h e mid-September/ t h e new I s r a e l i Foreign 
M i n i s t e r / Moshe Dayan met p r e s i d e n t Ca r t e r i n Washington and 
c l a r i f i e d t h a t PLO's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Geneva Conference was 
32 
unaccep tab le t o I s r a e l . But t h e r e was no s ign of agreement by 
t h e Arabs in view of t h e u n c e r t a i n t y of PLO's r o l e in Geneva 
Conference, The Egyptian Foreign Min i s t e r / Isroael Fahmi, on 
September 26, 1977 r e j e c t e d I s r a e l i cond i t i ons of PLO's non-
p a r t i c i p a t i o n in Geneva Conference and expressed t h a t the summit 
33 
would be a " n o n - s t a r t e r ' * . 
In t h e meanwhile/ the us Sec re t a ry of S ta te* Vance and 
Andrei GromyokO/ member of t h e P o l i t b u r o of t h e Cen t r a l Committee 
3< -^ West V^ia Diary (New D e l h i ) , Vol. I I , No. 40/ October 1-7, 
1977, p . 722. 
3 1 , Robert S tephens , n . 2, p , 4 , 
F i n a l l y , t h e PLO l ed by Arafa t dec l ined t o accept t h e UN 
Resolu t ion 242. 
The New York Times (New York), August 27, 1977. 
3 2 . Moshe Dayah, Byg^k^t^nyQvqn » ^.P^yggffal, h999}m ,<?! V^ 
E q y p t - l a r a e l peace Negot ia t ions (New Delh i : Vikas 
pub l i sh ing Hoxise, Pv t , L t d . , 1981), p . 6 9 . 
3 3 . fdlddle Eas t Monitor (New J e r s e y ) , Vol. VI I , No. 18 , 
October 1, 19 77, p . 1 . 
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Of t h e Commvjnist p a r t y of t h e s o v i e t Union, who was a l so t h e 
Fore ign M i n i s t e r of t h e USSR/ had b i l a t e r a l t a l k s with the 
Uni ted S t a t e s a u t h o r i t i e s which r e s u l t e d i n i s s u i n g of t h e 
j o i n t US-Soviet d e c l a r a t i o n on October 1, 1977, t o convene t h e 
Geneva Peace Conference* Both t h e s e c o u n t r i e s were t h e c o -
chairman of t h e Geneva peace Conference on t h e Middle E a s t . 
I t was extremely neteworthy t h a t t he US Admin i s t r a t ion accepted 
in t h e Statement '*the l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n 
people" which would be ensured in any s e t t l e m e n t . The camnuni-
que t h a t c a l l e d f o r t h e p a r t i c i p a t i o n of the " P a l e s t i n i a n 
people** sought "normal peaceful r e l a t i o n s on t h e b a s i s of 
mutual r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e p r i n c i p l e s of s o v e r e i g n t y , t e r r i t o r i a l 
i n t e g r i t y , and p o l i t i c a l independence" and a r o l e for the 
34 
u n i t e d S t a t e s and t h e Sovie t union i n such g u a r a n t e e s . 
In f a c t , two reasons had evoked; t h e US i n t e r e s t t o 
become t h e c o - s i g n a t o r y wi th t h e Sovie t Union. F i r s t l y , t h e 
Sov i e t p o s i t i o n was unexpectedly mild and she had a l s o no t 
34 . I t was f u r t h e r s t a t e d t h a t "In t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y as Co-
Chairman of t h e Geneva Conference, t h e United S t a t e s and 
t h e USSR aff irm t h e i r i n t e n t i o n , through j o i n t e f f o r t s 
in t h e i r c o n t a c t s wi th the p a r t i e s concerned, t o f a c i l i -
t a t e in every way the resumption of t h e work of the 
Conference n o t l a t e r than December, 1977." 
PgT?^ yten,?Tl^  gf„ §t.f^^e Byllfi^iirni. Vbl. L X X V I I , NO. 2002, 
November 7, 1977, p p . 639-440. 
And a l s o see fo r f u r t h e r d e t a i l s The New York Times (New 
York), October 2 , 1977. 
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i n s i s t e d on PLC's pa r t i c ipa t ion or a Pales t in ian S t a t e . 
Secondly* the United Sta tes o f f i c i a l s assoned t h a t the US-Soviet 
declara t ion would be conducive t o the Soviet co-operation t o 
persuade the Syrian pres ident , Hafez Al-Assad not t o i n s i s t on 
a veto over the Geneva decision. The PLO hai led the Jo in t 
Communique and regarded i t as the healthy step towards a j u s t 
36 
peace in the Middle East . I s r a e l i however, decried tha t 
the document would fvirther lead to the perpetuat ion of hard 
pos i t ions taken by the Arab States and i t wovdd be an obstacle 
37 
t o peace in the Middle East . In order to s e t t l e the cont ro-
versy out of. the Joint statement, president Carter invi ted the 
I s r a e l i Foreign Minister, Dayan for meeting on the night of 
38 
October 4, 1977, in New York. The meeting which l a s t ed i:pto 
2 AM, witnessed ce r t a in rough exchanges of t a lks between the 
two but i t produced an American-Israeli working paper, drawn 
by the Secretary of S ta t e , Vance and Moshe Dayan, on October 5, 
39 
1977. But the Contents of the paper was disclosed by Dayan 
on October 13, 19 77. I s rae l agreed tha t the Pales t in ian Arabs . 
from the West Bank and Gaza, who would be allowed t o a t t end the ' 
3 6. Jimmy Carter , K^eoi^g Faith (New York : Bantam, 1982) ,p.293 
36. Arab Report and R^prd (Lonrion) » No. 19/20, October 1-^1. 
1977, p . 878. 
37. TtiQ Jerusalem t ^ s t (Jerusalem) , October 2, 1977. 
38. Moshe Dayan, n. 3 2, p . 66. 
39. Jimmy Carter , tk, 35. p . 294, 
104 
Geneva Conference as members of the united Arab delegation, 
would a l so p a r t i c i p a t e alongwith the Jordanian and Egyptian 
delegat ion, in a working groi;^ t o discuss the future of the 
West Bank and the QSza s t r i p . Both the United States and Is rae l* 
however, expressed t h e i r agreement .on t he Security Council 
Resolution 242 and 338 as the basis for the negot ia t ions a t the 
proposed Conference. The Likud Cabinet on October 11, 1977, 
40 
had already approved the text of the working Paper. I t was 
40, In the working paper, the United States and I s rae l expressed 
t h a t : 
"(a) The Arab pa r t i e s wil l be represented by a unified 
Arab delegation, which wil l include Pales t in ian 
Arabs. After the opening sess ions , the Conference 
wil l s p l i t i n t o working gro tps . 
(b) The working groups for negot ia t ions and conclusion 
of peace t r e a t i e s wil l be formed as follows: 
A. Egypt-Israel B. Jordan-Is rae l 
C. Syria - I s rae l D. Lebanon-Israel 
(All the p a r t i e s agree t h a t Lebanon may join the 
Conference when i t so reques t s ) • 
(c) The West Bank and Gaza issues wil l be discussed in 
a working groijp t o cons is t of I s r a e l , Jordan, Egypt 
and Pales t in ian Arabs. 
(d) The solvition of the problem of t h e Arab refugees and 
the Jewish refugees will be discussed in accordance 
with terms t o be agreed upon. 
(e) The agreed basis for the negotiat ions a t the Geneva 
Peace Conference on the Middle East are IK Security 
Council Resolution 242 and 338. 
(f) All the i n i t i a l terms of reference of the Geneva 
Peace Conference remain enforce, except as may be 
agreed by the p a r t i e s . " 
c o n t d . . . . 
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f u r t h e r dec l a r ed in t h e U S - I s r a e l i J o i n t Communique t h a t : 
"Acceptance of t h e J o i n t US-USSR s ta tement of 
October 1, 1977, by t h e p a r t i e s i s not a p r e -
r e q u i s i t e for t h e convening and conduct of t h e 
Geneva Conference".40 
The United S t a t e s s e n t t h e working paper t o t h e Arab 
c a p i t a l s for t h e i r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Egypt proposed a modi f ica-
t i o n in t h e document by seeking t h e PLO r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n t h e 
42 Conference. Whereas PLO spokesman i n Beirut dec la red t h e 
43 Communique as " t o t a l l y unaccep tab le" . I t was announced by t h e 
Al -Fa tah , t h e l a r g e s t g u e r r i l l a grov;p, headed by i t s founder 
and l e a d e r Yasser Arafa t t h a t i t was on ly the PLO which had t h e 
r i g h t t o r e p r e s e n t t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s •*at a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l Confe-
44 
r e n c e s " inc lud ing t h e proposed Geneva Peace Conference. Syiria 
was c r i t i c a l of the U S - I s r a e l i working Paper and i t s p o s i t i o n 
45 
was p e r p e t u a l l y hardening . 
c o n t d . * *. 
The Jerus^Xei"" PP?^ (Jerusalem) , October 14, 1977. 
Also see The New York Times (New York) , October 14, 1977. 
And a l s o see for f u r t h e r d e t a i l s Midd;).^ East Monitor _ 
(New J e r s e y ) , Vbl. VII , No. 19, October 15, 1977, p . 1. 
4 1 . Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , \tol. LXXVII, No. 2002, 
November 7, 1977, p . 640. 
42 . Vfasl-linqtQn Post (washinyton) , October 20, 1977. 
4 3 . The New Arab (New D e l h i ) , \fol. i v . No. XI, November 1977, 
p . 14. 
44 . Middle East Monitor (New J e r s e y ) , \fol. V l l , No. 2o, 
November 1, 19 77, p . 1. 
4 5 . Ibi<^. 
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Amidst such controversy, president Carter in his address 
at Democratic National Committee Fund r a i s ing dinner on October 
22, in Los Angeles, sa id t h a t : 
" I would ra ther commit sucide than t o hurt the 
nation of I s rae l " .46 
Later , a t a meeting of the World Jevish Congress on 
November 2,, 1977, Carter assured tha t he did not favour t h e 
47 
establishment of a Pales t in ian Sta te on the West Bank. One of 
the Important reasons for t h i s pol icy reversa l was the domestic 
p o l i t i c a l compulsion as the Zionist lobby in America had become 
alarmed by President Ca r t e r ' s Middle East po l icy . Ca r t e r ' s 
press Secretary, Jody Powell, ca l led i t the most sens i t ive 
p o l i t i c a l problem and announced t h a t the US Adninistration did 
not want "any pxiblic confrontation with the Jewish Commimity 
over the Middle East" ; 
46. Carter further sa id tha t j "If I should ever hurt I s r a e l , 
which I won't , I think p o l i t i c a l su ic ide would almost 
automatically r e su l t because i t i s not only our Jewish 
c i t i zens who have the deep commitment t o I s r a e l , but 
the re i s an overwhelming si;5>port throughout the na t ion , 
because t he r e i s a common boixid of commitment t o the 
same pr inc ip les of openness and freedom and democracy 
and s t rength and courage t h a t t i e s us together in an 
irrevocable way". 
Near East Report (Washington, D.C.), Vbl. XXI, No. 43, 
October 26, 1977, p . 184. 
47. I b i d . , Vol. XXI, No. 45, November 9, 1977, p . 193. 
48. Lawrence Mosher, "Let ter from Washington", Middle East 
Internationa) (London) , No. 78, December, 1977, p . 12. 
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Sa<^t's v i s i t t o Jerusalem and I t s aftermath 
On the other hand/ president Sadat was disappointed by 
Carter ' s p o l i c y of Soviet Inclusion In the peace process by 
r e l e a s i n g the US-Soviet Joint statement. Besides/ Sadat was 
a l s o unhappy with the united States having pampered Syria and 
t h e PLO. In fact / US had assaned that any set t lement acceptable 
t o radical pro-Soviet Syria would be appreciated by the other 
Arab S t a t e s . Whereas president Sadat thought that the US 
approach t o the USSR, Syria and the PLO would lead to undue 
power t o inf luence Egypt which in turn would jeopardise the 
49 
Egyptian i n t e r e s t s in any se t t l ement . On November 2, 1977/ 
pres ident Sadat, i n h i s speech before the People ' s Assembly of 
Egypt announced h i s in tent ion t o v i s i t I srae l and t a l k d i r e c t l y 
50 
t o the I s r a e l i a u t h o r i t i e s . His idea was welcomed by prime 
Minister Begin o f I srae l who equal ly expressed h i s des ire t o 
4 9 . I srae l Altman, "The Egypt ian-Israe l i Negotiations'*/ in 
Colin Legum (Edited) , Middle East Coptemporarv Survey/ 
Vol. 1 1 / 1977-78 (New York: Holmes & Meier publ ishers / 
I n c . , 1979) / p . 85 . 
50. Sadat sa id that "Israe l must be grea t ly surprised t o hear 
me say that I am . . . ready to go t o the Knesset and discuss 
with them." 
White Paper on the Peace I n i t i a t i v e s Undertaker^ bv pr^sic^ept 
APyyral-gft<la<^ ,(l^lXrXV?)j i s sued by the Egyptian Ministry, 
for Foreign Affa irs (Cairo : State Information Service/ 
1978) , p . 151. 
And a l so see for further d e t a i l s Al-Ahram (Cairo) / 
November 10, 1977. 
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51 
go t o Cai ro for peace . In a news Conference on November 10, 
1977, t h e US Pres ident# C a r t e r p r a i s e d S a d a t ' s w i l l i ngness to 
52 
go t o I s r a e l for Peace . I t was on Novenber 15, I s r a e l s e n t 
53 
an i n v i t a t i o n t o p r e s i d e n t s ada t t o v i s i t Je rusa lem. 
Before h i s v i s i t t o Je rusa lem, Sadat went t o Damascus 
on November' 16, but he could not convince P r e s i d e n t Hafez A l -
54 
Assad of S y r i a . P re s iden t Sadat announced t h a t he wovild proceed 
t o I s r a e l on November 19 for a two-day v i s i t , d e s p i t e t h e 
o p p o s i t i o n from Assad of Syr ia and t h e r e s i g n a t i o n s t ende red by 
Ismael Fahiii , t he Egyptian Foreign M i n i s t e r and Mahmoud Riad, 
55 
t h e Min i s t e r of S t a t e fo r Fore ign A f f a i r s . 
5 1 . Jp^ ,;rpyuga].em popt ( Je rusa lem) , November 13 , 1977» 
52. The P r e s i d e n t f u r t h e r s a i d t h a t ; " I was p l e a s e d with 
t h e s ta tement yes te rday by P r e s i d e n t Sadat t h a t he was 
w i l l i n g t o . . . . consu l t d i r e c t l y with I s r a e l and with 
t h e o t h e r Arab n a t i o n s without qtaibbling any more about 
t h e d e t a i l e d working of t h e p rocedu re s , t h a t ' s our 
p o s i t i o n . " 
Pspar.tipsR^,Q^ fft^te p,vai.^ t^ .jLj[?, v o i . L X X V I I * NO. 2007, 
Decwnber 12, 1977, p . 840 . 
53 . T]l-)e Jerusalem Post ( Je rusa lem) , November 18 , 1977. 
54. Assad p o i n t e d out t o the v i o l e n t Arab r e a c t i o n t h a t he 
would have t o f ace . Sadat s a i d t h a t even if . such a 
r e a c t i o n took p l a c e , i t would d i sappear w i t h i n t h r e e 
months, for wi th in t h a t p e r i o d the A r a b - I s r a e l i s t r i f e 
would have been r e s o l v e d , s i n c e I s r a e l would be a t 
l o s s t o f i n d an argument to j u s t i f y i t s cont inued 
occvpa t ion of Arab l a n d s . 
Mahmoud Riad, Tn^ .St^VRql^ fof PgftSS.i" t n ^ , ^ i ^ ^ ? . Efts^ (London* Quartet Books, 1981) , p . 307. 
55* Afr ica Diary (New D e l h i ) , v o l . XVIII , No. I* January 1-7, 
1978, p . 8811 . 
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P r e s i d e n t Sadat reached Jerusalem on November 19 # 1977, 
for a tvD-day v i s i t of I s r a e l tn o rder t o break what he de sc r ibed 
t h e "psycholociical b a r r i e r " which was making o b s t a c l e s in the 
Middle East peace p rocess and Sadat expected t h a t h i s e f f o r t s 
56 
would pave t h e way for reconvening of t h e Geneva Conference. 
The roost s i g n i f i c a n t a spec t of p r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s speech be fo re 
t h e I s r a e l i Knesset on Kovember 20, 1977, was h i s w i l l i n g n e s s 
t o accep t I s r a e l . ' s e x i s t e n c e . He s t a t e d t h a t : 
" In a l l s i n c e r i t y , I t e l l you we welcome you 
among us , wi th f u l l s e c u r i t y and s a f e t y . . . 
we r e a l l y and t r u l y welcome you t o l i v e among 
us i n peace and secx i r i ty" . 57 
He observed t h a t t h e e x i s t e n c e of I s r a e l was a s i g n i f i -
c a n t p o i n t t o reach a j u s t and permanent peace . I s r a e l , however, 
woiild a l s o have t o withdraw from a l l t h e Arab t e r r i t o r i e s 
i n c l u d i n g East Je rusa lem, occxjpied during 1967 war. F u r t h e r , 
peace could not be achieved un less the P a l e s t i n i a n problem was 
58 
s o l v e d . Sadat dec l a red t h a t he d id not ccme for a s e p a r a t e 
5 6 . Arab Report apd % c o r d (London) . No. 21/22 , November l - 3 o , 
1977, p . 922 . 
57 . White Paper on t h e Peace I^jL^j^atives underj^i^ken bv 
p r e s i d e n t Anwar~al»Sadat (1971-1977) . n . SO, p . 173. 
And a l s o see for f u r t h e r d e t a i l s Al~Ahram (Cairo) , 
November 2 1 , 1977. " 
58 . Sadat expressed t h a t "The P a l e s t i n i a n ques t ion i s t h e h e a r t 
and crux of the c o n f l i c t , peace cannot be achieved wi thout 
t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s . . . the on ly way to deal with ( the P a l e s -
t i n i a n problem) in the d i r e c t i o n of j u s t and permanent peace 
in t h e e s t ab l i shment of a s t a t e of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n p e o p l e " . 
I b i d . , p p . 177-179. 
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deal or t r e a t y wi th I s r a e l but he sought a conprehensive p e a c e . 
In h i s speech^ Prime Min i s t e r Begin, however/ n e i t h e r 
d i r e c t l y responded t o p r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s o f f e r of r e c o g n i t i o n no r 
spoke about t h e ques t i ons of t e r r i t o r i e s o r P a l e s t i n i a n problem. 
He p r a i s e d Sadat for h i s courageous s t e p t o v i s i t I s r a e l . Begin 
f u r t h e r expressed t h a t normal r e l a t i o n s between I s r a e l and 
Arab s t a t e s shovdd be e s t a b l i s h e d and eve ry th ing should be 
n e g o t i a b l e . He a l s o i n v i t e d t h e Syr ian and Jo rdan ian heads of 
60 
s t a t e t o n e g o t i a t e peace t r e a t i e s w i th him. 
In Arab c a p i t a l s , t h e people .were in deep g r i e f and 
shock t o see t h e t e l e c a s t of S a d a t ' s v i s i t on t h e i r T e l e v i s i o n 
and t h e y wondered t h a t Egypt whidh cons idered Zionism and 
I s r a e l as t h e enemy of the Arabs for t h e l a s t t h i r t y y e a r s , 
61 
was being r e p r e s e n t e d by p r e s i d e n t Sadat as I s r a e l ' s f r i e n d . 
p r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s move was sxppor ted by Morocco, Oman 
and Sudan and t h e s t a t e c o n t r o l l e d media in E g y p t , p r a i s e d him 
a s a Hero, Whereas he was s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i s e d by Sy r i a , t h e 
III • i i w — — — » » . — • « — » » » • I II 1 1 « Til r i T 1 » • • ! I I . 1 1 I T i III I f i l l . . I . , I II I 
59• I b i d . , p . 172* 
60 . prime Min i s t e r Begin s a i d t h a t s " . . . I am renewing my i n v i -
t a t i o n to P r e s i d e n t of Syr ia t o fol low in yovr f o o t s t e p s , 
Mr. P r e s i d e n t , and come t o xis t o open n e g o t i a t i o n s fo r a 
peace between I s r a e l and Syr ia so t h a t we may s ign a peace 
t r e a t y between v i s . . . i i n v i t e King Husayn ( s i c . ) t o come t o 
us t o d i scuss a l l t h e problems whicdi need t o be d i scussed 
between u s , " 
West Asia Diaipy (New D e l h i ) , Vol. I l l , No. 2, January 8-14, 
1978, p . 865. 
6 1 . Mahmoud Riad, n . 54, p . 307. 
I l l 
PLO and t h e r e i e c t i o n i s t s t a t e s - A l g e r i a , Iraq* Libya and South 
62 
Yemen and t h e y charged Sadat with t r e a c h e r y . 
Notwithstanding t h e oppos i t ion from t h e Arab s t a t e s , t h e 
Egyptian p r e s i d e n t dec l a red t o main ta in t h e peace momentvcn and 
c a l l e d f o r a p r e p a r a t o r y Conference in Cairo and i n v i t e d I s r a e l , 
US, USSR, S y r i a , Lebanon, Jordan , t he PLO and the UN for t h e 
Conference. I t was, however, r e j e c t e d by S y r i a , ussR, t h e PLO 
and Lebanon t o v i s i t I s r a e l y e t . King Hussein Ibn Ta l a l ©f 
Jo rdan and h i s Goverixnent p l aced t h e cond i t ion t h a t they could 
a t t e n d t h e Conference i n Ca i ro i f a l l o the r p a r t i e s t o the 
d i s p u t e a t t e n d e d . The u n i t e d S t a t e s S t a t e Department formal ly 
accep ted Egyp t ' s i n v i t a t i o n whereas t h e I s r a e l i Coverrment 
prompt ly responded p o s i t i v e l y t o S a d a t ' s i n v i t a t i o n . The UN a l s o 
63 
gave i t s approval t o send i t s o f f i c i a l t o Ca i ro . In a p r e s s 
Conference s ta tement on November 30 , 1977, p r e s i d e n t C a r t e r 
expressed h i s views t h a t he did not d e s i r e for "a s e p a r a t e peace 
agreement between Egypt and I s r a e l " excluding t h e o the r p a r t i e s . 
At t h e same t i m e , he p o i n t e d out t h a t : 
" I f a t some l a t e r da te i t becomes obvious t h a t 
Jo rdan does no t want peace , o r t h a t Sy r i a does 
not want peace , or t h a t Lebanon does no t want 
peace in a s e t t l emen t wi th I s r a e l , then an a l t e r -
n a t i v e might have to be pursued . But we've 
c e r t a i n l y no t reached t h a t p o i n t y e t . " 64 
6 2 . Arab Report and Record, n . 56, p , 9 2 7 , 
6 3 . Mld<^e Blast Monitor (New Jersev) . Vol. VII , No. 22, 
December 1, 1977, p . 1. 
6 4 . Department of S t a t e B u l l e t i n , \ to l . LXXVII, No. 2008, 
December 19, 1977, p . 882. 
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An Arab mini-summit was he ld from December 2 - 5 / 1 9 7 7 
i n T r i p o l i , Libya which was p a r t i c i p a t e d by S y r i a / Libya, 
A l g e r i a / South Yemen and I r a q and they decided t o f reeze t h e 
r e l a t i o n s wi th Egypt . Sadat r e a c t e d by b reak ing Egyp t ' s r e l a -
65 
t i o n s with t h e s e c o u n t r i e s on December 5* 1977. The Arab 
d i f f e r e n c e s came t o the su r f ace and Egypt began t o be i s o l a t e d 
66 
in t h e Arab world-
I t was on December 14/ 1977/ t h a t t he Cai ro Conference 
s t a r t e d with speeches by t h e heads of t h e I s r a e l i , Egyptian and 
US d e l e g a t i o n s and t hey expressed t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n 
67 
r e g a r d i n g peace s e t t l e m e n t , Egypt s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e r e roust be 
f u l l r a l i s a t i o n of t h e l e g i t i m a t e r i g h t s of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n 
peop le in o rder t o ach ieve a conijrehensive s e t t l e m e n t . The 
Egypt ian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e Abd al -Majid f u r t h e r a s s e r t e d t h a t peace 
roust be based on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l law/ t h e UN Char te r and t h e 
68 
R e s o l u t i o n 242. Whereas/ the I s r a e l i d e l e g a t e / Ben E l i s s a r 
r e f e r r e d t o t h e Reso lu t ion 242 only/ as the b a s i s for a conpre -
69 hens ive peace i n the r e g i o n . 
65» Afr ica Diarv (New D e l h i ) / Vol. XVIII/ No. 8/ February 19-25 , 
1978/ p p . 8881. 
6 6 . Mahmoud Riad, n . 54/ p . 308 . 
6 7 . Arab Report and Record (London) / No. 23/24/ December 
1-31/ 1977/ p . 1019, 
6 8 . ^-Ahram (Ca i ro ) / December 15, 1977. 
6 9 . BBC Monitoring Se rv i ce / Summarv of World Boa rcas t s , 
ME/569 3/A/lO. 
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In t h e meantime, prime Min i s t e r Begin v i s i t e d the United 
S t a t e s from December 15 - 17/ t o d i scuss a newly dravm peace 
p lan wi th P res iden t Car te r which c o n s i s t e d of two s e t s of 
p r o p o s a l s - one dea l ing with I s r a e l ' s i n t e n t i o n t o r ecogn ize 
Egypt ian sovere ign ty over S i n a i , for a peace t r e a t y between 
Egypt and I s r a e l . The o t h e r p rov ided for t h e s e l f - r u l e for t h e 
70 
P a l e s t i n i a n s l i v i n g in t h e West Bank and Oaza s t r i p . 
P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ta lJ ted t o Sadat t e l e p h o n i c a l l y and 
sought a Sadat-Begin meeting which was accep ted by the Egyptian 
p r e s i d e n t , prime M i n i s t e r Begin e ^ r e s s e d t h a t Car t e r had 
r ega rded t h e p roposa l s as a " f a i r basis'* and a " c o n s t r u c t i v e " 
71 ' p l a n f o r t h e Middle Eas t n e g o t i a t i o n s . The S t a t e Department/ 
in o rde r t o avoid any embarrassment/ however/ c l a r i f i e d t h a t t h e 
US Adminia t ra t ion was not endorsing the proposa l but i t wished 
72 t o accept t h e p l an provided both Egypt and I s r a e l agreed t o i t . 
70 . Arab Reoprt and Record/ n . 67/ p . 1020. 
The t e x t of t h e peace Plan was* however/ d i s c l o s e d by prime 
M i n i s t e r Begin in h i s address t o t h e Knesset on December 
28/ 1977. 
For t h e f u l l t e x t of the P lan see Tt>^ Jerusalem pos t 
( Je rusa lem) / December 29/ 1977. 
And a l s o see BBC Monitoring Se rv ice / ^unmarv of World 
Boarcas t s / ME/5702/A/1-7. 
7 1 . The New York Times (New York) / December 18/ 1977. 
72 . Moshe Dayan/ n, 32/ p . 102. 
And a l s o see fo r fu r the r d e t a i l s Near Eas t Report 
(Washington/ D.C. ) /Vol . XXII, No. 1/ January 4 , 1978/ p . 3 . 
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President Sadat, in a news Conference on December 17, 
19 77, expressed his optimism about the possible outcome of a 
73 
settlement in view of Begin's plan. 
In fact. Begin's plan was based on the assunption that 
Sadat urgently sought peace and he wouie go to the extent of 
signing a separate peace treaty with Israel provided Israel 
ret turned back. Sinai to Egypt and provided Israeli Government 
showed a sign of flexibility regarding West Bank and Gaza 
74 
strip:^ 
Meanwhile, the Cairo Conference did not yield any concrete 
75 
results and it was axispended on December 22, 1977. It was on 
December 25 that Begin reached Ismailia in Egypt to negotiate 
76 his peace plan with president Sadat. In his Press Conference 
on December 26, Begin, however, clarified that Resolution 242 
^3. Arab Report and Record, n. 67» p. 1020. 
74. This view was reflected, for instance, in Israeli Defense 
Minister Ezer Weizman's statement to the Likud members of 
the Knesset who observed thatt "The Egyptians are fed vp 
(with the Arab •- Israeli conflict) . They would be willing 
to go for a separate agreement with Israel, if only a 
formula was found that would enable them to delay (decision 
on) the question of the comprehensive settlement to a later 
date**. 
Quoted in Israel Altman, n. 49, p. 94. 
75. Arab Report and Record, n. 67, p. 1019. 
76. Mahmoud Riad, n. 54, pp. 306-309. 
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d id no t impose t o t a l I s r a e l i withdrawal from t h e occupied 
77 Arab t e r r i t o r i e s . S a d a t ' s counte r proposal t h a t a P a l e s t i n i a n 
S t a t e should be e s t a b l i s h e d on t h e West Bank and Gaza s t r i p 
78 
was r e j e c t e d by the I s r a e l i Prime M i n i s t e r , Begin. 
The I s m a i l i a supnmit f a i l e d t o evoke any s i g n i f i c a n t 
dec i s i on except t h e formation of two committees - o n e ^ p o l i t i c a l 
a t t h e l e v e l of M i n i s t e r s of Foreign Af fa i r s i n the c o u n t r i e s 
and t h e o ther* m i l i t a r y a t t h e l e v e l of M i n i s t e r s of Defense. 
In a way/the p o s s i b i l i t y of a Geneva Conference or any agreement 
79 
was comple te ly undermined. 
Again from January t o Jxily 1978, no s i g n i f i c a n t 
change in t h e peace p rocess was wi tnessed between Egypt 
80 
and I s r a e l . In f a c t , S a d a t ' s v i s i t t o Jerusalem in November 
7 7 . The prime M i n i s t e r added t h a t : " . . . This ma t t e r i s a ma t t e r 
for n e g o t i a t i o n , t o e s t a b l i s h t h o s e secure and r ecogn i sed 
boundar ies which a r e mentioned i n t h e second paragraph of 
Reso lu t ion 242". 
The J e r i ; | s q l ^ Pos t (Jerusalem) , December 27, 19 77. 
78 . This was i n d i c a t e d in the j o i n t "agreed d e c l a r a t i o n " by 
I s r a e l and Egypt a f t e r sada t -Begin t a l k s i n I s m a i l i a 
Afr ica Diary (New D e l h i ) , Vol. XVIII, No. 8 , February 19-25, 
1978, p . 8879. 
7 9 . Mahmoud Riad# n . 54, pp . 308-309. 
8 0 . J . R . Gainsborough, The A r a b - I s r a e l i Conf l i c t : A P o l i t i c o -
ti^q^l Analys i s (Vermont : Gower, 1986), p . 210. 
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of 
1977 had reduced the p o s s i b i l i t y / a comprehensive peace s e t t l e -
ment in the Middle East t o an Egypt ian-Israel i dialogue and even 
t h a t achievement seemed t o be thwarted. The US o f f i c i a l s f e l t 
t h a t i t would lead t o another war* with the spe l l of o i l embargo 
by the Arabs leading to the massive energy c r i s i s , which would 
81 
a l s o affect the American influence in the region. 
president c a r t e r ult imately took a dramatic step and 
invi ted both Begin and Sadat a t a t r i p a r t i t e Summit a t Camp 
David, in order t o achieve a peace settlement in the Middle 
82 East . The White House announced on August 8, 1978, tha t president 
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin had agreed t o reach- Camp David 
on September 5, 1978, t o p a r t i c i p a t e in a meeting with president 
Carter in which an attempt t o draw a framework for peace in t he 
* 83 
Middle East would be made. 
In an interview to the Newsweek, Begin r e i t e r a t e d his 
stand to conclude a permanent p a r t i a l peace in case of Egypt's 
and I s r a e l ' s f a i lu re t o reach an agreement on comprehensive peace 
84 
a t the Catnp David Sunmit, I t was, however, re jec ted by Sadat 
81* The New York T^mes (New York), Ju ly 21, 1978. 
82. Jimmy Carter , h. 35, p . 317. 
83 . Keesipq'g Contemnorarv Arch^Lv^^ (London), Vol. XXV, 19 79, 
p . 29654. 
84. Begin s t a t ed t h a t ; "Should Egypt be prepared t o sign with 
us a peace t r ea ty with the understanding tha t i t is t o be 
followed by peace t r e a t i e s with the r e s t of our neighbours, 
we would be prepared t o do s o . But i f i t t r ansp i re s t h a t 
c o n t d . . . , . 
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who sought a conprehensive peace settlement ins tead of separate 
peace. 
The united States o f f i c i a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y thie s t a t e 
Department o f f i c i a l s were worried a t C a r t e r ' s decision as any 
f a i l u re of the Camp David Sunmit would affect his rep t t a t ion 
both in the United States and abroad. Consequently* the US 
Middle East pol icy would be undermined. But Carter showed his 
determination t o s t i ck t o his decision. 
Camp David Svroroit 
I t was on September 5, 1978, that Car ter , Sadat and 
87 
Begin reached Camp David. The f i r s t meeting between the th ree 
leaders was held on September 6, and although. Carter assuned 
contd. * • 
the re are now insurmountable d i f f i c u l t i e s t o achieving 
t h i s goal^ I have a concrete idea about the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of a p a r t i a l agreement which would be of a permanent nature" . 
^pwsweek (New York) , August 28, 1978, p . 15. 
85 . The Jeyrusalem Post (Jerusalem), August 21, 19 78. 
86. Zbigniew Brzezinski, n . 27, p . 252. 
87 . Jimmy Car ter , n. 35, p . 317. 
From Thurmotit, Maryland, the road uncoils for seven miles 
\3p t o Catoctir Mountain, through Virgin fores ts / t o Camp 
David, the p res iden t i a l r e t r e a t , s ix ty miles or a t h i r t y -
minute hel icopter r ide from the White House. 
Molf B l i t ze r , .jgety^gn ,^sh^pqt^9p ap^ i7^ rM?A.lgffi : A Repprter 's 
Note Book (New York: Oxford University p ress , 1985),p. 217. 
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t h a t the summit vould lead t o the conclusion of a peace t r e a t y 
yet / president Sadat pointed out t h a t i t would take a long 
time to discuss the important matters in d e t a i l s . They, however/ 
decided t o reach an agreement which could be transformed into a 
88 
peace t r e a t y within the span of '*perhaps three months". During 
the meeting, Sadat placed a Peace Plan which sought the I s r a e l i 
withdrawal from the occupied Arab t e r r i t o r i e s in exchange for 
the conclusion of peace t r e a t i e s between I s rae l and the Arab 
countr ies concerned/ the red iv is ion of Jerusalem, the removal of 
I s r a e l i set t lements from the occupied a reas . The plan further 
proposed the termination of I s r a e l i mi l i t a ry government in the 
West Bank and Gaza s t r i p with a five-year t r a n s i t i o n a l period 
during whidi the adminis t rat ion of West Bank and Gaza would be 
supervised by Jordan and Egypt/ respec t ive ly . I t Vas a lso urgt^d 
to grant the Pa les t in ians r i g h t s of self-determinat ion including 
the r ight to es tab l i sh a Pales t in ian S t a t e . But Begin re jec ted 
the Plan o u t r i g h t l y . ' 
At t h i s Juncture/ the United s t a t e s presented a draft 
90 on September 10* which was equally re jec ted by Begin. The US 
88. Ib id . / p . 344. 
And also see for further de t a i l s Moshe Dayan,n. 3 2, p . 160, 
89. Moshe Dayan/ n. 3 2, p . 162. 
And also see for fvt ther de t a i l s Al-Ahram (Cairo) , 
September 19, 1978. 
90. Zbigniew Brezezinski, n . 27, p . 260. 
c o n t d * . . . • 
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p lan was modif ied i n conf i rmi ty with the I s r a e l i demands and 
conf ined i t s e l f t o a s e p a r a t e peace agreement between Egypt 
91 
and I s r a e l . At t h e same t ime/ P r e s i d e n t C a r t e r ' s new procedure 
to s e p a r a t e t h e S i n a i i s s u e from t h e i s sue of West Bank and Gaza 
was approved by Sada t . Consequent ly , the S ina i agreement was 
being d e a l t wi th by C a r t e r whereas S e c r e t a r y Vance c o n c e n t r a t e d 
on t h e framework for a comprehensive s e t t l emen t which were 
92 d i s c u s s e d s e p a r a t e l y . 
On September 14, 19 78, during the d i s cus s ion on S i n a i , 
S a d a t ' s demands of t e rmina t i on of I s r a e l i s e t t l e m e n t s from t h e 
S i n a i a r ea was r e j e c t e d by Begin and as a r e s u l t Sadat decided t o 
93 depar t from the Sunroit. C a r t e r , however, persuaded Sadat t o 
s t a y , on the p l e a t h a t S a d a t ' s depaxrture from t h e Sunnmit woxild 
n a t u r a l l y a f f e c t t h e US-Egyptian r e l a t i o n s and t h e i r p e r s o n a l 
f r i e n d s h i p , thwar t S a d a t ' s peace i n i t i a t i v e and a l s o l e a d to an 
end t o the C a r t e r ' s p r e s idency . C a r t e r f u r t h e r feared t h a t t h e 
Summit f i a s c o would be a major v i c t o r y for t h e Sovie t Po l i cy in 
94 
t h e Middle E a s t . 
contd* •«• 
The. d r a f t d e a l t wi th the West Bank, the P a l e s t i n i a n s and t h e 
I s r a e l i withdrawal on t h e b a s i s of UN Resolu t ion 242, 
Jimmy C a r t e r , n . 3 5, p p . 370-371 . 
9 1 . Mahmoud Riad, n . 54, p . 3 2 1 , 
9 2 , Zbigniew Brasezinski, n . 27 , p . 244, 
9 3 , Mahmoud Riad, n . 54, p , 3 21 , 
94 . Zbigniew Brzez in sk i , n , 27, p p . 271-272, 
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I t was decided on Septemner 16^ tha t the disputed issues 
95 
vould be discussed by exchange of l e t t e r s among the d igna tor ies . 
I t was on September 17# 1978/ that Begin in a l e t t e r to president 
Carter, expressed his readiness to place the Egyptian demand for 
the removal of I s r a e l i set t lements frcm Sinai , to the Knesset, 
which would decide and vote on i t within two weeks af te r his 
96 
re tu rn t o I s r a e l , in the meantime, Sadat agreed to discuss the 
West Bank and Gaza issue on behalf of the Pales t in ians "following 
consul ta t ion with Jordan and representa t ive of the Pales t in ian 
97 
people" . 
The issue of East Jerusalem became the focal point of the 
Summit when president cater implicitly expressed that the United 
States considered the East Jerusalem as Israeli occupied terri-
tory and he further reiterated that it was the stand the united 
98 
States took in the United Nations in 1967 and 1969 as well. 
95. Israel Altman, n. 49, p. 124. 
96. pepflflwiffl^  9£.,gtfltfi. gMlIeUn^ ^«>i. LXXVIII, NO. 2019, 
October, 1978, p . 10. 
97. I^i<a, 
98. Ibij l^ 
On July 14, 1967, the US Ambassador, Arthur Goldberg, dec-
la red in the UN General Assembly tha t the Uhited States did 
not recognise I s r a e l i measures t o change the s t a tus of 
Jerusalem by annexing the occupied East Jerusalem. Similar ly, 
Ambassador Charles Yost on July 1, 1969, in UN Securi ty 
Council deplored the I s r a e l i action of occupying the East 
Jerusalem. 
yjtltp l^ijjeast Observer in, Washipqtoj) (Washington, D .C . ) , 
Vbl. I , No. 20, November 15, 1978, p . 4 . 
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99 
But Begin r e t o r t e d and t h r e a t e n e d t o l e ave t h e meet ing . 
However/ t h e c r i s i s was overcome by an accep tab l e formula which 
p rov ided t h a t Egypt, I s r a e l and t h e Uhited S t a t e s would d r a f t 
l e t t e r s t a t i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s regard ing East 
1CX> 
Je rusa l em. 
I t was a l s o r e p o r t e d t h a t Begin t h r e a t e n e d nott t o s ign the 
Accords, in ca se p r e s i d e n t Sadat and P res iden t c a r t e r c a l l e d 
Jerusalem as "occv^jied t e r r i t o r y " , u l t i m a t e l y , both p r e s i d e n t s 
101 
had t o bow t o the wishes of Prime M i n i s t e r Begin. 
In t h e meantime, the Egyptian Foreign Min i s t e r Ibrahim 
Kamal r e s i g n e d from t h e pos t as he d id not want t o p a r t i c i p a t e 
i n approving a s e p a r a t e peace between Egypt end I s r a e l and he 
a l s o disapproved t h e con ten t ion t h a t Egypt should t a l k on 
102 
behal f of t he P a l e s t i n i a n s . 
9 9 . Moshe Dayan, n . 32 , p . 179• 
100. Fayez A. Sayegh, "The Camp David Agreement and the 
P a l e s t i n i a n problem". Journa l of P a l e s t i n e S t u d i e s , 
\ tol. VI I I , No. 2 , Winter, 1979, p . 10. 
1 0 1 . U a l d . , pp . ,10-11. 
102. Mahnoud Riad, ki. 54, p. 321. 
president Sadat had never been given a mandate either by 
the PLO, the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, or by any 
of the Arab states to act on behalf of the Palestinians. 
J.R. Gainsborough, n. 80, p. 210. 
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However* the Camp David Summit resulted in the two 
agreements - A "Tramework for Peace in the Middle East" and 
a "Framework for the conclusion of peace Treaty between Egypt 
and Israel". Eventually/ this accord was signed by president 
Sadat of Egypt and prime Minister Begin of Israel/ in a White 
House ceremony witnessed by Jimmy Carter on September 18, 
103 
19 78. 
I t may be noted tha t with the Can^ David Sunmit / two 
s ign i f ican t s h i f t s in the US pol icy occurred - (a) In s p i t e of 
the US s t a t ed goal of comprehensive settlement* the separate 
Egypt ian- Is rae l i peace accord was signed, (b) The united States 
sh i f t ed her pol icy of being an •*honest broker** t o a " fu l l 
' 104 par tner" in the Camp David t a l k s . 
The Accords 
llider the term of the "Framework for Peace in the Middle 
East/ "Egypt/ I s r a e l , Jordan and the representa t ives of the 
Pa les t in ian people should p a r t i c i p a t e in negot ia t ions for the 
reso lu t ion of the Pales t inian problem in a l l i t s aspects and 
Egypt and I s r ae l agreed tha t in order t o achieve t h a t object ive/ 
103. I s r ae l Altman* n. 49# p . 124. 
And also see for further de t a i l s Moshe Dayan, n. 32, p . i88, 
104. The Mideast Observer in Washington (Washington. D.C.) / 
Vbl. 1/ Ho, 16/ September 15/ 1978, p . 1. 
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negot ia t ions regarding the West Bank and Gaza should be car r ied 
in th ree s tagesJ 
In the f i r s t stage/ Egypt and I s rae l agreed, they would 
inv i t e Jordan t o p a r t i c i p a t e in negot ia t ions t o determine the 
d e t a i l s of a t r a n s i t i o n a l arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza 
which woxald not exceed five years. The framework further 
provided for a self-governing au thor i ty , f reely e lec ted by the 
inhabi tants of the west Bank and Gaza s t r i p to replace the 
I s r a e l i mi l i t a ry government and Civil Adninis t ra t ion, thus 
leading t o fu l l autonomy to the inhabi tants of these areas and 
t o implement these arrangements, i t was agreed t h a t : 
"due consideration should be given both t o the 
pr inc ip les of self-government by the inhabi tants 
of these t e r r i t o r i e s ahd t o the leg i t imate secu-
r i t y concerns of the p a r t i e s involved".105 
In the second s tage , Egypt and Jordan would agree on the 
procedures t o se t up the self-governing au thor i ty in the West 
Bank and Gaza. The Pales t in ians might be included in t he Egyp-
t i a n and Jordanian delegations provided the p a r t i e s mutually 
agree. The powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the self-governing 
au thor i ty would be defined by I s r a e l , Egypt and Jordan. The 
105. Near East Rf^port {Washington, D.C.), .Vol. XXII,. No. 38, 
September 20, 19 78, p . 170« 
And a l so see for further de t a i l s Departroer^^ of ^t-.^te 
gygi^UP* n . 96, pp . 7-11. 
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framevork f u r t h e r p rov ided t h a t : 
"A withdrawal of I s r a e l i armed forces w i l l t a k e 
p l a c e and the re w i l l be a redeployment of the 
remaining I s r a e l i fo rces i n t o s p e c i f i e d s e c u r i t y 
l o c a t i o n s . The agreement would a l s o inc lude a r r a n -
gements fo r a s s u r i n g i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y 
and p u b l i c order**. 106 
In t h e t h i r d and f i n a l s t a g e , Egypt/ I s r a e l , Jordan and 
t h e e l e c t e d r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of t he West Bank 
and Gaza would p a r t i c i p a t e in t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s : 
•*to determine t h e f i n a l s t a t u s of the West Bank 
and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th i t s ne ighbo r s , and t o 
conclude a peace t r e a t y between I s r a e l and Jordan 
by t h e end of t h e t r a n s i t i o n a l pe r iod" ,107 
F i n a l l y , t h e Egypt ian , I s r a e l i and Jo rdan ian r e p r e s e n t a -
t i v e s and s e l f - g o v e r n i n g a u t h o r i t y would form a con t inu ing 
committee t o t a k e dec i s ion "by agreement on the m o d a l i t i e s " for 
a d n i t t i n g p e r s o n s , who were d i s p l a c e d from t h e West Bank and 
Gaza s t r i p in 1967, wi th impor tant measures t o p reven t d i s r v ^ -
108 t i o n o r d i s o r d e r . 
I t may be noted t h a t the autonomy p lan for t h e West Bank 
and Gaza would be t r a n s i t i o n a l In s t ead of being permanent 
ar rangement . Not on ly t h a t , I s r a e l would a l s o have her c o n t r o l 
over t h e a rea through t h e redeployment of t he I s r a e l i fo rces on 
106. i ^ i j l t 
107 . I b i d . 
108. I^id« 
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v u l n e r a b l e l o c a t i o n s * Most s u r p r i s i n g l y / t he Camp David Accords 
109 d i d n o t mention the PLO» 
While commenting on t h e Camp David Accords on t h e ' 'Frame-
work fo r peace i n the Middle East**/ Abba Eban, the former 
Foreign M i n i s t e r of I s r a e l observed t h a t : 
"The hard t r u t h i s t h a t on the most c r u c i a l 
and conplex i s s u e - t h a t of the P a l e s t i n i a n s 
and t h e West Bank - t h e Camp David s i g n a t o r i e s 
d id l i t t l e more than postpone t h e i r c o n f r o n t a -
t i o n by t h e kind of Semantic d e x t e r i t y t h a t 
i s qu ick t o wear out*** 110 
The "Frame work for t h e conc lus ion of peace t r e a t y " d e a l t 
wi th the s ign ing of peace t r e a t y between Egypt and I s r a e l wi th in 
t h r e e months of t h e s ign ing of t h e Camp cavid Accords. I t 
p rovided for t h e phased I s r a e l i withdrawal firom S ina i which 
would begin w i t h i n 3 t o 9 months a f t e r s ign ing of the Accords and 
t h i s p r o c e s s would t a k e 3 years p e r i o d . According t o t h e 
framework, " t h e r i g h t of f ree passage by sh ip s of I s r a e l th rough 
t h e Gulf of Suez and Suez canal" would be ensu red . The Accord 
f u r t h e r p rov ided for t h e n o r m a l i s a t i o n of d ip lomat ic and 
111 
commercial r e l a t i o n s between Jerusalem and Cai ro . 
109, I s r a e l Altman, n , 49# p . 120. 
110, Abba Eban, '*Camp David - The Uhfinished Bus iness" , For^eiqn 
A f f a i r s , v o l . 57, No. 2, January , 1979, pp . 343-344. 
^^^' -Mear Saflt Report , n . 105, p . 1 7 1 . 
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president Sadat who reached Cairo on September 23, 19 78 
a f t e r signing of the Carop David Accords, was extended warm 
112 
welcome by hvmdreds of thousands of cheering Egyptians. The 
Egyptian cabinet had already described the accords as Egypt's 
"most marvellous victory in i t s contemporary his tory" . In the 
meeting/ which l a s t ed th ree hours, the cabinet pledged full 
si;5)port for Sadat and Premier Mamdouh Salem expressed that the 
r e s u l t of the Summit "heralded an era of co-operation and 
113 
co-existence between Arabs and Jews". 
Whereas, the opposition Unionist progressive Party 
(UPP) accused Sadat for deviating from the promise not t o 
e s t ab l i sh r e l a t ions with I s rae l unless t he re was complete 
114 I s r a e l i withdrawal from the occv;^ied Arab t e r r i t o r i e s . 
On the other hand, the I s r a e l i Knesset unanimously 
approved the Camp David Accords on September 26, 1978 and granted 
i t s approval t o remove the I s r a e l i s e t t l e r s from Sinai provided 
Egypt and I s r a e l concluded peace. I t was voted a f t e r 18 hour 
heated debate with 85 in favDur,19 against and 16 absentees. 
During the course. Prime Minister Begin was, however, c r i t i c i s e d 
by his own Likud coa l i t ion Party which blamed him for having 
betrayed his own nation and jeopardised I s r a e l ' s secur i ty . 
112. Arab Report and Rpcord (London) , ifo. 18, S^tember 16-30, 
1978, p . 672. 
113. jibid. , p . 673. 
114. Ifeida. 
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Amidst the debate. Likud's Geula Cohen observed t h a t : 
"Now we a l l feel cheated. I s r a e l ' s connections 
at Camp David, were made on the very heart of 
Israel**. 115 
Meanwhile/ the I s r a e l i Transport and Communication 
Minister resigned following differences with other minis ters 
over foreign pol icy issues and revealed his in ten t ion t o form a 
pa r ty which would take more f lexible stand than t h a t followed 
116 by the Begin Government. 
Arab react ion to the Camp David Accords 
The Camp D^vid Accords were* however, vehemently c r i t i -
c ised by the Arab leaders . The PLC declared that peace could 
not be achieved in the Middle East without the Pales t ine Libe-
117 
r a t i on organisat ion which was not mentioned in the accords. 
PLO leader , , Yasser Arafat denounced the accords as a " d i r t y deal" 
and he accused president sadat of havirxj surrendered the Arab 
Jerusalem in re turn of Sinai de se r t . Arafat further declared 
t h a t President Carter and "American i n t e r e s t s in the Middle 
East" would^pay" for the Egypt ian-Israel i accords. 
115. A s i ^ Recorder (New Delhi) . Vol. XXIV. No. 43, October 
22-28, 1978. p . 14560. 
117. Arabia ajr^ d the Gulf (Londcn) . Vol, 2. No. 39. September, 25, 
1978, p . 2. 
118. i<;eegj-fiq'^ <SsiR%.^iisi:.^r{.J^.9h^ysMi. n . 8 3 , p . 29659. 
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Jordan c r i t i c i s e d the Camp David documents in a s t a t e -
ni«it issued by the Jordanian cabinet on Septentoer 19# 1978. 
The statement ca l l ed the Pales t in ian? should be"the f i r s t and 
most important pa r ty in a peace settlement" and urged the 
I s r a e l i withdrawal from occupied Arab t e r r i t o r i e s , including 
Arab Jerusalem. I t s t ressed t h a t Jordan would not be bound by 
119 the accords as the Government had not been a par ty to them • 
The Saudi statement, issued with the conclusion of the 
spec ia l cabinet meeting, headed by King Khalid Ibn Abdul Aziz 
declared the Camp David formula as unacceptable as i t did not 
provide an "absolute c lear I s r a e l i in tent ion t o withdraw" from 
the occupied Arab t e r r i t o r i e s # including Jerusalem. I t was 
fur ther s t a t ed tha t the documents also fa i led t o include: 
"ttie r i gh t of the Pa les t in ian people t o se l f -
determination and se t \:tp t h e i r own s t a t e in 
t he i r own so i l and ignored the ro l e of Pa les -
t i n e Liberation Organisation which Arab Sunmit 
Conferences have recognised as the sole r ep re -
senta t ives of the Pa les t in ians" , 120 
At the same tiroe* the statement commended president 
Car te r , for h is peace i n i t i a t i v e s but i t sa id tha t Saudi Arabia 
could not accept formulae t ha t "contradict higher Arab i n t e r e s t s " 
119. But i t had been al leged by the PLO on September 19, t h a t 
Jordanian King* Hussein Ibn.Tala l , had through the United 
Sta tes and Bri t i sh diplomatic channels t a c i t l y agreed t o 
the arrangements provided in the accords for the West Bank. 
Ibid*, pp. 29658-29659. 
1 2 0 . AS j a p Re99F.dgr* n . 1 1 5 , p . 14559 . 
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and termed the p r e s e n t s i t u a t i o n c r i t i c a l and f i n a l l y c a l l e d 
121 for a J o i n t Arab s t a n d . The Camp David deal was a l so denoijaced 
by Emir Sheikh Jaber Ai-Ahmad a l Sabah of Kuwait* who p r e s i d e d 
over a s p e c i a l cab ine t in Kuv^ait. Meanwhile* p r e s iden t Hafez 
Al-Assad of Sy r i a t o u r e d t h e West Asian c o u n t r i e s t o exp la in 
122 t h e h a r d l i n e Arab o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Camp David Accords. 
p r e s iden t Assad charged Sadat with having "defea ted t o 
t h e enemy** by abandaning "not on ly Jerusalem bu t t h e whole Arab 
c a u s e " . The Syr ian p r e s i d e n t made h i s accusa t i on on September 
20» 1978, i n an address t o t h e opening s e s s i o n of an emergency 
123 
meet ing of the " r e s i s t e n c e f ron t " in Damascus. At t h e c o n c l u -
s ion of t h e meet ing on September 2A, 1978, a communique was 
i s s u e d which c a l l e d : 
" .To e s t a b l i s h a un i f i ed p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y 
command t o r e s i s t p r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s p o l i c i e s ; 
t o seek c l o s e r r e l a t i o n s with the s o v i e t Uhion 
t o coun te r US i n f l u e n c e in the Middle E a s t ; 
t o i n i t i a t e a Complete economic boycot t of Egypt 
and t o seve r a l l remaining p o l i t i c a l and c u l -
t x r a l l i n k s wi th t h a t country and, t o seek 
t h e removal of t h e Arab League headquar te r s from 
Cai ro t o another Arab c a p i t a l " . 124 
1 2 1 . IPHr 
122 . Ihj^r 
123. The " r e s i s t e n c e f ron t" was e s t a b l i s h e d in December 1977, 
a t T r i p o l i Conference which c a l l e d t o oppose t h e Egyptian 
peace i n i t i a t i v e s and i t comprised S y r i a , A l g e r i a , Libya , 
South Yemen and t h e PLO. 
lf,9S?.im'8 g9n.1iftnPBPrAF.Y-Arg]l,4-.veS^ n . 8 3 , p . 29659. 
124. 2^sJ^ 
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Ear l i e r , i t was on September 20/ 1978, t h a t the US 
secre tary of s t a t e , \^nce flew to west Asian countr ies t o 
persuade Arab leaders t o accept the accords. But his tour 
did not draw any favourable response from the Arab S ta t e s , not 
125 
even the moderate ones l i ke Jordan and Saudi Arabia. in a 
b r ie f statiement diaring his departure a t Damascus a i rpor t on 
September 24, 1978, vance ca l led his five hours long meeting 
with president Assad of Syria as sa t i s f ac to ry and he further 
claimed tha t Assad was incl ined t o continue dialogue between 
t h e i r two coviitries for the benefit of the shared hope of 
accomplishing a jus t peace in the a rea . This claim was contradic-
t ed by some o f f i c i a l s in Damascus and they explained that 
pres ident Assad had c l a r i f i e d t o Vance tha t i t was impossible 
for him t o accept the Canp David Accords because, they v io la ted 
Arab summit decis ions , p a r t i c u l a r l y those specifying that the 
only legi t imate representa t ive of the Pales t in ian people was 
the PLC. On the other hand. President Jaafar Al-Nimeiry of 
Sudan approved the accords and pronised t o a s s i s t in implementa-
126 t ion of the peace process in the Middle East . Apart frcro 
president Niroeiry of Sudan, Morocco and Oman a l so favoured tVe 
^ 127 
accords. 
125. Near E^^p Renort (Washington, D . C . ) , Vol. XXII, No. 38, 
September 2o, 1978, p . 167. 
126. Asj|.ap fiecord^r, n. 115, p . 14559. 
127. t^gg,ina'.g. gggtgmpor^rY ArcMvaSi n* 83, p . 29658. 
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During the cx>urse of October 1978# the Iraqi Government 
played a aaminant ro l e in r a l l y i n g Arab opposi t ion t o the Camp 
David Acoorda and as a r e s u l t of in t ens ive diplomatic e f f o r t s by 
Iraq# the ninth Arab Summit Cpnfere,nce was convened in Baghdad 
from November 2 to 5 1978, which was attended by the represen-
t a t i v e s of 21 of the 22 Arab League metnh>ers, including Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia and other moderate s t a t e s * but Egypt was not 
i n v i t e d in the Conference. Though^ i n i t i a l l y there was an 
uncertainty , l a ter the Iraqi i n v i t a t i o n t o the Conference were 
accepted on October 9, 1978, by the f i v e members of the " r e s i s -
t ence front* namely, Syria, Alger ia , Libya, South Yemen and the 
128 PLO. ° 
Syr ia ' s acceptance t o the i n v i t a t i o n paved the way for 
the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of the long standing mutual h o s t i l i t y between 
Syria and Iraq which was acccxnplished during the ta lks between 
President Assad and Iraqi pres ident , Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr in 
129 Baghdad from October 24 t o 26, 1978". 
The Communique of the n inth Arab Summit observed that 
the accords, were detrimental t o the Pa les t in ian people ' s r i g h t s 
and r i g h t s of the Arab people in Pa l e s t ine and the occv^ied Arab 
128. ;;bid. , p . 29659. 
129. Syria reopened its border with Iraq on October 22, 
confirming reports of a reconciliation between the 
rival regimes. 
Arab .Report and Recoy^ (London) , NO. 20, October l6*3l, 
1978, p. 764. 
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t e r r i t o r i e s . I t was r e a l i s e d t h a t t h e s e documents had emerged 
beyond t h e purview of t h e Arab c o l l e c t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and 
were c o n t r a r y t o the Arab Sunmit c o n f e r e n c e s , the Arab League 
130 
Charter and t h e UN R e s o l u t i o n s r e g a r d i n g P a l e s t i n e q u e s t i o n . 
The c o n f e r e n c e d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e s e accords d id not r e s u l t i n t h e 
j u s t Peace as sought by Arab n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , i t d e c i d e d t o 
r e j e c t t h e accords and d i s s o c i a t e i t s e l f from thetn and f u r t h e r , 
t h e Conference ^ r e j e c t e d a l l the p o l i t i c a l , economic , l e g a l and 
131 
o t h e r e f f e c t s r e s u l t i n g from t h e m ' . 
At t h e same t i m e the Communique s t a t e d t h a t : 
' "The Conference d e c i d e d t o c a l l on the Egypt ian 
Government t o abrogate t h e s e agreements and not 
t o s i g n any r e c o n c i l i a t i o n t r e a t y w i t h the enemy. 
The Conference hoped t h a t Egypt would return t o 
t h e f o l d of Jo in t Arab a c t i o n and not a c t u n i l a -
t e r a l l y i n the a f f a i r s o f the A r a b - Z i o n i s t 
C o n f l i c t " . 13 2 . 
However, t h e Communique adapted by the Baghdad Conference 
was regarded a s l e s s h o s t i l e t o Egypt than i t had been presumed. 
I t was i n f a c t , Saudi Arabia and o ther moderate s t a t e s which 
opposed t h e demands f o r an immediate p o l i t i c a l and economic 
b o y c o t t o f Egypt and as a r e s u l t such r e s o l u t i o n was not adopted 
by t h e Summit. On the o t h e r hand, i t was r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e 
agreement had been reached by t h e m a j o r i t y o f the c o u n t r i e s 
e x c e p t Sudan, Morocco and Oman which v o i c e d t h e i r d i s s e n s i o n . 
130 . I b i d . , No. 2 1 , November 1 - 1 5 , 1978, p . 8 0 3 . 
1 3 1 . I b i d . 
132 . lifX^^ 
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t h a t i f Egypt s igned t h e peace t r e a t y with I s r a e l then t h e s t e p s 
would be taken t o remove t h e headquar t e r s of t h e Arab League 
133 irom Ca i ro and t o impose economic s a n c t i o n s on Egypt. 
In pursuance of t h e Baghdad Sumnit r e s o l u t i o n t o d i ssuade 
Sadat from s ign ing a peace t r e a t y , a four-man de lega t ion l e d by 
Labenese Prime M i n i s t e r , Salim Hoss v i s i t e d Cai ro t o meet with 
P r e s i d e n t Sadat on November 4 , 1978 but he r e fused t o meet them 
and a t t h e same t ime in an address t o the p e o p l e ' s Assembly Sadat 
teirmed the Summit p a r t i c i p a n t s as "cowards and dwarfs" and 
l34 
expres sed t h a t he would not heed t o " h i s s i n g of snakes" . 
Western and Sov ie t A t t i t u d e 
The Western a t t i t u d e t o t h e Camp David Accords was favou-
r a b l e . The accords were h a i l e d by t h e Western powers including 
t h e member s t a t e s of t h e European community whose Foreign Minis -
t e r s , i n a s t a t e m e n t , i s sued on September 19 , 1978, c o n g r a t u l a t e d 
Sada t , Begin and Ca r t e r for the grand accomplishment and 
exp re s sed t h e hope t h a t : " t h e outcome of t h e Canp David Confe-* 
r e n c e w i l l be a f u r t h e r major s t e p on the p a t h t o a J u s t , 
comprehensive and l a s t i n g peace** and they p ledged t h a t they 
would render t h e i r p o s s i b l e suppor t t o achieve such a 
135 p e a c e . 
133. Keesinq 'g Contemporary Arch ives , n . 8 3 , p . 29660, 
134. jjlpidlt 
135. I£>Adt' p . 29659. 
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Whereas/ the Sovie t News Agency Tass on September 19/ 
19 78/ b i t t e r l y c r i t i c i s e d the accords a s a " b e t r a y e l of the 
Arab cause** and charged Sadat wi th '•coroplete su r rende r before 
136 
t h e expans ion i s t ambit ions of t h e I s r a e l i a g g r e s s o r " . In f a c t / 
wi th the ccnc lu s ion of the Camp David AcoordS/ t h e Soviet Union, 
in o r d e r t o i n f l uence the Middle East p o l i t i c s , brought the 
P a l e s t i n e L i b e r a t i o n Movement under t h e ambit of her fo re ign 
, , 137 p o l i c y . 
I t was on October 29, 19 78/ t h a t t h e PLO Chairman/ Arafa t 
138 
v i s i t e d Sov ie t Union in order t o draw t h e Sovie t si;t»port. In 
a j o i n t Communique, they condemned the accords between Egypt and 
139 
I s r a e l and they f u r t h e r welcomed t h e proposed Baghdad Conference. 
136. Ibi<j. 
137. Dmitry Volsky/ ""Secrets of Camp David**, New Tinges 
(Moscow)/ NO. 38/ September 1978, p p . 8-9• 
138. During t h e course of t h e t a l k s which passed in an 
atmosphere of c o r d i a l i t y and mutual unders tanding , 
t hey d i scussed t h e s i t u a t i o n in t h e Middle East a«id 
the t a s k s of a r i s i n g in the s t r u g g l e f o r a j u s t 
s e t t l e m e n t of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n problem. 
New Times (Moscow) , No.45, November 1978, p . 3 . 
139. The Communique s t a t e d t h a t ; **Considering the ob t a in ing 
s i t u a t i o n , they a r e profoundly convinced t h a t t h e t a s k 
of r a l l y i n g and a c t i v i z i n g a l l fo rces opposed t o a n t i -
Arab s e p a r a t e dea ls i s of s p e c i a l movement. In t h i s 
connect ion t h e p a r t i e s welcomed the convening i n Beghdad 
of a Svramit Conference of Arab S t a t e s and t h e pLO". 
Qxioted in Dmitry Volsky, "Diiel of Tendencies" , New Times 
(Moscow) , No. 46 , November, 1978, p . 10 . 
CHAPTER-IV 
WEST ASIA AFTER CAMP DAVID 
The Egyptian-Israeli peace talks for the conclusion of 
a peace treaty was held in Washington on October 12, 1978, with 
the respective delegation led by the Egyptian Defence Minister, 
Kamal Hassan Ali and the Israeli Defence Minister, Ezer Wei2inan 
and the Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan with the US President, 
Jimmy Carter attending the opening ceremony. Though, an annoui-
cement was made on October 2 2 that the provisional agreement 
had been reached on the basis of a draft text which was prepared 
by the United States, major difficulties, hov«ver, subsequently 
2 
arose. 
The I s r a e l i o f f i c i a l announcement made during t h e l a t e r 
p a r t o f 1978 f o r f u r t h e r expans ion o f t h e Jewish s e t t l e m e n t s 
in t h e west Bank, c r e a t e d t e n s i o n not o n l y between Egypt and 
I s r a e l but a l s o between the u n i t e d s t a t e s and I s r a e l . The major 
f a c t o r t h a t impeded t h e p r o c e s s of n e g o t i a t i o n s , was t h e 
Egypt ian c o n t e n t i o n r e g a r d i n g l i n k a g e between t h e E g y p t i a n - I s r a e l i 
Peace Treaty and t h e implementat ion o f a Camp David p r o v i s i o n 
3 
r e l a t i n g to the West Bank, i t was i n mid-November, 1978 t h a t 
1 . Near East Report (Washington, D . C . ) , \ to l . XXII, No. 4 2 , 
October 1 8 , 1978, p . 1 9 1 . 
2 . KeggiRSl.:.9. .Qgpt^mpgry.Y.. jSSPhXiiS^j (London) , Vol . XXVi' 
1979 , p . 29660, 
3 . iMj?J. 
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in an interview to the Newsweek, president Sadat admitted t h a t : 
"there are some d i f f i c u l t i e s in the t r e a ty 
between Egypt and I s rae l tha t are surmountable. 
We can overcome them very ea s i l y . But the 
serious point of difference i s the question of 
linkage between the Egypt ian-Israel i t r e a t y and 
autonomy in Gaza and on the West Bank" .4 
I s r ae l s trongly r e s i s t e d the Egyptian demands for the 
5 
linkage between the two framework. Meanwhile^ the controver-
s ies led t o the expiry of December 17/ 1978, the t a rge t date 
for signing of the peace t r e a t y between Egypt and Is rae l and 
both s ides blamed each other for the f iasco. While the Egyp-
t i a n s charged the I s r a e l i s with being more r i g i d , the I s r a e l i s 
maintained tha t Egypt put forward the new deriands which were 
6 
not covered by the Camp David Accords. 
I t was on February 22, 19 79 tha t the I s r a e l i cabinet 
r e jec ted t he US inv i t a t ion t o prime Minister Begin to a t tend 
a summit Conference with his Egyptian counterpart , Mustafa 
Khalil which was in te rpre ted in I s r a e l i c i r c l e as equal is ing 
Khal i l , who was a nominal head of Egypt, with the rank of 
4» j^ewsweek (New York) , November 27, 1978, p . 24. 
5 . Near East fiepprt (Washington, D.C.), Vol. XXII, No. 43, 
October 25, 1978, p . 195. 
6* i>^^si^pq's ppptemppr.afy. ArcMvgg' «• 2, p . 29660 
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7 Begin/ . the rea l head of I s r a e l . As a r e s u l t of Begin's 
re jec t ion t o meet prime Minister Khalil and Sadat ' s refusal to 
v i s i t the United Sta tes for negotiat ing purpose, president 
Carter announced on March 5, 1978 about his programme t o v i s i t 
Q 
Egypt and Israel which was welcomed by both Begin and Sadat. 
In fact / Car te r ' s domestic and foreign po l i c i e s were increa-
s ingly undermined and he did not want t o allow the grea tes t 
achievement of his administrat ion - the Camp David Accords, t o 
f a l l apar t . He decided t o take r i sk s by involving himself 
9 
personal ly in the negot ia t ing process . Washington o f f i c i a l s 
were caut iously opt imis t ic about Ca r t e r ' s decision t o t r ave l 
t o the Middle East in order t o bring about a peace t r e a t y 
between Egypt and I s r a e l . For ins tance . Republican Senator 
Jacob J a v i t s of New York observed tha t the Carter Adninistrat ion 
was courageously "taking some r i sks" t o ensure peace in the 
Middle East .^^ 
7. West /^ gJA plat-Y rw«»w Delhi) , \tol. IV, No. iS, April 30 
May 6/ 1979/ p . 1560. 
8. Shimon Shamir and Moshe Gammer, "The Egypt ian-Is rae l i 
peace t rea ty" in Colin Legun (Edited) M^ddle East 
Contemporary Survey. Vol. 3, 19 78-79/ (New Yorkj 
Holmes fc Meier Publishers/ I n c . , 1980), p . 112, 
9 . Ihi^* p . 114. 
10» Near Ea t^^  F^fport (Washington, D.C.) , Vol. XXIII/ No. 10, 
March 7/ 1979, p . 39. 
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president Carter reached Cairo on March 8/ 1979 in 
order to begin t a l k s for the conclusion of a peace t r e a ty 
between Egyptian and I s r a e l i Goverrments. president Sadat 
proposed t h a t i f autonomy in the West Bank was impossible, i t 
should be es tabl ished in Gaza s t r i p f i r s t , and Egypt should 
12 
se t \jp a " l i a i son office" t h e r e . In an address t o the people ' s 
Assembly of Egypt on March 10, 1979, President Carter sa id 
t h a t J 
"The conclusion of a t r e a t y between I s rae l and 
Egypt will enable your government t o mobilize 
i t s resources not for war but for provision of 
a be t t e r l i f e for every Egyptian".13 
In order t o ensure the incentive for a t r e a t y , he fur ther 
pledged the American sv^jport for the developments of Egypt 
14 and i t s po l i c i e s t o maintain s t a b i l i t y in the region, on the 
same day. Carter reached Jerusalem and presented Begin with 
Sadat ' s amendnents of proposals which was re jec ted by the 
15 I s r a e l i prime Minis ter . The US president sought Begin to sign 
11 . Washinotop Post (Washington), March 9, 1979. 
12. David Hirs t and Irene Beeson, ^.ad^t (Londons Faber and 
Paber, 1979) , p . 319. 
13. PepflytFT'g»?t fff. ^tatff Bx^l^^in* Vol. LXXIX, NO. 2026, 
May 1979, p . 21 . 
14. The President added t h a t " the conclusion of the peace 
t r e a t y t ha t we are discussing wil l strengthen cooperation 
between Egypt and the Uhited Sta tes in other ways. I 
fu l ly share and will s\jpport President Sadat ' s bel ief t h a t 
s t a b i l i t y must be maintained in t h i s par t of the world, 
even while c<»structive change i s ac t ive ly encouraged". 
15. David Hirst and Irene Besson, n. 12, p . 319. 
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t h e peace t r e a t y during his v i s i t t o Jerusalem so that the 
f a i l u r e of negot ia t ions and the undermining of h i s personal 
p r e s t i g e in America and elsewhere in t h e world would be avoided. 
But Prime Minister Begin r e s i s t ed Car t e r ' s demand to sign the 
16 peace t r e a t y . White speaking at the I s r a e l i Knesset on 
March 12, 1979• fresident Carter expressed t h a t : 
•"The r i sks of peace between you and your 
Egyptian neighboiirs are r e a l . But America 
i s ready t o reduce any r i sks and t o balance 
them within the bovaids of our s t rength and 
bur influence". 17 
He also promised the I s r a e l i s the American economic and 
18 
mi l i t a ry ass i s t ance ; Though, Ca r t e r ' s v i s i t seemed to be on 
the verge of fiasco due t o Begin's refvisal to pay heed t o 
Sadat ' s proposal and t o sign a peace t r e a t y , an a t tenpt was made 
a t the eleventh hour t o solve the disputes in negot ia t ing process 
and f ina l ly , a break-through was achieved as a r e s u l t of the 
consul ta t ions between I s r a e l i Foreign Minister , Moshe Dayan and 
the US Secretary of s t a t e , Vance leading to the formulation of 
proposals such as (a) I s rae l would be allowed t o buy o i l from 
16. Moshe payah. Breakthrough : A f>efsonal Accpupt of the 
EaVDt-Israel Peace negot ia t ions (New Delhi : Vikas 
publishing House, Pvt. L td . , 1981), p . 272. 
1'7* Department of S»ate Bul le t in , n . 13, p . 28. 
18. Carter sa id t h a t : "we know I s r a e l ' s concern that the p r ice 
of peace with Egypt wil l exacerbate an already d i f f i cu l t 
economic s i t u a t i o n . . . We are prepared to see I s r a e l ' s 
economic and mi l i t a ry re la t ionsh ip with the United States 
take on new and strong and more meaningful dimensions 
even than already ex i s t* . 
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Egypt on the b a s i s as o t h e r cus tomers , (b) Egypt would withdraw 
for the t ime be ing , i t s demand for t h e l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s in 
Gaza, with the understanding t h a t i t would be d i scussed l a t e r , 
(c) The t r e a t y would spec i fy t h e s t a g e of i n t e r im I s r a e l i 
withdrawal and the ambassadors would be exchanged one month 
a f t e r completion of wi thdrawal . The new p roposa l s were a c c e p -
t e d by Begin. Howe.ver, he a s s e r t e d t h a t the t r e a t y would be 
19 
s igned only a f t e r t h e Knesset a p p r o v a l . 
On March 13, 19 79, p r e s i d e n t Car t e r reached Ca i ro and 
in t h e Conference, he announced I s r a e l ' s r ead iness t o s ign t h e 
20 
t r e a t y wi th I s r a e l , i t was on March 14, 1979^ t h a t t he I s r a e l i 
cab ine t approved the f i na l p roposa l s and t h e whole peace 
t r e a t y package was accepted on March 19 and t h e following day. 
t h e t r e a t y was p laced before t h e Knesset which passed i t a f t e r 
21 28 hours of debate with 9 5 votes t o 18, p r e s iden t C a r t e r in e 
s ta tement on March 22, h a i l e d the I s r a e l i approval of t h e 
19. Shimon Shamir and Moshe Gammer, n . 8 , p . 113. 
And a l s o see for fu r the r d e t a i l s Moshe Dayan, n . 16, 
p p . 273-278, 
20. Afr ica Diary (New Delh i , Vbl. XIX, No. 26, June 25 -
J u l y 1, 1979, p . 9563. 
2 1 . Shimon Shamir and Moshe Gammer, n . 8, p . 113. 
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peace t r e a t y and he observed t h a t ; 
"The binds of shared values and common purpose 
between the united States and I s r ae l are strong 
and enduring. The achievement of peace between 
Is rae l and Egypt wil l strengthen even more otr 
r e l a t ions with these two p a r t i e s in peace and 
help more towards a s t a b l e , co-operative and 
peaceful future for a l l the peoples of the Middle 
East".22 
Eqvp^ ' I s r a e l i Peace Treaty 
On March 26, 1979/ in the White House ceremony in 
Washington, the Peace t r e a ty was signed between Sadat and Begin 
in a i g l i s h , Hebrew and Arabic language which was duly signed 
23 by president Carter as witness. Carter , in an address a f te r 
witnessing the signing of the peace t r e a t y , sa id t h a t : 
"The country sides of both lands a re free from 
the l i t t e r and the carnage of a wasteful war . . . 
The dedication and determination of these two 
world statesmen have borne f r u i t . Peace has 
come t o I s rae l and Egypt. There now remains 
the r e s t of the Arab world whose si;5)port and 
whose co-operation in the peace process i s 
needed and honestly sought, I am convinced 
tha t other Arab people need and want peace. Bvtt 
some of the i r leaders are not yet b i l l i n g to 
honour these needs and desires for peace**.24 
22. Department of s t a t e Bul le t in , n. 13, p . 4 . 
23 . A«iian RACOr^er (New D e l h i ) , Vol. XXV, No. 18, Apr i l 3 o -
May 6, 1979, p . 14865. 
24. The President added t h a t : "we must now demonstrate the 
advantages of peace, and expand i t s benefi t t o encompass 
contd 
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After thanking president Carter , president Sadat said 
that* 
"The steps we took in the recent pas t wi l l serve 
Arab v i t a l i n t e r e s t s . The l ibe ra t ion of Arabs 
land and the r e i n s t i t u t i o n of Arab authori ty in 
the West Bank and Gaza would ce r t a in ly enhance 
our common s t r a t eg i c i n t e r e s t s . While we take 
i n i t i a t i v e to protect these i n t e r e s t s , we remain 
fa i thful t o our Arab commitment. Let there be 
no wars or bloodshed between Arabs and I s r a e l i s " . 25 
prime Minister Begin equally expressed his joy on signing 
of the Peace t r e a t y . His speech, however, revealed the adamant 
a t t i t u d e of I s rae l on the s ta tus of East Jerusalem when he 
eloquently sa id that* 
"No more war, no more bloodshed, no mere 
breavement. Peace unto you . . . And i t i s . . . 
the t h i r d grea tes t day in my l i f e . The f i r s t 
was May 14, 1948, when our flag was hois ted. 
Our independence in our ances tors ' land was 
proclaimed a f t e r , 1,878 years of dispersion, 
persecut ion, humiliation and ul t imately , 
physical destruct ion . . . The second day was 
when Jerusalem became one c i t y . . . t h i s i s 
the t h i r d day in my l i f e . I have signed a 
t r e a ty of peace with our great neighbour, 
with Egypt**.26 
con td . • . • 
a l l those who have suffered so much in the 
Middle E a s t . . . " 
Near East Report (Washington, D.C.) , Vol. XXIII, 
NO. 13, March 28, 1979, p . 63 . 
25. Ibid.3 p . 64. 
26. I b i d . , p . 65. 
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The terms of the t r e a ty bas ica l ly provided for I s r a e l i 
re turn of the e n t i r e Sinai Peninsula t o Egypt, captured in 
1967 war in exchange of Egyptian recognit ion of the Sta te of 
I s r a e l . The t r e a t y highlighted that* 
"(a) There wil l be I s r a e l i withdrawal from the 
e n t i r e Sinai - including i t s set t lements/ 
sophis t ica ted mi l i t a ry bases and the o i l 
f i e lds - within th ree years . Within nine 
months I s rae l would withdraw two-third of 
the Peninsula. 
(b) After the completion of I s r a e l i interim 
withdrawal in nine months* normal r e l a t ions 
will be es tab l i shed . One month af ter the 
completion of the interim withdrawal/Israel 
and Egypt will exchange t h e i r respect ive 
ambassadors. 27 
(c) Security arrangements wi l l be made on both 
s ides of the I s rae l i -Egypt ian border * inclu-
ding l imited forces zones and IW troops t o 
monltoc, wil l a l so conduct survei l lance 
f l i gh t s to monitor compliance. 
(d) I s r a e l i ships wil l have the same r ight of 
free passage in the Suez Canal and i t s 
approaches as the vessels of other na t ions . 
(e) I s rae l will be permitted to buy o i l from 
the f ie lds i t i s re turning to Egypt mder 
normal commercial terms",28 
27. Near East Report> n. 24, p . i . 
And also see for further de t a i l s American Foreign pol icy; 
Basic Docunents, 1977-1980 (Washington i Department of 
S ta t e , 1983) , pp, 669-683, 
28. I b id . 
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Hbwever* before the signing of the peace t rea ty* the 
two mem or an duns of agreement between the United States and 
I s rae l was .c landes t ine ly signed by the American and I s r a e l i 
au tho r i t i e s on the same day of signing the peaCe t r e a t y . In 
f ac t , Egypt was not apprised of such _ ro em or an da. The 
memoranda provided for the US act icn in case of the t r e a t y 
v io la t ion by Egypt and i t also ensured o i l to I s r ae l for 15 
2d 
years/ should I s r a e l ' s sources jeqpardised. The Egyptian 
prime Minister/ Mustafa KJ^alil pro tes ted against the memoranda 
and asser ted tha t i t indicated tha t there could be v io la t ions 
only from the Egyptian s ide and he observed tha t the memoranda 
would "adversely affect the whole process of peace and s t a b i l i t y 
in the region". The us s t a t e Department, responded to Egyptian 
29. The memoranda, s t a t ed that* "The united States wil l 
provide support i t deems appropriate for proper act ions 
taken by I s r ae l in response to such demonstrated v io l a -
t ions of the Treaty of peace. In par t icu la r* the t r e a t y 
of peace is deemed t o threaten t h e secur i ty of Israel* 
including, i n t e r a l l i a * a blockade of I s r a e l ' s use of 
in te rna t iona l waterways, a v iola t ion of the provisions 
of the t r ea ty of peace oonceming l imi ta t ion of forces 
or an armed a t tack against I s r a e l , t he United s t a t e s 
wi l l be prepared t o consider, on an urgent bas i s , such 
measures as the strengthening of the United States 
presence in the a reas , the providing of emergency supplies 
t o I s r a e l , and the excercise of maritime r i g h t s in order 
t o put an end t o the violance". 
#P.?r4,Cflti fQy.e.iflR. Pglicy : Basic Doctment^. ;977-1980 
(Washington, Department of S ta te , 1983) , p . 684. 
And also see Near East fteport (Washington, D.C.) , 
Vbl. XXIII, No» 14, April 4, 1979, p . 69. 
30. ifeiiit 
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p r o t e s t and offered t o s ign a s i m i l a r document which Egypt 
. 31 
r e fu sed t o s i g n . 
US a i d t o E9ypt and I s r a e l 
After t h e conclus ion of the peace t r e a t y t h e US Admi-
n i s t r a t i o n provided both Egypt and I s r a e l wi th t h e f i n a n c i a l 
a s s i s t a n c e . Speaking a t a Senate Foreign Re la t ions Committee 
on Apr i l 11» 1979, t he US Sec re t a ry of S t a t e , ^Mnce gave 
d e t a i l s of a d d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e as a reward t o 
Egypt and I s r a e l for t h e s ign ing of peace t r e a t y , which amounted 
t o t h e t o t a l of $ 4 .8 b i l l i o n over t h r e e y e a r s , p rov ided by 
t h e United S t a t e s . Out of t h i s amount, Egypt would be f inanced 
32 $ 1.5 b i l l i o n whereas I s r a e l would be p rov ided with $ 3 b i l l i o n . 
The Di rec to r of t h e US Agency for I n t e r n a t i o n a l Deve-
lopment (AID) , Donald Brown s a i d t h a t t h e $ 1.5 b i l l i o n f i n a n c i a l 
a s s i s t a n c e approved by t h e Congress , would be given in loans 
I I II I I nil » ! • I—I I •• I I . . 1 . • I • I I III I . I I I I • . , 1 . . 1 . 1 1 I I I . . . . 11 II 
3 1 . T i^e New Ybrk Times (New York), March 29, 19 7 9 . 
3 2 . The amount of t he American a i d t o I s r a e l was in add i t i on 
t o the $ 1.8 b i l l i o n in annual m i l i t a r y and economic a i d 
t h a t I s r a e l got from the US. The American a i d to Egypt 
was in a d d i t i o n t o the $ 750 m i l l i o n in economic a i d 
$ 2CX3 m i l l i o n in food a i d t h a t Egypt c u r r e n t l y r e c e i v e d 
from Washington. 
Time (New York), Apr i l 2 , 1979, p . 6 . 
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and m i l i t a r y c r e d i t s t o Egypt and apart from t h i s amount^ $ 300 
33 
m i l l i o n in sv^plementary aid would be expended to Egypt. A 
further $ 15 m i l l i o n committed for 1979 was a l l o c a t e d in order 
t o provide 1,500 scholarships* which costed $ 45 mi l l i on over 
three years . AID a l so agreed t o grant $ 1,225 mi l l ion to s e t 
\jf> l o c a l developments funds which would provide loans t o v i l l a g e 
counci l for investment in profifemaking p r o j e c t s . The funds would 
be contro l l ed by the v i l l a g e Council/ and each of which would 
34 be made vp t o t h e equivalent of $ 5 m i l l i o n in l o c a l currency. 
The siJ5>plementary a id of $ 300 m i l l i o n would be provided t o 
Egypt over three years in order to help president sadat for 
35 
so lv ing the real human needs of his people . 
The $ 1.5 b i l l i o n of mi l i t ary sa l e t o Egypt as indicated 
by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown in his test imony before 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was necessary to ensure 
the s ecur i ty of Egypt and t o promote the s t a b i l i t y in the 
i 36 reg ion . 
33 . Middle East Eqonomic Survey (Nicos ia ) , \*>1. XXII, No. 36, 
J m e 25, 1979, p . 1. 
34 . MAfldlt ^:^9% .BggngF"><? SL^SSSt, (London), Vol. 23, No. 41 , 
October a i , 1979, p . 35 . 
35. KeesiDo's Contemporary Archives, n . 2, p . 29950. 
36 . Hearings before the committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
Uhited States House, Ninety Six Congress, F ir s t s e s s i o n , 
Supnlemental 19 79 Middle East Aid package for Israel and 
Egypt (Washington, D.C.s US Government Print ing Off ice , 
1979) , p . 150. 
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I t was in October 1979^ t h a t a study mission headed by 
the pentagon's Research Director# William Perry reached Egypt 
t o review the Egyptian request for 200 F-15 and F-16, 100 
tanks alongwith the technical ass i s tance t o manufacture F-5E 
J e t f ighters indegineously and he recommended a major American 
commitment to modernize the Egyptian mi l i t a ry power, AS a 
r e s u l t , the White House informed the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee about i t s plan. to s e l l t o Egypt 85 P-16 a i r c r a f t s 
37 
and a l so some mi l i t a ry equipment. 
However, behind the scene lobbying against the quant i ty 
of arms aid t o Egypt was launched by Israel when in December 
1979, the I s r a e l i Defense Minister^ Ezer Weisatian sought the us 
38 Administration t o reduce the US arms aid t o Egypt. This was 
followed by the US National Security Covxicil (NSC) consideration 
on February 15, 1980, v*iich studied the Egyptian arms request 
and a l so I s r a e l i p ro tes t against the proposed a id . I t was 
reported t h a t the NSC members and President Carter j u s t i f i e d 
the s a l e of F-.16 to Egypt and ul t imately Carter decided to s e l l 
39 38-F-16 f ighter bombers t o Egypt. On February 25, 1980, i t was 
37. The Jerusalan post (Jerusal em^  . February 20, 1980. 
38. Christopher S. Raj, "US-Egypt Tacit Al l iance: Post October 
War Phase" in Surendra Bhutani, (Edited) , Arab East Today (New Delhit Kalamkar prakashan (P) Ltd, 1981) , p7 145. 
39. ipi^f 
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repor ted that formal agreement on the sa le of $ 2 b i l l i on 
worth of US arms to Egypt was conclucaed between Egyptian 
Defense Minister , General Kamal Hassan Ali and the US Assistant 
Secre tary , McGiffort and on March 13 and 25/ 1980, the Pentagon 
apprised the congress with proposed arms sale t o Egypt which 
included 244 M-60 advanced b a t t l e tanks,40 F-16 a i r c r a f t s with 
spares , sqpport equipment and armament, including P-16 f l i gh t 
simxiltator, r e l a t ed Communication System, t r a i n i n g , to spare 
engines and air-frame components, 60o Hughes AGM-65 Maverick 
ASMP» 20 mm ammunition, 2500 500-lb MK-B2 bombers, 850 20oO-lb 
MK-84 bombs and associated se rv ices . On April 22, 1980, the 
"pr incipal agreement" for two b i l l ion arms purchase was signed 
by Egyptian Defense Minister, Ali in Washington. These arms 
were si:^plied t o Egypt under the Foreign Mili tary sa le (JMS) 
which meant cash payments and approved by the Congress in 
40 May 1980, 
In a l e t t e r to I s r a e l i Defense Minister , Weizman, the 
US Secretary of Defense, Brown, on March 19, 1979, expressed 
t h a t the Itiited States would provide extraordinary ass i s tance 
t o I s r a e l for re locat ing the Sinai a i r bases t o the Negev and 
in addi t ion to t h i s , I s rae l would also be supplied with 
40* i ^ i^ 
And also see for further details Middle East Monitor 
(New Jersey) , Vbl. X, NO. 4, March l, 1980, p.3. 
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41 
m i l i t a r y equipment. The new a i d commitment inc luded $ 3 b i l l i o n 
over t h r e e years p e r i o d for c o n s t r u c t i o n of two a i r bases in 
t h e Negev and t o a s s i s t in meeting o the r r e l o c a t i o n s c o s t s . 
The $ 800 m i l l i o n g ran t of the t o t a l $ 3 b i l l i o n a s s i s t a n c e 
would be p a i d in t h e form of loans t o be spread i n t h e f i s c a l 
42 yea r s 1979-80, In a d d i t i o n ^ t h e United S t a t e s would extend 
"manager ia l and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e " for the base . Long-term 
loans would be g ran ted t o enable I s r a e l to purchase $ 2,2 
b i l l i o n worth arms from t h e un i t ed S t a t e s which inc luded 
200 t a n k s , 800 armoured personne l c a r r i e r s , a i r to -ground 
m i s s i l e s and a r t i l l e r y weapons* Terms fo r the loans would be 
in accordance wi th t h e c u r r e n t market r a t e s , a 10 year deferment 
on payment of p r i n c i p a l , and then 20 years t o r e p l y the l o a n . 
Fu r the r , t h e US Admin is t ra t ion was a l s o p repared t o 
a c c e l e r a t e t h e d e l i v e r y of P-16 f i g h t e r p l anes promised t o 
I s r a e l i n . 1 9 7 8 . Although^ t h e p lanes had been scheduled for 
d e l i v e r y in 1981, t h e d a t e moved xxp t o January 1980 for t h e 
44 d e l i v e r y of t h e p l a n e s . 
4 1 . Hearing before t h e committee on Foreign Re la t ions of t h e 
United S t a t e s Senate , Nine ty s i x Congress, F i r s t Sess ion 
tl4d<^^ ^ast^, Peace Package (Washington, D . C . J US Government 
P r i n t i n g Of f ice , 1979V,p, 1180 
42. i b i ^ 
43. President Carter s 1979 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional 
Quarterly, 1980) , p, 35. 
44. m^j. 
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Arab oppogit ior i t o t h e E g y p t - I s r a e l i Peace Trea ty 
There was widespread condemnation of Peace t r e a t y in 
t h e e n t i r e Arab world. For i n s t a n c e / in an i n t e r v i e w t o the 
Newsweek/ p r e s i d e n t Hafez Al-Assad of Syr ia denovnced the 
E g y p t - I s r a e l i Peace Trea ty and p l aced Sadat " i n the p o s i t i o n 
of an enemy of t h e Arab na t ion* in t h e same t r e n c h with I s r a e l " . 
He f u r t h e r observed t h a t the United S t a t e s was t r y i n g t o 
45 d iv ide t h e Arabs in a c a l c u l a t e d way. On March 26, 1979/ 
t h e PLO l e a d e r , Yasser Ara fa t , speaking a t t h e Sabra re fugee 
camp in B e i r u t , t h r e a t e n e d t o "c rush the t r i a n g u l a r a l l i a n c e 
of C a r t e r , Begin and Sadat" and t o "chop off t h e i r hands" for 
46 i g n o r i n g P a l e s t i n i a n r i g h t s . The P a l e s t i n i a n s p r o t e s t e d and 
demonstra ted in many Arab and o t h e r c a p i t a l s and a l s o in t h e 
I s r a e l i occupied West Bank and Gaza, fol lowed by s eve ra l i n c i -
d e n t s , inc lud ing temporary s e i z u r e of the Egyptian Embassies 
In Kuwait and Dacca and of t h e Egyptian a i r l i n e o f f i c e i n 
Damascus, where two bombs b l a s t e d o u t s i d e t h e US Etnbassy but 
47 
wi thou t causing any i n j u r y . 
4 5 . p r e s i d e n t Assad expressed t h a t : "The US i s t r y i n g t o 
d iv ide and r u l e by . . . t r a n s f e r r i n g some of t h e Arabs t o 
t h e I s r a e l i s i d e . There a r e a l s o US a t t emp t s t o c r e a t e 
an atmosphere of t e n s i o n in the a r e a . . . And t h e s e o v j e c -
t i v e s c o i n c i d e , of course , with Z i o n i s t aims - t h i n g s t h e 
American peop le a r e no t aware of and would n o t , agree 
t<i I f they understood what i s happening." 
Newsweek (New York) , j ^ r i l 2 , 19479, p . 8 . 
•46. Kees inq ' s Oontemporarv Arch ives , n . 2, p.. 29951. 
47 . i ^ M * 
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A t h r e e day Conference of Arab League M i n i s t e r s was 
he ld on March 21» 1979/ i n Baghdad in order t o t ake a c t i o n s 
48 
a g a i n s t Egypt fo r t he s ign ing of the Peace t r e a t y with I s r a e l . 
The Conference which was a t t ended by Foreign Min i s t e r s and 
Economy M i n i s t e r s of 18 members S t a t e s and by the PLO (Sudan 
and Oman being absent i n a d d i t i o n t o Egypt, which was not 
i n v i t e d ) was marked by sharp disagreement between the h a r d l i n e r s 
l e d by I r a q , Syria» Libya and the PLO and the moderates -
Yemen, Bahrain* Qatar , Morocco, T u n i s i a and Maur i t iana l e d by 
49 Saudi Arab ia , r egard ing s anc t i ons a g a i n s t Egypt. The s p l i t in 
t h e Arab ranks was ave r t ed due t o t h e s a g a c i t y of King Hussein 
Ibn T a l a l of Jordan and Kuwaiti l e a d e r s h i p . In f a c t , in a 
pre-Conference meeting with King Khalid Ibn Abdul Aziz , King 
Hussein succeded in persuading t h e Saudi King for t h e suspen-
s ion of Arab economic a s s i s t a n c e t o Egypt a p a r t from moving t h e 
Arab League headquar t e r s from Ca i ro , suspending Egyptian 
membership in t h e Arab League and boycot t ing t h e Egyptian f i rms 
o r i n d i v i d u a l s who dea l t wi th I s r a e l . A f u r t h e r t e n s i o n 
occu r r ed during t h e Conference, when a t I r a q ' s c a l l , i t was 
dec ided t o suspend Egypt from var ious o r g a n i s a t i o n a t t a c h e d t o 
t h e Arab League o r in Arab League sponsored J o i n t p r o j e c t s 
and t o ban economic a i d t o Egypt from the Arab funds, banks 
48. ibisJ^ 
4 9 . Middle East Monitfoy (New. J e r s e y ) , Vol. IX, No. 7 , 
Apr i l 1/ 1979, p . 4 . 
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50 e t c . I t seemed ttiat the modrates and the hardl iners were on 
the verge of f inal s p l i t regarding the question of severence 
of diplomatic r e l a t i ons with Egypt. But Kuwait's diplomatic 
manoeuvre and i t s c ruc ia l mediatory ro le on March 3o, 1979/ 
averted the * f ina l breakdown between the two ranks. The 
severence of diplomatic r e l a t ions with Egypt was the thorn ies t 
i s sue to crop up during the summit as i t was contrary to the 
basic p r inc ip le of t r a d i t i o n a l Saudi pol icy/ namely - t o keep 
i t s options wide open to avoid i rrevocable breaks with any 
Arab Sta te t h a t too with Egypt, which was in f luen t i a l in Arab 
a f f a i r s . In s p i t e of Saudi Arabia ' s strong fee l ings , severence 
of diplomatic r e l a t i ons with Egypt was adopted as a recommenda-
t i o n which was t o be implemented within one month's duration 
51 ins tead of the decision which was immediately enforceable. 
I t was a t the eleventh hour of the Conference of Arab 
League members t h a t succeeded in put t ing together a credible 
and far-reaching package of sanctions against Egypt which 
marked a spectacular show of Arab unanimity in which both 
hard l iners and moderates alone patched vp t h e i r differences 
and a t t i t u d e s regarding sanctions against Egypt for the peace 
50. MiddlS ?a?^ SffgROTi*;? ^^^YSY (Nicosia), Vbl. XXII, No. 25< 
^ r i l 9* 1979, p . 7. 
&1* i^X^ 
And a 
i i a a S t (London), vol . NO. 14, April 6, 1979, p 
 l so see for further de t a i l s M<d<fte East Economic 
, » 3 . 
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t r e a t y with I s r a e l . 
The Conference vnanlwously approved the r e s o l u t i o n s 
which seaned as going fu r the r t han t h e "miniiuun p o s i t i o n " 
recommended by t h e p rev ious Arab Summit, and a wide ranging 
p o l i t i c a l and economic boycot t was recommended a g a i n s t Egypt» 
However, t h e Conference n e i t h e r t ake any dec i s ions t o withdraw 
Arab funds from Egyptian f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s nor made any 
r e f e r e n c e t o t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of using t h e Arab " o i l weapon** by 
h a l t i n g s q p p l i e s t o the un i t ed S t a t e s and o t h e r governments 
which sijpported the peace t r e a t y , a l though , an embargo was 
53 p l aced on o i l s u p p l i e s t o Egypt. 
AS for p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n s , i t was decided t h a t : 
"(a) The Arab s t a t e s would withdraw t h e i r 
ambassadors from Egypt fo r thwi th and would 
seve r d ip lomat ic r e l a t i o n s with Egypt wi thin 
a mcnth. 
(b) Fur thermore, Egyp t ' s membership in the Arab 
League as well as in s e v e r a l s p e c i a l i s e d Arab 
i n s t i t u t i o n s , would a l s o be suspended and t h e 
Arab League headquar te r s and those of i t s a n c i l -
l a r y i n s t i t u t i o n s would be moved out of Egypt. 
This of course would depr ive Egypt of a p r i n - 54 
c i p a l forun of i n t e r - A r a b diplomacy and in f luence" . 
52 . ib±^ 
5 3 . Kees lnq ' s Contemporary Archives , n . 2, p . 29951. 
54. ibifl^ 
And a l s o see for t h e f u l l t e x t of the Conference d e c i s i o n s 
BBC Monitoring Serv ice ^unmar.y, of World Broadcas t s , 
ME/6082/A/7-12. 
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I t was a l s o agreed t h a t i n order t o i n t e n s i f y Egyp t ' s 
i s o l a t i o H / A r a b s t a t e s would make t h e i r e f f o r t s t o br ing out 
t h e suspension of Egyp t ' s membership from the non-a l igned 
movement/ t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n of I s lamic Conference (OIC), o rga -
55 
n i s a t i o n of African un i ty (OAU) e t c . 
As far as economic d e c i s i o n s were concemedr Arab 
economic loans * d e p o s i t s , guarantees» bank c r e d i t s * c o n t r i b u -
t i o n s i n cash or kind t o Egypt would be s topped . Economic 
a i d from the Arab funds, banks and f i n a n c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s 
which e x i s t e d w i th in t h e sphere of the Arab League and J o i n t 
56 Arab c o - o p e r a t i o n was e q u a l l y p reven ted t o the Egypt ians . 
The r e s o l u t i o n f u r t h e r a s s e r t e d t h a t * 
"These measures which have been adopted by 
t h e Arab Min i s t e r s of Foreign Af f a i r s and 
Economy a r e cons idered t o be t h e minimum 
s t e p s t o confront t h e danger of the t r e a t y 
and i t i s l e f t t o t h e governments i n d i v i d u a l l y c^ 
, t o t a k e whatever s t e p s t hey b e l i e v e neces sa ry" . 
56 . The r e s o l u t i o n fu r the r urged t h a t j "(a) consequent t o t h e 
suspension of Egyp t ' s membership from the Arab League i t s 
membership in the es tab l i shment funds and o r g a n i s a t i o n s 
s h a l l a l s o be suspended and a l l the b e n e f i t s Egypt may enjoy 
from t h e s e sources s h a l l a l s o be t e r m i n a t e d . In ca se , any 
of t h e s e bodies a re based in Egypt, t hey should be t r a n s -
f e r r e d t o o ther Arab cowj t r i e s t e m p o r a r i l y , (b) As the 
"Egyp t i an -Z ion i s t " t r e a t y and the annexes a t t a c h e d t o i t 
commit Egypt t o s e l l o i l t o I s r a e l Arab c o u n t r i e s s h a l l 
r e f r a i n from s\:¥>plying Egypt with o i l and i t s d e r i v a t i v e s . 
(c) To ban t r a d e exchange with t h e p u b l i c and p r i v a t e 
Egyptian e s t ab l i shmen t s t h a t engaged in t r a n s a c t i o n s wi th 
t h e Z ion i s t enemy". 
Miyadle Eas t Monitor (New J e r s e y ) , Vbl. IX, NO. 10, 
May 15, 1979, p . 2 
57. MAdtftg, fiag.t. ggPP9tPAc. ,§v.i;:yey> n . 50 , p . 9 . 
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In pursuanCQ of the reso lut ion passed by the Arab 
minis ters in Baghdad, the organisation of Arab Petroleum 
Exporting countries (OAPEC) decided at i t s extraordinary 
m i n i s t r i a l l e v e l meeting in Kuwait from April 16 - 17, 19 79, 
t o suspend Egypt's membership in the organisat ion and the Joint 
C O 
ventures sponsored by i t . At the same time, the nine Arab 
Sta tes - Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Mauritiana, UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco snapped t h e i r diplcmatic and 
59 p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with Egypt. Egypt a l so equal ly reacted 
by breaking the diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with the h o s t i l e Arab 
60 S t a t e s . 
In a statement, the Saudi Minister o f Information, 
Muhammad Abduh Yaroani, expressed that in view of the Egypt-
I s r a e l i Peace t r e a t y , Saudi Arabia would not provide any new 
a id t o Egypt but the government would continue to meet the 
58. Apart from Egypt, OAPEC coirprised of Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria , Libya, the UAE, Syria, Qatar and 
Bahrain * 
Middle East Economic Survey (Nicos ia ) , Vol. XXII, N. 27. 
April 25, 1979, p . 1. 
59* Alger ia , Libya, Syria, Iraq, South Yeman had already 
severed the diplcmatic re la t ions with Egypt when president 
sadat v i s i t e d Jerusalem in November 1977 and Jordan had 
c a l l e d her ambassador from Cairo fol lowing the s igning 
of the Egypt-Israel-peace Treaty. 
tt^ggiS..£.a§V M<an .^gtl (New J e r s e y ) , Vol. IX, No. 8 , 
April 15, 1979, p . 1 . 
60 . Middle East Economic Survey (Nicos ia ) , Vtol. XXII, No. 28, 
April 30 , 1979, p . 5. 
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e x i s t i n g o b l i g a t i o n s t o E g y p t . The m i n i s t e r e x p l a i n e d t h a t 
S a u d i A r a b i a d e c i d e d t o b r e a k t h e r e l a t i o n s due t o t h e f a c t 
t h a t Egypt 
" a c c e p t e d and i n t e n d e d t o exchange d i p l o m a t i c 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e Z i o n i s t enemy and had s t a r -
t e d e s t a b l i s h i n g normal r e l a t i o n s w i t h him 
w i t h o u t t a k i n g i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e r e a l i s a -
t i o n of t h e minimum demands of t h e Arab n a t i o n 
f o r e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a comprehens ive and j u s t 
p e a c e " . 6 2 
F u r t h e r / t h e r e were a l s o s e v e r a l Arab o r g a n s a t i o n s and 
J o i n t v e n t u r e s which d e c i d e d t o s u s p e n d E g y p t ' s membership in 
63 
c o n s o n a n c e w i t h t h e Baghdad d e c i s i o n s . 
Non-Arab R e a c t i o n t o t h e t r e a t y 
I n i t i a l l y , Western r e a c t i o n t o t h e t r e a t y was more o r l e s s 
simiJifiir t o t h a t a s f o l l o w e d by t h e Camp David A c c o r d s . In a 
s t a t e m e n t on March 2 6 , 1979/ Nine member s t a t e s of t h e 
E u r o p e a n Economic Community (EEC)^ a p p r e c i a t e d ' * t h e w i l l of p e a c e 
61» I b i d . , n . 5 8 , p . 6 . 
6 2 . I b i d . , n . 6 6 , p , 6 . 
63, These included the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF) which also 
imposed a ban on any loans, guarantees or any other finan-
cial or technical assistance to Egypt, the Arab Labour 
Organisation, which decided to move its headquarters from 
Cairo to Baghdad, the Arab Uhion of Chemical Fertilizers 
producers, the Union for iron and Steel industries, the 
Arab General Union for Textile Industries and the Arab 
Organisation for Administrative science. 
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which has led pres ident Carter t o engage himself personal ly 
in these negot ia t ions , as well as of the effoxrts made by 
President sadat and Prime Minister Begin". The nine members 
asse r ted tha t the Peace t r e a t y cons t i tu ted the correct 
implementation of the Security Council Resolution 242 but 
they a l so stuck t o the previous declarat ion of June 29, 19 77 
which declared that» 
* . , * the establishment of a jus t and las t ing 
peace in the Middle East can only take place 
*.within the framework of comprehensive settlement, 
must be based on Security Council resolu t ions 
242 and 338, and must t r a n s l a t e into fact the 
r igh t of the Pales t in ian people t o homeland".64 
ViitiU the passage of t ime, the governments of the EEC 
sought to evolve a united pol icy towards the Arab-Is rae l i 
con f l i c t in contrast with the thinking of the Uiited Sta tes 
as the European leaders fe l t t ha t the US Pales t ine pol icy was 
a l i ena t ing the Arab and muslim world which would eventual ly 
65 pave t he way for the Soviet presence in the Middle East. A 
Venice Simmit of the EEC took place on June 12, 1980, which 
64. n^^<Sl^ Eflgt^  ?n ,^9J^ nat^ ,l?paJL (London) , No. 96, 
March 30, 1979, p . 15. 
65 . Edward Mortimer "Europe Looks for a Role" Midd}.e 
East Internatiopa^ (London), NO. 125, May 23, 1980, 
p . 7. 
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issued a statement on June 13, that* 
"(a) The nine countr ies of the comtnxjnity base 
themselves on Seciirity Coiaicil r eso lu-
t ions 242 and 3 3 8 . . . 
(b) . . . the time has come t o promote the 
recognit ion and implementation of the 
two p r inc ip le s universal ly accepted by 
the in terna t ional community* the r igh t 
t o existence and t o secur i ty of a l l the 
s t a t e s in the region/ including Israel* 
and j u s t i c e for a l l the peoples which 
implies the recognit ion of the leg i t imate 
r igh t s of the Pa les t in ian people* 
(c) A jus t solut ion must f i na l ly be found t o 
the Pa les t in ian problem which i s not 
simply one of refugees. The Pales t inian 
people, which i s concious of ex is t ing as 
such, must be placed in a pos i t ion by an 
appropriate process defined within the 
framework of the comprehensive peace 
sett lement t o exercise fully i t s r i g h t to 
self -determinat ion, 
(d) The achievement of these objectives requires 
the involvement and sqpport of a l l the pa r -
t i e s concerned in the peace sett lement which 
the nine are endeavouring t o promote in 
keeping with the p r inc ip les formulated in the 
declarat ion . . . The p r inc ip les apply to a l l 
the p a r t i e s concerned* and thus the Pales t in ian 
people* and t o the PLO* which wil l have t o be 
associated with the negotiations'*.66 
On the other hand* the Soviet Union condemned the Egypt-
I s r a e l i Peace t r e a t y and ir. a speech on April 6, 1979# made a t A. 
lunch given in the honour of v i s i t i ng Foreign Minister Ben Yahia 
of Algeria* the Soviet Counterpart, Andrei Gromyok^ c r i t i c i s e d 
the t r e a t y as an attempt t o l ega l i se I s r a e l ' s presence on the 
66. Mid^e E^st In te rna t iona l (London), No. 127, Jvxie 20, 
1980* p . 13. 
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Arab t e r r i t o r y and he f u r t h e r condemned the t r e a t y as a " sepa -
6*7 
r a t e d e a l " . 
Again in Mid-April 1979» a J o i n t Sy r i an -Sov ie t Commuiique 
was i s s u e d on t h e occas ion of t h e v i s i t of Gromyoko t o pamascus, 
which s t a t e d t h a t * 
"under the cover of the I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n t r e a t y , 
i m p e r i a l i s t fo rces a r e seeking t o extend t h e i r 
m i l i t a r y p resence in t h e Middle E a s t . They 
condemn t h e c a p i t u l a t o r y a c t i o n s of t h e Egyptian 
l e a d e r s h i p a s causing s e r i o u s harm t o t h e 
s t r u g g l e of t h e i r independence*.68 
I t was from November 12 - 14, 1979, a week before the 
t e n t h Arab Sunnmit, t h e PLO l e a d e r , A r a f a t - v i s i t e d Moscow and 
in a j o i n t Communique he, expressed h i s ' 'deep f e l t g r a t i t u d e 
for" fron s e l f l e s s support and a s s i s t a n c e of t h e Sovie t Ukxion. 
67 . Gromyoko expressed t h a t s "Both t h e Sovie t Uiion and 
Alge r i a a r e deeply concerned about t h e s i t u a t i o n in 
t h i s a rea ajmd s t r o n g l y condemn t h e E g y p t i a n - I s r a e l i 
T r e a t y , a s e p a r a t e deal concluded under t h e aeg i s of, 
o r t o be more «xac t , u ider p r e s s u r e from, t h e I t i i t ed 
S t a t e s " . 
Sovie t Ne\^s (Txandon) , No. 5967, Apr i l 16, 1979, 
p . 120. 
68 , New Tifnes (Moscow) No. 14, Apr i l 19 79, p . 5 . 
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The ccxnmunique ca l led for: 
"(a) a ful l and unconditional withdrawal of 
I s r a e l i t roops from a l l Arab lands inc lu -
ding Pales t in ian t e r r i t o r i e s occupied by 
i t in 1967; 
(b) the implementation of the inal ienable n a t i o -
n«l i r i g h t s of the Arab people of Palestine* 
including i t s r igh t to self-determinat ion and 
the establishment of i t s own independent 
(c) and a l so t he r igh t of Pales t in ians to re turn 
t o t h e i r home".69 
By the end of 1979# the Soviet Uaion expressed i t s fu l l 
STj^jport t o the cause of PLO and i t s p o l i c i e s . The Soviet 
ges ture , however, was not viewed with favour by the conservative 
Arab Sta tes because they suspected t h e Soviet in tent ion and 
p o l i c i e s in regard t o PLO's r i g h t s , p a r t i c u l a r l y a f te r the 
70 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. 
I t was by the end of 1980 t h a t the Soviet union propoun-
ded a p o l i t i c a l settlement of the Middle East c o n f l i c t . I t 
recognised I s r a e l ' s r i gh t to e x i s t and the Securi ty Council 
r eso lu t ions Number 242 and 338 and opposed Zionism and svj^ported 
the Pales t in ian r i gh t to s truggle for an independent s t a t e . 
69. Surendra Bhutani, **The Soviet ttiion and the Arab-Israel i 
Confl ict" , in S.A.H. Haqqi (Edited) West Asia Since Camn 
Dayid (Delhi: Mit tal Publ icat ions , 1988), pp. 212-213. 
70. I b i d . , p . 213. 
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Puxrther, i t cons ide red t h e PLO as a c a t a l y s t a g a i n s t the 
71 Mter ican imper ia l i sm. 
The r e a c t i o n of t h e non-a l igned c o u n t r i e s was, however 
moderate towards Egypt. But a Foreign Min i s t e r l e v e l Conference 
of the c o - o r d i n a t i n g Bureau of Non-aligned Movement (NAM) was 
h e l d in Colombo from June 6 r 10, 1979 and condemned t h e 
t r e a t y as t h e " p a r t i a l and s e l e c t i v e agreement** and i t b i t t e r l y 
c r i t i c i s e d both the US r o l e i n aggrava t ing t h e s i t u a t i o n i n t h e 
Middle East and a l s o I s r a e l i p o l i c y of expans ion i s t i m p e r i a -
l i sm which involved "annexing occupied P a l e s t i n i a n t e r r i t o r y 
i n c l u d i n g Jerusalem* and e s t a b l i s h i n g p a r a - m i l i t a r y Z i o n i s t 
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set t lements**. I t wqs a l s o emphasised t h a t t he PLO had t h e rigljit 
t o r e j e c t a l l s e t t l e m e n t s which aimed a t undermining the 
" P a l e s t i n i a n q u e s t i o n and denying t h e natxjral r i g h t s of the 
73 P a l e s t i n i a n peop le" . The d e c l a r a t i o n fxirther c r i t i c i s e d t h e 
• •po l i c i e s which t h e Uhited S t a t e s " sought ' ' t o impose on the 
r e g i o n t o t h e detr iment of t h e i n a l i e n a b l e r i g h t s of the P a l e s -
t i n i a n people and the t o t a l l i b e r a t i o n of occupied P a l e s t i n i a n 
74 
and Arab t e r r i t o r y " . 
7 1 . I b i d . , p . 215. 




Again i n September 1979, the Non-alignment Sunmit was 
h e l d in Havana# Cuba. During t h e Course of debate i n t h e 
p o l i t i c a l committee, African s t a t e s de fea ted t h e e f f o r t s by 
t h e Arab h a r d l i n e r s t o get Egypt e x p e l l e d from the Non-al igned 
Movement as a pinishment fo r t h e Peace t r e a t y . The de l ega t e s 
s e t \xp a panel t o review Egypt's a c t i o n s and decide whether 
Egypt should be suspended from NAM. At t h e same t i m e , t h e head 
of Somalian de l ega t ion Ahmad Mohammad Adan came s h o r t of 
demanding the withdrawal of Cuban t r o o p s from E t h i o p i a , i t s 
ne ighbour ing r i v a l . However, t h e NAM svwmit ended wi th on ly 
"denunciation** of Egypt f o r s ign ing of the peace t r e a t y wi th 
I s r a e l * 
75 . Middle East Monitof (New Jersey) , Vol. IX, No. 17, 
September 15, 1979, p . 2 . 
CHAPTER - V 
EGYPT-ISRAELI RAPPROCHEMENT AND 
PALESTINIAN AUTONOMY 
The t h r u s t of E g y p t - I s r a e l i p e a c e T r e a t y was t o p r o m o t e 
f r i e n d ] . y t i e s between t h e two g i a n t war waging n a t i o n s of West 
A s i a and t o s o l v e t h e P a l e s t i n i a n p rob lem a m i c a b l y . On A p r i l 
2, 1979» p r i m e M i n i s t e r Menachem Begin of I s r a e l p a i d a s t a t e 
v i s i t t o C a i r o a s t h e f i r s t I s r a e l i l e a d e r t o an Arab c o v n t r y 
d e s p i t e t h e p r o t e s t from t h e Arab ambassado r s s t a t i o n e d i n C a i r o . 
The d i g n a t o r i e s l e f t t h e c a p i t a l of Egypt In a n g e r and r e g i s t e r e d 
t h e i r a n g u i s h and e x p r e s s e d t h e i r r e l u c t a n c e t o a c c e p t t h e p e a c e 
t r e a t y , s i g n e d be tween Egypt and I s r a e l * p r ime M i n i s t e r B e g i n , 
howeve r , r e m a i n e d calm and u n p e r t u r b e d d u r i n g h i s v i s i t t o C a i r o 
a n d announced t h a t b o t h t h e c o u r i t r i e s would open t h e i r b o r d e r 
f o r p r o m o t i o n of mu tua l u n d e r s t a n d i n g and c o - o p e r a t i o n . He a l s o 
a n n o u i c e d t h a t t h e y would meet a g a i n i n E l - A r i s h , t h e c a p i t a l o f 
S i n a i on May 2 7 , 1979 , and t h e town would b e r e v e r t e d from t h e 
I s r a e l i h o l d t o t h e E g y p t i a n s o v e r e i g n t y , p r e s i d e n t S a d a t 
e x p r e s s e d h a p p i n e s s o v e r t h e announcement and e m p h a s i s e d t h a t 
b o t h t h e c o t t i t r i e s s h o u l d d e v e l o p d i r e c t c o n t a c t s f o r mu tua l 
2 b e n e f i t and p e a c e i n t h e r e g i o n . 
1 . Near E a s t Repo^^ (Wash ing ton , D.C.) Vtol. X X I I I , No. 14, 
A p r i l 4 , 1979, p . 6 7 . 
2* A f r i c a D i a r v (New D e l h i ) , Vbl . XIX, No. 3 1 , J u l y 30 -
Augus t 5 , 1979, p . 9 6 1 0 . 
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In fac t , t h e i r agreement t o open the borders in l e s s 
than eight weeks seemed to be a concession by Sadat who had 
once urged tha t in each step towards the notmalisat icn of 
r e l a t i o n s between Egypt and I s r ae l be synchronised with the 
progress in the autonomy t a l k s for the Pales t inian 3elf-Government 
in the West Bank and Gaza S t r i p . In r e tu rn t o president Sadat ' s 
concession^ Begin expressed his agreement on speeding up the 
I s r a e l i withdrawal from El-Arish which had been occupied by 
the I s r a e l i s s ince the 1967 war. The two leaders further decided 
t o se t up a communication l i n e between them so as t o t a l k d i r ec t l y 
and to take decision in case of exigencies. 
process of Normalisation 
On J^sril 25* 19 79, Egypt and I s rae l o f f i c i a l l y ended the 
31 years of h o s t i l i t i e s by exchanging t r e a t y r a t i f i c a t i o n docu-
ments a t an American monitoring base in S ina i . Meanwhile , the 
I s r a e l i Defense Minister/ Ezer Weizman and his Egyptian counter-
p a r t / Kamal Hasaan Ali had ta lks regarding the arrangements for 
the re turn of El-Arish in Sinai t o Egyptian con t ro l . They a lso 
discussed the co-ordination of t he Joint m i l i t a ry committee's 
work on the return of a l l S inai i n s t a l l a t i o n from Is rae l t o 
Egypt, Both the minis ters declared tha t I s r ae l would withdraw 
4 . Middle East In ternat ional (London), No. 98, April 27, 
1979, p . 15. 
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from El-Arish on May 25/ 1980, two days before t he schedule. 
While speaking on I s r a e l i Radio, Welzman emphasised t h a t a f t e r 
the return of El-Arish< the process of norroalisation of r e l a t ions 
between the two countr ies would begin i n i t i a l l y with tourism 
5 
•• in an organised way" . 
On Upril 29 # 19 79, Ashdod was the f i r s t I s r a e l i flag 
ship t o pass through t h e Suez Canal s ince 19 54 and i t was 
cheered by thousands of Egyptians which indicated the Egyptians' 
zeal t o strengthen further fr iendly t i e s between the two 
6 
count r ies . The f i r s t Egyptian c i v i l i a n and mi l i t a ry personnel 
reached El-Arish on May 14, 1979, t o take charge of various in s t a l 
l a t i ons and on May 23, Egypt's Minister of Sta te for Foreign 
Affa i r s , Butrus Butrus Ghali and the I s r a e l i Foreign Minis ter , 
Moshe Dayan met and solved the question of currency t r ans fe r s 
and movement of students from Gaza S t r ip t o Egypt. Eventually, 
on May 25, 1979 El-Arish and Zone I were handed over t o the 
Egyptians. The handing over ceremony, howerver, was marred by 
the Jewish s e t t l e r s who refused to evacuate vegetable garden in 
the region and ul t imately , they were persuaded by the I s r a e l i 
au tho r i t i e s to vacate the area on the assurance of be t t e r 
5 . ^ f F ^ c a D i a r y (New D e l h i ) , Vol , XIX, No. 3 9 , S e p t a n b e r 
2 4 - 3 0 , 19 79 , p . 9 6 8 9 . 
6 . Near E a s t Repor^ (Wash ing ton , D . C . ) , Vb l . X X I I I , 
No. 18 , May 2 , 19 79 , p» 8 4 . 
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7 dwelling place in other pa r t s of I s r a e l . 
Both president Sadat and Prime Minister Begin annoixiced 
on May 27, 19 79 t o open the borders between the two countr ies / t o 
r e l ease pr isoners of war and t o hold another meeting as to assess 
g 
the progress of t h e i r newly build r e l a t i o n s h i p . Sadat, Begin and 
7. Shimon Shamir and Moshe Gammer/ "The Egypt ian-Is rae l i Peace 
Treaty i Negotiations and Inplementation" Colin Legum (Edited) Middle East Contemporary Survey/ Vol. I l l / 1978-79 (New York s Holmes & Meier publ i shers , InC. / 1980), p . 116. 
8. In order to develop the t i e s between Egypt and Israel^ Begin 
and Sadat expressed t h e i r agreements on cer ta in po in t s : 
(a) Despite sane last-minute Egyptian rese rva t ions , the 
borders between Egypt and Israel were open, c i t i zens of one 
country would be able t o v i s i t the other . Officials sa id 
l a t e r tha t de ta i l s would have t o be worked out , but there 
was an agreement in p r inc ip le not t o wait un t i l next 
January, as specif ied in t he Egypt- Is rae l i Peace Treaty. 
(b) In re turn for Sadat 's agreement to open the borders. 
Begin would" undertake s teps t o s e t free a nunber of Arab 
pr isoners whose re lease wi l l not impair I s r a e l ' s Securi ty". 
Other sovurces reported t h a t 50 t o 60 Arabs in the West Bank 
and Gaza S t r ip held on suspicion of subversion would be 
released* Ea r l i e r , Egypt had asked that I s r ae l r e lease 
ce r ta in p o l i t i c a l pr isoners as a goodwill gesture , including 
about 20 who were being held without sepc i f i c charges. 
I s r ae l had indicated t h a t i t would do so . 
(c) Begin would go t o Alexandria, Egypt in the f i r s t week 
of July " to hold important t a lks about problems" which 
concerned them. 
(d) The Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan would go to Cairo 
before the next session of the Pales t inian autonomy t a l k s 
in Alexandria. 
Asian Recorder (New Delhi) , vol.XXV , No. 28, July 9-15, 
1979, pp. 14976-14977. 
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the US Secretary of s t a t e , Cyrus Wnce met for about half an 
hovir i n a Villa in El-Arish and then they flew Beersheba in 
Negev for s t a t e reception to Sadat and f i n a l l y they flew from 
Beersheba over Tel Aviv to Cairo in order t o fccmally open the 
a i r corr idor which f i n a l l y woiild allow di rec t commercial routes 
9 between Egypt and I s r a e l . 
The t a lk s between I s r a e l i Foreign Minis ter , Moshe Dayan 
and Egyptian prime Minister , Mustafa Khalil and other Egyptian 
o f f i c i a l s were concluded with an agreement between Egypt and 
I s r a e l / t o allow t h e i r c i t i zens t o t r ave l freely between the 
two countries* 
On September 4, 1919, president Sadat s a i l ed in to the 
I s r a e l i Port of Haifa for three-day t a lks with prime Minister 
Begin of I s r a e l . The following day, Sadat and Begin announced 
9 . yhe .Jerusalem post (Jerusalem), May 28, 1979. 
10. on the conclusion of the agreement on June 6, 1979, premier 
Khalil expressed tha t the prospective v i s i t o r s could apply 
for visa through the respect ive Egyptian and I s r a e l i Foreign 
Ministers or through consulates of t h i r d count r ies . I t was 
fur ther agreed tha t the t r ave l between the two countr ies 
would be allowed only by a i r or sea, not over-land through 
the Sinai Peninsula, prime Minister Khalil said that the 
nat ional a i r l i n e s of I s r ae l and Egypt would not provide 
d i rec t a i r service between Cairo and Tel Aviv for some t ime. 
He said the intematicMial a i r l i n e s would be permit ted to do 
so. 
Middle East Monitor (New Je r sey) , Vol. IX, No. 13, 
Ju ly 1, 1979, p . 3 . 
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b i l a t e r a l agreements on the re turn of Sinai t o Egypt before t h e 
schedule* Joint Egypt ian-Israe l i Patrols in the Peninsula and 
Egyptian o i l sa les t o I s r a e l . I t was fur ther announced tha t 
the ear ly .withdrawal from the Saint Catherine monastry area in 
Southern Sinai« would be mater ia l i sed before November 19/ 19 79* 
the second anniversary of Sadat 's h i s t o r i c Journey t o Jerusalem 
and t h i s re turn would take place two months before the schedule 
se t \xp by the Egypt- Is rae l i peace Treaty. The Joint pa t ro ls 
would a l so be i n s t a l l e d for the next two and a half year as a 
12 temporary measure for smooth t ransact ions in S ina i . I t was 
fur ther reported tha t Begin and Sadat a l so reached an agreement 
on the supply of o i l t o I s r a e l . The main intent ion of president 
Sadat to supply adequate o i l to I s rae l was t o solve t h e two 
important thorny issues - the question of Arab sector of Jerusalem 
13 
and the question of autonomy for the Pa le s t in i ans . But no 
agreement was announced on e i the r the amount of autonomy t o be 
granted t o Pa les t in ians in West Bank and Gaza Str ip or on the 
s t a tu s of Jerusalem. I t may be noted t h a t while speaking a t 
11. Middle East International (London)/ No. 106, September 14/ 
1979/ p . 12. 
And a lso see for further de ta i l s Asian Recorder (New Delhi) 
vol . XXV/ No. 41 , October 8-14/ 1979/ pp. 15110-15111. 
12. Near East Report (Washington, D.C.) , Vol. XXIII, No. 36, 
September 5, 1979, p . 159. 
13. Asian Recorder (New Delhi) , Vol. XXV, No. 4 i , ocbober 8- i4 , 
1979, p . 15112. 
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a Jo in t press Conference/ President Sadat sa id tha t East 
Jerusalem should be included in the autonomy plan which was 
countered by Begin who rep l ied tha t Jerusalem was the "capi ta l 
14 
of I s r ae l " and he added t h a t i t was "an ind iv i s ib l e c i t y " . 
An agreement with Egypt was approved by Is rae l on 
November 8, 19 79, which provided tha t Egi^t would s e l l o i l t o 
I s r ae l on disco\»it p r ices for one year and a f t e r t h a t , i t would 
be allowed t o buy unlimited quant i ty of o i l at the market p r i c e . 
Meanwhile, I s r a e l , on November 14, handed over t o Egypt 
a foxirth sect ion of Sinai area , including the Mount Sinai and the 
o i l f i e lds in southern S ina i , two months before the schedule in 
order t o f a c i l i t a t e president Sadat t o go to Mount Sinai t o 
16 
ce lebra te the second anniversary of his t r i p to Jerusalem. 
The El-Arish border - crossing s t a t i on v4iich was opened in 
December, for free passage, in both d i rec t ions t o Sinai inhabi-
t a n t s also marked the progress towards normalisation before 
January 26, 1980, the date v*iich was formally scheduled for i t s 
14. M^y ^M% f^tPQf^ ^ n . 12, p . 159. 
15* I s rae l pumped about 20 percent of i t s o i l needs from the 
o i l f i e lds which were began producing commercially <»ily 
20 months ago. o ther o i l came from Mexico, Venezuala and 
Nigeria . 
Asian Recorder (New Delhi) , Vol. XXV, No. 52, December 
24-31, 1979. p . 15240. 
16. IH^, 
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17 beginning. The withdrawal of the l a s t I s r a e l i combat forces 
on Janxjary 23, 1980^ frcrn one of the most s t r a t e g i c a l l y s i g n i -
f icant areas which included Mitla and Giddi passes and the huge 
mi l i t a ry base in Bir Gafgafa,marked the completion of the f i r s t 
18 phase of I s r a e l i withdrawal vmder the t r e a t y . 
Resumption of r e l a t i o i s in January, 1980, between the 
two countr ies was marked by President Sadat ' s anxiety t o get on 
with the negot ia t ions t o conclude agreements on av ia t ion , t r ade 
and cu l tu re within s ix weeks and to fur ther expedite the au to-
19 
nomy issue for the Pa les t in i ans . 
The linkage of autonomy and normalisation of r e l a t i o n s , 
however, had been r e s i s t e d by the I s r a e l i s , who were anxious to 
speed ip the normalisation and drag t h e i r feet on the Pales t in ian 
20 
autonomy t a l k s . The I s r a e l i diplomatic mission reached Cairo 
17. Shimon Shamir and Moshe Gammer, n . 7, p . 116. 
18. I s rae l had now returned two-thirds of the Sinai Peninsula 
to Egypt and was scheduled t o re turn the f ina l t h i r d ia 
April 1982. 
Near East R«>port (Washlnyton, D.C.) , Vol. XXIV, No. 5, 
Janxiary 3o, 1980, p . 17. 
And a l so see for further de t a i l s Apian Recorder (New Delhi) 
vol . XXVI, No. 10, March 4-10, 1980, pp. 15350-15351. 
29. The Middle East Newsletter (London), No. 131, 
February 11-24, 1980, p . 3 . 
20. I b i ^ . 
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on February 17, 1980 and the I s r a e l i Embassy was formally 
inaugurated on the following day. Both Egypt and I s r a e l 
exchanged ambassadors in accordance with the Peace t r ea ty on 
21 February 26, 1980. 
The process of normalisat ion, however, was accon^anied 
by disil lusionment and f r i c t i on both for the Egyptians and 
I s r a e l i s as f i r s t the I s r a e l i s complained tha t t h e i r ambassador 
in Cairo was being soc i a l l y boycotted and further the ambassador 
and h i s s t a f f faced hardships in rent ing apartments in Cairo. 
On the other hand, there were p r a c t i c a l l y a i;ew number of 
t o u r i s t s from Egypt who v i s i t e d I s r a e l and only a few commer-
c i a l deals were mater ia l i sed between the Egyptians and I s r a e l i s . 
Although, people had welcomed the peace process and exhibi ted 
great hosp i t a l i t y t o v i s i t i ng I s r a e l i s , the a t t i t u d e of the Egyp-
t i an i n t e l l i g e n t s i a remained d i s t i n c t l y reverse . The three 
major i<Seologically diverse c lasses - the l e f t i s t s , the 
neo-^asser i tes and the Radical muslims vehemently opposed t o 
president Sadat and re jec ted the Camp David Accords and Peace 
21, Saad Mortada presented h is c redent ia l s t o I s r a e l i 
president Yitzhak Navcn and simultaneously the I s r a e l i 
Ambassador Ben - E l i s sa r presented his c reden t ia l s to 
president Sadat of Egypt. 
^ear East:, Report (Washington, D.C.) , Vol. XXIV, No. 9 . 
February 27, 1980, p . 3 5. 
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22 
t r e a t y wi th I s r a e l . Many p o l i t i c a l l y concious Egyptians 
f e l t t h a t the Camp David Accords did not guaran tee t h e r i g h t 
of Se l f -de t e rmina t i on t o the P a l e s t i n i a n s . The Egyptians by 
and la rge* favoured t h e oppos i t ion e j p r e s s e d by the o the r Arab 
c o u n t r i e s as they fea red t h a t t h e i r economic, p o l i t i c a l and 
c u l t viral a s p i r a t i o n s would be j eopa rd i s ed i f Egypt e s t a b l i s h e d 
23 
r e l a t i o n s with I s r a e l , p r e s i d e n t Sadat was d i s p l e a s e d with t h e 
n e g a t i v e a t t i t u d e of h i s countrymen and on c e r t a i n occas ions he 
p e r s o n a l l y exp la ined the s i g n i f i c a n c e of peace p r o c e s s which 
would pave t h e way for ensur ing t h e p r o g r e s s and so lv ing t h e 
24 P a l e s t i n i a n problem in t h e r e g i o n . 
The I s r a e l i a u t h o r i t i e s expressed resentment over t h e 
r e a c t i o n of Egypt ians and argued t h a t t he implementat ion of 
peace p rocess would be imprac t i cab l e as even t h e Egyptian i n t e l l i -
g e n t s i a and p r e s s media were a g a i n s t n o r m a l i a a t i o n of r e l a t i o n s 
»« i * ^« " "«» ' "«»m» i ^P* i« *<»Wl l ^ i ^ "W^«««Wi»»»W«««« l * *«^ lW>V"« "» i» i»«B«»^* 
22* The l e f t i s t s re jec ted the t r e a t y because/ i t was based on 
"pax Arnericana" and coipled with the capi ta l i s tistic'*open door" 
pol icy, the neo-Nasserites disapprove<a the t r e a t y because i t 
was seen as a betrayel of pan-Arabisro and of Nasser ' s a n t i -
in iper ia l i s t i c s t ruggle , the Radical muslims opposed because, 
i t rel6gated par t of Par al-Islam to a dhixnmi minority which 
had no leg i t imate claim to statehood* While representing 
these views the opposition press in Egypt vehemently c r i t i -
c ised the peace process and the I s r a e l i s in general . 
Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir "The Egypt ian-Israel i Nego-
t i a t i o n s " in Colin Legun (Edited) {fiddle East C9pte^Dorary 
survey. Vol. IV, 1979-80 (New York* ftolroes & Meier 
publ i shers . I n c . , 1981), pp. 115-116. 
23, Broadcasts from the Arab countries vhich in fact , black 
l i s t e d the Egyptians accused of es tabl ish ing contacts with 
I s r a e l , fur ther ra i sed t h e i r fea rs . 
24. IfciiU 
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between Egypt and I s r a e l . The tension further hightened as a 
a 
r e s u l t of the publ icat ions of / se r ies of ca r r i ca tu re by 
AI-Aklf^bar newspaper of Cairo which depicted Prime Minister Begin 
as a IJazi and rediculed the I s r a e l i o f f i c i a l s . This generated 
very angry reac t ion from the I s r a e l i c i r c l e s . Notwithstanding 
the edi tor Musa Sabr i ' s apology to I s r a e l i s / t h e tension fur ther 
acce lara ted . But i t was in September 1980 following the v i s i t 
of t he I s r a e l i Foreign Minister# Yitzhak Shamir t o Cairo frcm 
September 9 t o 11, 1980, the normalisation process once again 
gathered momentun. President Sadat and his Foreign Minister 
Butrus Butrus Ghali assured the v i s i t i n g Foreign Minister of 
I s r ae l t h a t normalisat ion would be accelerated despi te opposition 
and fxjrther, the negot ia t ion for autonomy for the Pales t in ians 
25 
would be discussed peaceful ly. The v i s i t of the I s r a e l i P re -
sident Yitzhak Navon to Egypt from October 20 t o 29, 1980 removed 
misimderstandlng between the two cou i t r i e s t o such an extent and 
to 
both the countr ies fur ther agreed/adept variove measures t o 
26 
acce la ra te the process of normalisation of r e l a t i o n s . president 
25. ik i^A' PP« 116-117. 
26. I t Included a r e i t e r a t i o n of the premise to open the land 
route for the movement of goods, a fourth weekly f l ight t o 
Cairo for El Al; the res tora t ion of the Status quo ante 
with regard to tourism arrangements a t the Saint Catherine 
monastery (in October, the Egyptians had decided j.j:\^ter a l i a 
not t o allow any more non- I s rae l i s t o v i s i t the s i t e frcm 
I s r a e l ) ; the exchange of i n d u s t r i a l , ag r i cu l tu ra l and 
educational exhibi t ions; v i s i t s to I s r a e l , by an Egyptian 
parliamentary and a par ty del^egation; as well as Min is t r l a l 
v i s i t s ; to speed \^ ) the r a t i f i c a t i o n of e a r l i e r agreements 
dealing with c i v i l avia t ion, cultxaral and s c i e n t i f i c 
exchanges, and t rade and economics; the establishment of 
contd 
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Navon/ who was a l so a scholar of Arabic^was the f i r s t I s r a e l i 
head of Sta te to v i s i t an Arab country. Navon*s v i s i t was 
considered t o be the most successful and in fact, he del ivered 
hia speech in Arabic which did not r e f l e c t any p o l i t i c a l o r ien-
t a t i o n . He expressed t h a t he did not come t o "negot ia te or 
27 bargain**. His speech mainly highlighted the Joint her i tage 
of Arabs and Jews in general and Egyptians and I s r a e l i s in 
p a r t i c u l a r . Besides/ Navon's success was p a r t l y due t o Egypt's 
determination t o make p re s iden t ' s v i s i t a success . The enthusias-
t i c and warm reception accorded to president Navon was viewed 
both in Egyptian and I s r a e l i c i r c l e as Sadat ' s e f for t t o 
demonstrate t o the united States as well as t o the Arab and 
I s r a e l i public t h a t he did not deviate from the peace process and 
t h a t his txjssle was with Begin Government alone/ not with 
28 I s r a e l and the I s r a e l i s . But the I s r a e l i au tho r i t i e s viewed 
con td . . • • 
a "svpreme consmand for peace" i . e . / Jo in t Committee of 
authors/ Social s c i e n t i s t s / educators and pfcychologists 
and an agreement to make further searches for the bodies 
of I s r a e l i so ld ie r s who had fa l len in Sinai in 19 73. 
Moshe Gammer/ ••ThfiL_MidfiUl§ East Peace process" in Colin 
Legum (Edited) Middle East Contemporarv Survey. Vbl. V, 
1980-81 (New York j ifolmes & Meier Pvfclishers, Inc . / 1982)/ 
p . 154. 
And a l so see for further de t a i l s BBC Monitoring Service 
Sunmarv of World Broadcasts. ME/6563/^9. 
27. Near East R«aport (Washington, D.C.) / Vbl. XXIV, No. 44/ 
October 3 1 , 1980, p . 199. 
28. Moshe Gammer/ n . 26/ p . 154. 
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the e n t i r e peace process as "too slow". In the meanwhile, an 
agreement was concluded on November 6, 1980 for transportat ion 
of goods v ia El~Arish. Since then there had been a s i g n i f i c a n t 
progress in b i l a t e r a l trade between Egypt and I srae l as the 
volume of trade in October 1980/reached t o $ 9 M i l l i o n . Dvxring 
the l a s t quarter of 1980/the trade average per month turned, to 
be $ 2.25 mi l l ion .^^ 
president Sadat's personal i n t e r e s t t o boost t?> agricvil-
tura l cooperation between the two countries r e s u l t e d in the 
s igning of several agreements and a l s o s e t xxp agr icul tural 
30 production. 
29. I s r a e l i exports t o Egypt included Soya meal# re fr igera ted 
eggs , butter , one-day ch icks , bananas, other food products, 
p l a s t i c goods, aluninium ware, equipment for the pharmacett-
t i c a l industry and vaccines and equipment for p o u l t r y -
ra i s ing . I s r a e l i firms intended t o buy Egyptian cotton 
products. Oil exports from Egypt t o I s r a e l in 1980 reached 
2 m i l l i o n t o n s , cos t ing $ 490 m i l l i o n . Egypt a l s o agreed 
t o extend them t o 2.5 m i l l i o n tons in 1981, and i t further 
reduced o i l p r i c e s during the f i r s t half of that year, in 
accordance with p r i c e reductions in the World marJcet. 
I b i d . , p . 155. 
30 . The agreements included: 
(a) An agro- industr ia l project on an area of 5,000 hectares 
of reclaimed land near Sal ihiyya t o include a c a t t l e ranch 
of 20,000 head. 
(b) A tomato farming and vegetable growing project in 
Nubariya. 
(c) Control of animal d i seases , e s p e c i a l l y Ri f t va i i ey fever. 
cont d. • . . . 
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The cul tural r e l a t i o n s , however, remained at the low ebb 
as very few Egyptian academics Journal ists and a r t i s t s ; v i s i t e d 
I s r a e l and at the same time I s r a e l i i n t e l l e c t u a l s exchanged the 
dialogues e i ther by d i rec t contact or through the p r e s s . I t was 
in mid-November t h a t an Israel i -Egypt ian Friendship Associat ion 
was formed and on February 26, 1981, both the c o u i t r l e s s igned an 
31 agreement re la t ing to the youth exchange programme. 
The Autonomy Talks 
On March 26, 19 79, the day vAien the peace t rea ty was 
concluded. President Sadat and prime Minister Begin s igned a 
document e n t i t l e d "The complimentary Agreement on t h e E s t a b l i s h -
ment of the P a l e s t i n i a n Self-Governing Authority with f u l l 
c o n t d . . . • 
(d) The s a l e of agr icul tural equipment t o Egypt. 
(e) Exchange of t echno log ica l e x p e r t i s e . 
(f) Ass is tance in marketing Egyptian agr icul tural products 
in Europe and the Persian Gulf. 
(g) Oo-q?eration in developing f i s h e r i e s in the Red Sea and 
the Bardawil Lagoon (on northern Sinai Coast ) . 
I b i d . , pp. 155-156, 
31 . Many obs tac les t o normalisation remained. Some resu l t ed 
from the d i f ferences in individual approaches and p o l i t i c a l 
cu l ture , and in the s tructure of the two s o c i e t i e s and t h e i r 
economies; some from the hesi tancy of dealing with the 
unfamiliar. Hswever, both Egypt and I srae l were making t h e i r 
best e f f o r t s t o strengthen the growing fr iendship ancng them 
out of the Peace t r e a t y . 
I b i d . , p .156 . 
177 
Autonomy In t h e West Bank and t h e Gaza S t r i p " and i n v i t e d Jordan 
t o p a r t i c i p a t e in the n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r t h e implementat ion of 
t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e Camp David Accords . In an event of Jordan/ 
jo in 
not dec id ing t o / t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s would be he ld between Egypt and 
I s r a e l . Jordan d id ref i i se and consequent ly ,Egypt m d e r t o o k t o 
32 
conduct t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s a l o n e . 
The I s r a e l i p o l i c y of new Jewish s e t t l e m e n t s i n the occu-
p i e d a reas dominated during t h e autonony t a l k s he ld in Alexandria 
on June 12, 1979. In f a c t , the ques t i on of s e t t l emen t cropped 
1^3 as a r e s u l t of I s r a e l ' s c r e a t i o n of a new c i v i l i a n ou tpos t 
nea r t h e West Bank Arab town of Nablus which wi tnessed t h e f i r s t 
s e t t l e m e n t a f t e r t h e conc lus ion of t h e Peace t r e a t y . The 
Egyptian Prime M i n i s t e r / Mustafa Khal i l s a i d t h a t t he s e t t l e m e n t s 
which were i l l e g a l , would hamper t h e chance of autcnomy ta l los . 
S i m i l a r l y , t h e US S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Cyrus Viance viewed I s r a e l ' s 
dec i s ion t o e s t a b l i s h t h e s e t t l e m e n t s as a "h indrance t o t h e 
33 Peace p r o c e s s " . AS a r e s t i l t , t h e t a l k s i n Alexandria broke up 
3 2, Egyp t ' dec ided t o n e g o t i a t e a l o n e , in s p i t e of t h e c a t e g o -
r i c a l r e j e c t i o n by the Arab c o u n t r i e s and t h e PLO, who 
r e i t e r a t e d t h a t Egypt had a b s o l u t e l y no r i g h t t o speak on 
behalf of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n people and was no t empowered i n 
i t s T rea ty t o accep t t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of I s r a e l i occupa t ion 
of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n t e r r i t o r i e s . 
Mahmoud Riad, The Shruqqle f o r Peace in t h e Middle East 
(London s Quar te t Books, 1981), pp . 337-338. 
3 3 . Afliaq Recorder (New Delhi) , Vol. XXV, No. 35 , August 27 -
September 2, 1979, p . 15054. 
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34 
without any concrete outcome. Despite such eventua l i ty , president 
35 Sadat exprc^ssed his s a t i s f ac t i on with autonomy t a l k s . The 
differences between Egypt and I s rae l was further surfaced when 
on September 16, 1979, the I s r a e l i Government l i f t e d the 12 year 
o ld ban on the purchase of p r iva t e property in the occupied west 
36 Bank and Gaza S t r ip by the I s r a e l i individuals and companies. 
In t he autonomy ta lks , which was held from September 26-27 in 
Alexandria, declared t h a t the l i f t i n g of ban cons t i tu ted an 
"obstacle t o peace" which would discourage other p a r t i e s from 
37 Joining the peace process . 
In the meantime, t he I s r a e l i Foreign Minis ter , Moshe 
Dayan resigned in October 1979 as a r e su l t of I s r a e l ' s continued 
34. Michael Adams, "The Arab- Is rae l i Confrontation, 19 67-82*' 
in The Mddle East and North Africa. 1982-83 (London: 
Europa Publicat ions Limited, 1982) , p . 55. 
35, A^iao Recorder, n . 33, p . 15054. 
3 6. un t i l now, Jewish c i v i l i a n set t lements sponsored by the 
s t a t e and b u i l t on requis i t ioned public lands could be 
b u i l t only with min i s t r i a l approval on the basis of secu-
r i t y needs. The prohib i t ion against c i v i l i a n land a c q u i s i -
t i o n . Imposed by the former Labour par ty Government a f te r 
the 1967 war, had been intended t o c u r t a i l Jewish land spe-
cudation in the West Bank and confine I s r a e l i Inhabi ta t ion 
in the t e r r i t o r y to narrow secur i ty picket l i ne s mapped out 
in the t e r r i t o r i a l con^jromise proposed by the then Foreign 
Minister Yigal Allon, 
fts.l^D ft^<a9ydW (New Delhi) , Vbl. XXV, No. 45, 
November 5-11, 1979, p . 15162. 
37. Michael Adams, n . 34, p . 55. 
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land expropriat ion po l ic ies in the West Bank. Dayan had recent ly 
conducted t a lks with the local Arab sympathisers of the PLO without 
prime Minister Begin*s approval as he sought I s rae l t o consider 
the Pales t in ian views. He asser ted t h a t the government •*;can't 
38 get the Arab opinion by s i t t i n g and ta lking with Jews". At the 
same t ime, the Begin Government had to face another setback 
following the c o u r t ' s decision over i t s cont rovers ia l pol icy 
towards the I s r a e l i occupied areas which was p o l i t i c a l l y detci-r -
39 
mental to nis Govertxnent, The stalemate in the autonomy t a l k s , 
however* led Robert StrausS/who was made "super ambassador" 
report ing d i r ec t ly to Carter/ to i n i t i a t e the change of Venxie and 
change of negot ia t ion t a c t i c s . The outcome of the London meeting 
which ended on October 26, 1979» was the agreement on two 
s igni f icant po in t s : 
" (a) In order t o ensure t h a t e lec t ions wi l l be 
held in a sound and free way, i t has been agreed 
t h a t the e lec t ions will be organised, held and 
supervised by a responsible c i v i l i a n I s r a e l i body 
and through local Pales t in ian Arabs t o be agreed 
ipon by the autonomy negot ia tors along with other 
claims. The in te rna t iona l media wil l be allowed 
t o oversee these e lec t ions in accordance with 
the topics which wil l be discussed and agreed 
upon by the working g ro ip . 
3 8 . M^dd^e pfi?t Monitor (New Jersey) , Vol, IX, No. 20, 
November 1, 1979* p , 1. 
39 . Ib id . 
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(b) While the two delegations of Egypt and Is rae l 
continue to discuss t he i r divergent viewpoints on 
several basic p r inc ip le s r e l a t e d to which s ide wil l 
affect the autonomous authori ty - the Administrative 
Council - the two delegations agreed t h a t the I s r a e l i 
delegation wil l continue to provide the other p a r t i e s 
pa r t i c ipa t ing in the negct la t ions with a de ta i l ed 
descr ipt ion of the powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s now 
being exercised by the mi l i t a ry government and I t s 
c i v i l i an aafninlstratlon. These spec i f ica t ions of t h e 
present s i t u a t i o n wi l l provide the p a r t i e s with 
basic information so that they can discuss the t r a n s -
fer of author i ty as s t i pu l a t ed by the Camp David 
framework". 40 
The outcome of the meeting re f l ec ted the compromise 
between Egypt and Is rae l * But the basic differences pe r s i s t ed 
between the two countr ies over autonomy i s sue . The meeting/ 
41 however, indicated a ce r t a in degree of f l e x i b i l i t y . 
The I s r a e l i au tho r i t i e s submitted a de ta i l ed proposal to 
grant autonomy t o Pales t in ians in a meeting of the working grotjps 
in Al-Giza# Egypt# on January 14-17, 1980. In the proposal , the 
I s r a e l i s emphasised on the creat ion of an 11 member Pales t inian 
Council with s t r i c t l y l imi ted ju r i sd i c t ion over heal th Services, 
a g r i c u l t u r e , r e l ig ious a f f a i r s , labour and welfare, commerce and 
industry^ t ranspor ta t ion and communications, j u s t i c e , adn in i s t r a -
42 t l on and education. I t a l so conferred on the I s r a e l i s t o r e t a i n 
40. Itaroar Rabinovich, "The Autonomy Plan" in Colin Legum (Edited) MitSdle East Contctnporarv Survey. Vbl. I l l , 1978-79 (New York j Holmes & Meier Publ ishers , I n c . , 1980), p . 182, 
4 1 . Ib id . 
42. A^yjlcfi p larv (New Delhi, Vol. XX, No. 15, April 8-14, 1980, 
p . §961. 
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t h e contxo l over v i t a l spheres as use of p u b l i c land» water 
r e s o u r c e s , i n t e r n a l s e c u r i t y , Jewish c i v i l i a n s e t t l emen t* fuel 
and power and c u r r e n c y . 
The proposed p l an was o u t r i g h t l y r e j e c t e d by t h e Egyptian 
d e l e g a t i o n and t h e l e ade r of t he Egyptian s i d e t o t h e powers 
conmi t t ee . Ambassador I zza t Abdul L a t i f expressed t h a t t h e p lan 
was not i n conformity with t h e concept of Camp David Accords/ 
which sought a comprehensive autonomy having f u l l powers and 
j u r i s d i c t i o n s in t h e l e g i s l a t i v e , j u d i c a l and e x e c u t i v e spheres 
44 f o r t h e West Bank and Gaza S t r i p . 
The Egyptian s t and seemed mot iva t ed t o show t h e i r Arab 
c r i t i c s t h a t Egypt had no t s o l d outt t h e P a l e s t i n i a n cause i n t h e 
i n t e r e s t of a s e p a r a t e peace with I s r a e l . I t a l s o i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
E g y p t ' s r e f u s a l was an a t tempt t o f o r c e t h e Uai ted S t a t e s t o 
a c t more e f f e c t i v e l y in o rder t o b reak e i g h t month o ld s t a l e m a t e 
45 in t h e P a l e s t i n i a n autonomy n e g o t i a t i o n s . Following t h i s / Dan 
P a t i r » t h e spokesman for t h e I s r a e l i de l ega t i on t o t h e t a l k s o f 
t h e autonomy working teams, r e a c t e d t o t h e Egyptian a s s e r t i o n about 
t h e I n c o m p a t i b i l i t y of t h e I s r a e l i ' p l a n wi th t h a t of t h e accords and 
4 3 . Time (New York) , February 4 , 1980, p . 2 8 . 
44 . ,BBC Monitoring s e r v i c e ^i^marv of WorjLd Broac^casts ME/ 
63 2 2 / V 4 - 5 . 
4 5 . ;^s;.^n Reopf<^er. (New D e l h i ) , Vol. XXVI, No. 10, March 4 -10 , 
1980, p . 15350. 
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he expressed that the draft , submitted by the I s r a e l i team was 
i n £act# the structure of the s e l f - a a n i n l s t r a t i o n and i t s power 
46 based e n t i r e l y on the Camp David p r i n c i p l e s . 
I t was on January 17, 1980/ t h a t the Egyptian prime 
* 
Minister# Mustafa Khalil expressed t h a t : 
"We demand that Israel honoxir what i t has s igned. 
Egypt honoured i t s commitments and w i l l f u l f i l 
the commitments out l ined in the t r e a t y . Autonomy 
can not be interpreted by one s ide a lone . We do 
not accept Begin*s statement on granting l i m i t e d 
powers t o the Palestinians**.47 
At the same time* in order t o divulge the a t tent ion of 
the Arab States from the Camp David and draw the a t t ent ion at 
the s o v i e t intervent ion in Afghanistan, prime Minister Khalil 
pointed out the i n i t i a t i v e , Egypt had taken on the day of the 
Sovie t intervent ion in Afghanistan and the measures proposed in 
the peop le ' s Assembly. He s a i d that i t was regre t tab le on the 
part of the •*rejectic» s ta te s" which " j u s t i f i e d the aggression". 
Khal i l cautioned that the method used by Soviet mion in 
Afghanistan might be used again in other countr ies l inked with 
the Sov ie t s by t r e a t i e s of fr iendship , such as the people ' s 
16 . BBC Monitoring Service Siyifinarv of world Broadcasts 
ME/6322/A/5. 
47. ;ibid. » ME/6323/A/1. 
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48 Democratic Republ ic of Yemen a^ nd E t h i o p i a . 
The working grovjps of t h e Egypt ian, US and I s r a e l i d e l e -
g a t i o n again met from January 28-29, 1980, in Tel Aviv. The 
Egypt ians s u b n i t t e d t h e i r ov«i d e t a i l e d p l a n fo r autonomy in t h e 
49 West Bank and Gaza S t r i p . I t proposed t h e formation of a 
P a l e s t i n i a n Council of 80 t o lOo members with f u l l l e g i s l a t i v e * 
50 
e x e c u t i v e and j u d i c i a l avrthori ty over t h e t e r r i t o r i e s . 
I s r a e l on January 29, dec l ined t o accept t h e Egyptian 
p r o p o s a l s and Halm Kubersky, head of an I s r a e l i working g ro tp 
t o l d h i s Egyptian Coun te rpa r t / I z z a t Abdul L a t i f t h a t Egyp t ' s 
p l a n was a model f o r sove re ign ty and no t of autoncroy. The 
p a r t i e s a l s o remained d i f f e r over the s t a t u s of Jerusalem which 
was proposed by t h e Egypt ians a s the s e a t of autonomous i n s t i -
t u t i o n . There was a l s o d i s sens ion over Egyp t ' s p lan fo r t h e 
P a l e s t i n i a n s , t o e l e c t a l e g i s l a t i v e i n s t e a d of an execu t ive 
a u t h o r i t y as p rov ided by t h e I s r a e l i model of autonomy. There 
was f u r t h e r d isagreement over t h e Jewish s e t t l e m e n t s i n t h e 
t e r r i t o r i e s . The I s r a e l i s expressed t h a t S e c u r i t y was t h e i r 
51 
concern , and not a s u b j e c t fo r n e g o t i a t i o n in t h e autonomy t a l K s . 
4 8 . yb^d« 
49* Moshe Gammer and Shixnon Shamir, n . 22, p . 120« 
50* hl-'hiiSHMa, (Cairo) , February 25, 1980. 
5 1 . A^ir^ca Diary , n . 42, p p . 9961-9962. 
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prime Minister Begin regarded the Egyptian counter-
proposal as a d i s t o r t i o n of the l e t t e r and s p i r i t of Camp David 
and declared that Israe l would not approve any proposal vAiich 
would l ead t o a Pa le s t in ian s t a t e . The Egyptian proposal 
demanded the t rans fer of the e x i s t i n g authori ty of the I s r a e l i 
m i l i t a r y government i n the West Bank and Gaza Strip* t o a l o c a l 
P a l e s t i n i a n parliament/ and that S e l f - r u l e apply t o East 
Jerusalem as w e l l . Begin asser ted t h a t Jerusalem would never 
52 
again be divided. 
I t was from 27-28, 1980 t h a t the next t a l k s were held 
in Schevenlngen, near the Hague. According t o I s r a e l i sources , 
the US - I s r a e l i f r i c t i o n on such quest ions as secur i ty and 
se t t lements was witnessed in the meeting. I t was, however, even-
t u a l l y agreed t o form two new committees - one for l e g a l n a t t e r s , 
and the other for economic a f fa ir s* They were i n addition to 
53 the two e x i s t i n g committees - for powers and e l e c t i o n s . 
US Vbte against I s r a e l 
The smooth US-Israel i re la t ions came to the lowest ebb 
when the Ukiited States alongwith the fourteen members of the 
UN Securi ty Cowici l , on March 1, 1980, voted against the I s r a e l i 
52. yb i^ . , p . 9961. 
53 . Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir, n. 22, p . I 2 l . 
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set t lements in the occqpied Arab t e r r i t o r i e s inclucJlng Jerusalem 
and ca l led for the cessat ion of establishments construct ion and 
planning of new ones and described t h e I s r a e l i measures as 
"ser ious obstruct ion to achieving comprehensive/ jus t and l a s t i n g 
54 peace In the Middle East" . The resolut ion s t a t e d tha t j 
•*.,. a l l measures taken by I s r ae l t o change 
the physical character/ demographic composi-
t i o n , i n s t i t u t i o n a l s t ruc tu re or s t a tu s of 
the Pa les t in ian and other Arab t e r r i t o r i e s 
occi^ied since! 1967, including Jerusalem or 
* any p a r t thereof, have no legal validity**.55 
Speaking at the LN during his explanation of US support 
t o the Security Council r eso lu t ion , the US Ambassador t o the 
united Nations Donald P. McHenry asser ted t h a t j 
"We regard t he set t lements in the occupied 
t e r r i t o r i e s as i l l e g a l under in t e rna t iona l 
law, and we consider them t o be an obstacle 
to a successful outcome of the current nego-
t i a t i o n s which are aimed a t a comprehensive. 
Just and l a s t i n g peace in the Middle Bast".56 
Alt ho ugh/the US Ambassador managed t o de le te a key 
paragraph on the s t a tus of Jerusalem yet the r e s o l t t i o n s t i l l 
contained seven other references to Jerusalem which implied t h a t 
54. UN Weekly Newsle t t e r (New Delhi) , \ to l . 3 1 , NO. 10 
March 7, 1980, p . 1. 
55 . ?t?4<at 
56. Thq Mideast Observer in Wasl^jj^ot^cn (Washington, D.C.) , 
Vol. I l l , No. 6, March 15, 1980, p . 3 . 
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57 t h e o c c t ^ i e d t e r r i t o r i e s inc luded Jerusa lem as w e l l . 
I s r a e l , whi le p r o t e s t i n g a n g r i l y c a l l e d t h e r e s o l u t i o n as 
• •un jus t i f i ed and one sided^* and I s r a e l i Foreign Min is t ry 
j u s t i f i e d t h e s e t t l e m e n t s s t and taken by t h e Menachenn Begin*s 
Government and condemned t h e American s t a t emen t as t h e S e c u r i t y 
C O 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s of I s r a e l was g iven t o p p r i o r i t y i n I s r a e l . But 
t h e Arab S t a t e s were p l e a s e d by the apparen t s h i f t in t h e US 
p o l i c y , I^owever, t o a v e r t t h e s t r o n g I s r a e l i r e a c t i o n and t h e 
American Jewish opinion a g a i n s t t h e Ca r t e r Ackninis t ra t ion/ the 
p r e s i d e n t himself announced t h a t t h e US vote was ca s t ed due t o 
t h e communication f a i l u r e . He expressed t h a t s 
"The un i t ed S t a t e s vo te i n the u n i t e d Nations 
was approved with t h e ixiderstanding t h a t a l l 
r e f e r e n c e s t o Jerxisaa^em woxild be d e l e t e d . The 
f a i l u r e t o communicate t h i s c l e a r l y r e s u l t e d 
in a vo te in favour of t h e r e s o l u t i o n r a t h e r 
t h a n a b s t e n t i o n " .60 
57 . lUewsweekf (New York) , March 17, 1980, p . 3 8 . 
58 . Aaron S. Klieman " I s r a e l " i n Colin Legun (Edited) , 
Middle East contemporary Survev. Vol. IV, 1979-80 
(New York j Holmes & Meier p u b l i s h e r s , i n c . , 1981), 
p . 557. 
59• ^ewsweek; . n . 57, p . 3 8 . 
iUaaX-SSdLSS/ January 1 t o May 23 , ;^80 (Washington t 
u n i t e d s t a t e s Government p r i n t i n g Of f i ce , 1981) , 
p . 427 , 
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Though/prime Minister Begin accepted C a r t e r ' s adni t tance 
of cooitnunication breakdown yet he was too c r i t i c a l of the US 
pol icy in the United Nations and he pointed out t h a t : 
" . . . i t i s no surpr ise tha t the sv^port of the 
American represen ta t ive for t h i s t e r r i b l e r e s o -
lu t ion aroused deep resentment within our nation 
and among otr f r iends" .61 
In fac t , the I s r a e l i o f f i c i a l s were, p a r t i c u l a r l y anta-
gonised t h a t the Security Council resolut ion made a reference 
t o the Arabs* and Pales t inians '"occupied t e r r i t o r i e s " including 
*Jerusalem". ^^ 
On the other hand. President Ca r t e r ' s confession of the 
communication f a i l u r e t h a t resu l ted in the US vote in t h e 
Securi ty Covncil against I s rae l of course, drew h i t t e r c r i t ic i sm 
frcm the Arabs.on March 5# 1980, the Arab League members oondaroned 
the US pol icy reversa l and the media and the government o f f i c i a l s 
in the Middle East expressed tha t president Carter t r i e d t o woo 
the Jewish voters for the forthcoming p re s iden t i a l elect iccu I t 
was f e l t by the Egyptian Minister of Sta te for Foreign Affairs 
ButrtB Butrus Ohali that the US vote in the Securi ty Council 
was t rue and the announcement of Carter afte;rwards was an attempt 
61 . ^i<^dle East yignitor (New Je r sey ) , Vbl. X, No. 5, March 15, 




to improve h i s s t and ing among Jewish v o t e r s . A s e n i o r PLO o f f i c i a l 
Majed Abu Sharar i n B e i r u t / e x p r e s s e d t h a t t h e US r e v e r s a l was "a 
blow t o t h o e e Arabs who run a f t e r Aroerica" . The Kuwait M i n i s t e r 
of S t a t e for Cabinet A f f a i r s Abdul Aziz Hussein was equa l ly c r i t i -
ca l of t he US p o l i c y and he observed t h a t : 
" C a r t e r ' s a t tempt t o r e v e r s e p o s i t i o n could 
l e a d t o a c r i s i s in Arab-American r e l a t i o n s " . 6 4 
The Republican cand ida te and the forroer CSovernor of Cal i -
f o r n i a / Ronald Reagan c r i t i c i s e d P re s iden t C a r t e r and s a i d t h a t 
t h e UN vote r a i s e d "fundamental ques t i ons about C a r t e r ' s r e a l 
a t t i t u d e s and i n t e n t i o n s toward I s r a e l " . While cons ide r ing 
S t a t e s • 
I s r a e l as t h e u n i t e d / " s t r a t e g i c a s s e t " » Reagan himself s t e a d -
f a s t l y c a l l e d f o r t h e US stjpport t o I s r a e l as "a t r u s t e d a l l y " , 
He fu r the r expressed t h a t " I s r a e l cannot be p r e s s u r e d i n t o 
a c t i o n s t h a t t h r e a t e n her s e c u r i t y " and if t h e t h i t e d S t a t e s 
j e o p a r d i s e d the I s r a e l i s e c u r i t y by " a c t i o n s such as t h e UN 
vote** i t would not only l e t down an a l l y but a l s o " impair" i t s 
65 
own s e c u r i t y . 
At t h e same t ime/ in an i n t e n s i v e q u e s t i o n i n g in t h e 
Sena te Foreign Re la t ions Committee t h e US S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , 
63 . Near East Report (Washington, D.C.) , Vol. XXIV, No. 11/ 
March 12/ 1980/ p . 4 3 . 
64. Middle East Monitor , n . 61/ p . 1. 
65 . Near East Report (Washington, D . C . ) , Vol.XXIV, No. 12/ 
March 19, 1980, p . 48 . 
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Cyrus Vane©/while owning the r e spons ib i l i t y for the oommunication 
f a i lu re / spoke tha t he was "mistaken" and he had ' 'accepted fu l l 
r e spons ib i l i t y for the misunderstanding**. However, he expressed 
t h a t the US Adninistrat ion considered the East Jerusalem as 
occvjpied terri tory. 
In fac t . Carter had t o pay the p r i ce for the US vote 
against I s rae l in the secur i ty Couacil and in November 1980, 
Ronald Reagan came i n t o power with lands l ide v ic tory . 
Fai lure of the Autonomy Talks 
Despite the setback t o the US Adninistrat ion following 
the UN vote, P res ida i t c a r t e r ca r r ied on his mission t o achieve the 
break-through - s^ d^ in a White House br ief ing on in f la t ion and 
energy^carter r ea l i s ed the exasperation expressed by the Arabs 
and favoured ATiabs co-operation in meeting the challenge 
created by the energy c r i s i s and assured t o e s t ab l i sh durable 
66. The Mideast ^bseryer in Washington (Washington, D.C.) , 
Vol. I l l , No. 7, April 1, 1980, p . 3 . 
67. Near Eas^ ^pg/T^ (Washington, D.C.) , Vbl. XXIV, No, 45, 
November 7, 1980, p . 203. 
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peace in t h e Middle E a s t . He emphasised t h a t s 
"To t h e ex ten t t h a t we can be success fu l in 
r e a l i s i n g t h e goals e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e Cainp 
David accords / inc luding t h e r e s o l u t i o n of 
t h e P a l e s t i n i a n q u e s t i o n , t h a t w i l l go a long 
way toward r e - a s s u r i n g t h e world about t h e 
s u p p l i e s of s c a r c e energy in t h e fu tu re and 
t h e s t a b i l i t y of t h e wor ld ' s economic sys tem".68 
At t h e same time* C a r t e r aga in i n v i t e d both Sadat and 
Begin t o consu l t with him s e p a r a t e l y in Washington as Egyp t ' s 
and I s r a e l ' s hope t o agree on the s e l f - r u l e for t h e P a l e s t i n i a n s 
May 
in t h e West Bank and Gaza S t r i p by /26 , 1980, appeared t o be i n i -
mical t o t h e norms of t h e Camp David Accords. The de lay in t h e 
r e s o l u t i o n of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n ques t ion had a l s o i n f a c t , o b s t r u c -
t e d C a r t e r ' s e f f o r t s t o r a l l y the I s lamic n a t i o n s of t h e Pers ian 
69 Gulf a g a i n s t t h e t h r e a t frcm the Sovie t conquest of Afghanis tan . 
However, fo r both p r e s i d e n t Sadat and Prime Minis te r 
Begin, the domestic p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s seemed t o l i r a i t t h e 
p o s s i b i l i t y fo r compranlse between them. Beg in ' s s i ^ p o r t a t 
t h e domestic f ron t reached a new low which reduced h i s a b i l i t y 
t o win h i s government 's backing t o make any b i g c o n c e s s i o n s , 
p r e s i d e n t Sadat was equa l ly opposed by t.he I s l a m i c fundamen-
t a l i s t s in Egypt and a t the same t i m e / t h e s e demonstra tors 
6 3 . Weekly Ccropila^ion of P r e s i d e n t i a l D o c u n ^ t s . Vol . XVl0> 
NO. 12, March 24, 1980, p . 511.. 
69 . "A Summit a t Separa te Tables" Ifewsweek, March 3 1 , 1980, 
p . 12. 
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demanded t h a t t h e Arabs In East Jerusalem should be p e r m i t t e d t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e i n e l e c t i o n s l ead ing to t h e e s t ab l i shmen t of P a l e s -
70 t i n i a n autcnomy. 
p r e s i d e n t S a d a t ' s v i s i t t o Washington on Apr i l 8 , 1980, 
on a two-day v i s i t for t a l k s with P r e s i d e n t Car te r r e g a r d i n g 
P a l e s t i n i a n autoncmy n e g o t i a t i o n s , and Prime M i n i s t e r Begin ' s v i s i t 
from J ^ r i l 14-17, d id not evoke any major b reak- through on a u t o -
nomy n e g o t i a t i o n s . In t h e i r s e p a r a t e t a l k s wi th Ca r t e r , Sadat and 
Begin r e i t e r a t e d t h e i r d ivergent a t t i t u d e s on such i s s u e s as 
Jervjsalem/ P a l e s t i n i a n s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , t he meaning of "fxill 
autonomy" t h e s e t t l e m e n t s in occxxpied t e r r i t o r i e s e t c . . Both t h e 
l e a d e r s were r i g i d in t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s t and and did not compro-
71 
mise on any i s s u e . 
I t was however, agreed t h a t they vould ca r ry on t h e n o n -
s top n e g o t i a t i o n s on t h e P a l e s t i n i a n autonomy u a t i l May 26, 1980. 
The r e s u n p t i o n of the t a l k s would begin soon in I s r a e l and 
72 
s h i f t t o Alexandr ia In Egypt in mid-May. 
Again t h e autonomy n e g o t i a t i o n s was opened on May 1, 1980, 
in t h e Tel Aviv suburb of Herz l iyya . The Egyptian de l ega t ion 
70 . Middle East M9nitor (New J e r s e y ) , \ tol . X, No, 6, 
J ^ r i l 1, 1980, p . 1 , 
7 1 . The Mideast Ob^^fver in Washinatcp (Washinqtoi , D.C.) , 
Vol. I l l , No. 8 , Apr i l 15, 1980, p . l . 
72. Near Eas t Report (Washington, D . C ) , VDI, XXIV. 
No, 17, Apr i l 23 , 1980, p . 8 1 , 
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p r e s e n t e d t h e s e c u r i t y p roposa l s on May 6, 1980 and i t p rov ided 
t h a t a P a l e s t i n i a n E n t i t y would be e s t a b l i s h e d in t h e t e r r i t o -
r i e s ; i t s s e l f -gove rn ing a u t h o r i t y would be r e s p o n s i b l e for. a l l 
i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l s e c u r i t y m a t t e r s (po l ice* S e c u r i t y Serv ices 
and border po l i ce )> i n o rde r t o s e p a r a t e t h e autcnocnous t e r r i t o r y , 
a b o r d e r l i n e would be drawn and t h e border P o l i c e would main ta in 
checkposts along t h a t f r o n t i e r ; t h e border Po l i ce would o p e r a t e 
in the West Bank in c o l l a b o r a t i o n wi th Jo rdan , and wi th Egypt in 
73 Gaza S t r i p . The I s r a e l i a u t h o r i t i e s were s u r p r i s e d and shocked 
and t h e y o .u t r igh t ly r e j e c t e d t h e Egyptian p r o p o s a l . The Egyp-
t i a n s t and was s o f t « i e d with 24 hours and they dec la red t h a t 
74 
every th ing was n e g o t i a b l e except s e t t l e m e n t s . The f i n a l 
73. The proposals fur ther included ce r t a in provisions - a n t i -
t e r r o r i s t act ion and criminal a r r e s t s would be taken by the 
local po l ice only. I s r ae l would have t o obtain the approval 
of the self-governing author i ty for the locat ions of i t s 
forces during the interim periods as well as for the s i ze 
and weapons of these forces and for mi l i t a ry movements in 
the t e r r i t o r i e s ; the I s r a e l i forces would not be allowed t o 
intervene in or s tay near, the populated a reas , and at the 
end of the interim period I s r ae l would withdraw completely 
from the autonomous t e r r i t o r i e s , the I s r a e l i se t t lements , 
being " i l l e g a l and provocative"would be dismantled except 
for those which were needed for secur i ty , but would have t o 
be approved by the permanent committee; the US should be 
inv i ted to p a r t i c i p a t e in implementing the autonomy plan. 
Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir, n . 22, p . 123. 
74. l i i i jk 
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communique expressed t h e agreement t o cont inue n e g o t i a t i o n s 
over s e c u r i t y issvies by t h e Egyptians and I s r a e l i s and t h u s , 
75 
a showdovm had been a v e r t e d . 
On May 8 , 1980, a f t e r t h e conclus ion of t h e Herz l iyya 
t a l k s , Sadat asked t h a t t he meeting scheduled t o take p l a c e on 
May 12, would be postponed irj order t o g ive him ample t ime t o 
r e a s s e s s the s i t u a t i o n and t h e t a l k s . This was cons ide red by 
t h e I s r a e l i s as p r e s s u r e t a c t i c s on t h e eve of the t a r g e t d a t e . 
They found Egyp t ' s u n i l a t e r a l dec i s i on t o postpone t h e f o r t h -
coming meeting as r e g r e t t a b l e and announced the suspens ion of 
t h e d e l i b e r a t i o n s of t h e working groi;qps. 
p r e s i d e n t Sadat in h i s speech t o t h e p e o p l e ' s Assembly 
on May 14, 1980, expressed t h a t j 
" I t i s obvious t h a t by May 26 we s h a l l not reach 
d e f i n i t e r e s u l t s and I cons ider t h i s very dange-
rous . . . I t i s our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o complete t h e 
work of Camp David" .77 
He f u r t h e r dec la red t h a t t h e I s r a e l i s e t t l e m e n t s were 
i l l e g a l , t h a t t h e Jerusalem was a p a r t of t h e West Bank, and t h a t 
78 b r ing ing any change would be i l l e g a l . . 
75. Jbid^ 
76. Ibj.^y, p . 124. 
77* IJfflS_(New York) , May 26, 1980, p . 7 . 
78. Ifrj^ ifl, , p . 6 . 
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The following day, the I s r a e l i Knesset passed a b i l l 
introduced by Geuia Cohen, a Likud member, which affirmed t h a t 
the Jertjsalem woxold forever remain vxidivided as I s r a e l ' s c a p i t a l , 
president Sadat reacted by suspending the ta lks and he regarded 
the Knesset ac t ion as an I s r a e l i pl-oy t o keep the issue of 
Jerusalem out of the autonomy t a l k s , even though the predominantly 
Arab eas tern sec tor of the c i t y was occupied along with the West 
Bank and Gaza S t r ip during 1967 war.^^ 
Meanwhile, president Sadat sought to concentrate on his 
domestic problems and he reshuffled his cabinet and accepted the 
res ignat ions of a l l 3l minis ters including prime Minister Mustafa 
Kha l i l . Further, Kamal Hassan Ali was entrusted the charge of 
Foreign Ministry and the chief negot ia tor in any future autonotny 
t a lks .®° 
Egypt's 2.6 mil l ion Coptic c h r i s t i a n minority and muslim 
f\jndamentali»ts had r isen arms against each o t h e r , president 
Sadat banned the ecc l e s i a s t i ca l groips tha t sought '*to spread 
p o l i t i c a l dissension". The whole p o l i t i c a l upsurge was due t o 
t h e culmination of peace t r e a ty with I s r a e l and the presence of 
fii deposed Shah of Iran in Egypt. 
7 9 . l^X^ 
8 0 . Near ff^s^ Report (Washington, D.C.) , Vol. XXIV, No. 2o, 
May 14, 1980, p . 9 3 . 
8 1 . XJ^BSU n . 77, p . 7 . 
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On the other hand* the I s r a e l i Defense Minister/ Ezer 
Weiaman resigned on May 25, 1980, over prime Minister Begin's 
82 set t lement po l i c i e s and Pales t in ian autoncrny t a l k s . The May 26, 
1980 deadline se t for the Pales t in ian autonomy t a l k s , passed 
without r e s u l t s and v i r t u a l l y the ta lks fa i led . In fac t , in 
the autcwiomy t a lks not only the key Pales t in ians pa r ty was absent 
but the Pales t in ians a l so expressed t h e i r strong opposition t o 
such t a l k s . This was subs tant ia ted not only by the PLO and the 
Pales t in ian diaspora but by a se r ies of events in Hebron and the 
83 
s t r i f e - t o r n West Bank and Gaza s t r i p as wel l . 
82. Former Defense Minister Weizman had long opposed the 
government's pol icy on set t lements . However, his actual 
res ignat ion was provoked by government^ effori: to cut the 
defense budget. Weizman had los t most of his Herut p a r t y ' s 
s ipport when he ca l l ed publ ic ly for new e lec t ions in a move 
t o unseat Begin. Weizman in his open l e t t e r of res ignat ion 
on May 27, accused Begin of bringing I s rae l to^ the nadir 
of disappointment" and of missing "a ra re opportunity" to 
press for Peace.Weizman expressed t h a t "Instead of taking 
measured and determined steps towards a comprehensive and, 
s tab le peace, we are treading in p lace" . At the same time* 
Begin ca l led Weianan charges "amazing" and accused him of 
"maddening ambition". 
Middle East Monitor (New Jersey) , Vol. X, No. 9, Jine 1, 
1980, p . 2. 
8 3 . . Mohamed Sid Ahnad, "Pales t inian Autonomy : What Next?" 
Middle East Internat ional (London) , No. 126, Jiwe 1980, p . 8, 
The growing res i s tence of West Bank Pales t in ians to the 
I s r a e l i occupation had caused a harsh clamp-down by the 
Security forces. The l a t e s t spate of r e s i s t ence dis turban-
ces was a r evo l t which was in fac t , orchas t ra ted by the 
National Guidance committee Lainat ai-tg^wiih g^l-watani (NGC) formed a t a public meeting in the East Jerusalem 
suburb of Bait Hanina on October 1, 1978, t o co-ordinate 
opposition t o the autonomy plan of the Camp David Accords. 
I t involved s t r i k e s in schools and business premises, as 
well as violent res i s tence in which stones and molotov 
contd 
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Despi te t h e unfavourable s i t u a t i o n , an i n t e n s i v e e f f o r t s 
was made t o resume t h e t a l k s which was f i n a l l y m a t e r i a l i s e d cri 
June 2, 1980/ in Washington,Pres ident C a r t e r t a l k e d t o t h e l e a d e r s 
of Egyptian and I s r a e l i de l ega t ions s e p a r a t e l y and urged them to 
make t h e i r bes t e f f o r t s t o complete t h e autonomy n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
The US d e l e g a t i o n ' s p r o p o s a l s fo r s e t t i n g up the autonomy i n a t i -
t u t i o n S / however/ were r e j e c t e d by both the l e a d e r s and f i n a l l y 
t h e commvaniqxje merely expressed t h a t t h e p a r t i e s had agreed 
84 t o resume t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
In f a c t , both Egypt and I s r a e l were unwi l l ing to resume 
t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s because of s e v e r a l r ea sons l i k e t h e forthcomijig 
e l e c t i o n s in America and I s r a e l * the unfavourable p o l i t i c a l 
c l i m a t e g l o b a l l y and r e g i o n a l l y , t h e d e c l i n e i n the mutual t r u s t 
between Egypt and I s r a e l , and pessimism about t h e p o s s i b l e 
contd . 
c o c k t a i l s were used and which may i nc lude f u l l s c a l e 
g u e r r i l l a ope ra t i ons such as t h e recen t a t t a c k on Jewish 
s e t t l e r s i n Hebron. The m i l i t a r y government a d n i t t e d t h a t 
t h e r e was a g r e a t e r w i l l i ngnes s on t h e p a r t of t h e P a l e s -
t i n i a n s t o confront I s r a e l i t r o o p s than ever before . 
According t o the I s r a e l i Reserve General Mat t i tyahu pe led , 
t h e m i l i t a r y government 's a c t i o n s in Hebron during t h e 
curfew verged on "cr imes a g a i n s t Hunani ty" . 
Middle East I n t e r n a t i o n a l (London), No. 125, May 23, 1980, 
p . 3* 
8 4 . Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir, n , 22, pp . 124-125. 
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success of the t a l k s . 
Despite the opposition from the American and Egyptian 
a u t h o r i t i e s , the Menachem Begin Government f i na l l y enacted the 
b i l l in Knesset on July 30, 1980# approving the e n t i r e Jerusalem 
c i t y as a permement cap i t a l of Jewish S ta t e . There waS/ however, 
the opposition for approving the b i l l in the Knesset i t s e l f . 
But i t was ul t imately approved as no member of Knesset was 
wil l ing t o stand against the national consensus. Begin himself 
was known to have to ld his colleagues that in the midst of 
de l i ca t e negot ia t ions with Egypt tha t he did not seek the b i l l 
but he could not afford t o oppose i t because of i t s nat ional 
importance. Even the opposition Labour party leader , Shimon 
Peres, who usually voted automatically against Likud supported 
l eg i s l a t ion* expressed thats 
"I was against the b i l l being introduced, but 
I c an ' t vote against i t because I'm bas ica l ly 
in favour of i t^ .SS 
On August 2, 1980, president Sadat despatched l e t t e r s t o 
both president Carter and prime Minister Begin in which Sadat 
demanded that in order t o continue the autonomy ta lks with I s r a e l , 
the sovereignty over Jerusalem should remain pa r t of the discussion. 
8S. Ib,i(?(,» p . 125. 
86« Africa Diarv (New Delhi) , Vbl. XXI, No« 2, January 8-14, 
1981. o . 103 51. , p .  . 
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d e s p i t e t h e new I s r a e l i law, d e c l a r i n g i t as I s r a e l ' s e t e r n a l 
c a p i t a l . 
on t h e same day* the Egyptian Foreign M i n i s t e r , Kamal 
Hassan A l l , announced t h a t Egypt had informed I s r a e l not t o send 
the I s r a e l i d e l e g a t i o n t o Alexandria on August 3 , for the new 
round of autonomy t a l k s u n t i l the a p p r o p r i a t e r e p l y were r e c e i v e d 
from C a r t e r and Begin. This a c t i o n was however, cons ide red by 
88 t h e I s r a e l i s as another suspension of t h e t a l k s . 
I t was on December 14, 1980 t h a t So l . Llnowi tz , p r e s i d e n t 
C a r t e r ' s s p e c i a l envoy t o West As ia , a r r i v e d in Ca i ro and met 
wi th p res iden t Sadat then he flew t o I s r a e l on December 16, 1980, 
fo r t a l k s with Begin. Following h i s v i s i t / S a d a t and Begin 
pub l i shed a communique which s a i d t h a t they made "important 
progress** in the t a l k s wi th t h e US as i t s f u l l p a r t i c i p a n t and 
t h e y f u r t h e r aff i rmed t h a t t h e Camp David Peace p rocess was t h e 
87 . S a d a t ' s demands appeared t o be a contoromise between h i s 
d e s i r e t o avoid breaking off t h e t a l x s a l t o g e t h e r and 
h i s need t o demonstrate Egyptian d i s p l e a s u r e a t t h e 
Jerusalem law. 
8 8 . Begin warned t h a t t h i s t ime , t h e i r resumption would no t 
a u t o m a t i c a l l y t a k e p l a c e whenever t h e Egyptians f e l t they 
were ready t o resume them. 
Moshe Gammer and Shimon Shamir, n . 22, p . 125. 
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only viable way for t h e comprehensive and l a s t ing peace in the 
Middle East . They a lso thanked president Carter for h is help 
and expressed t h e i r g ra t i tude t o the president e lec t Ronald 
Reagan's affirmation t h a t "the united States would remain com-
89 
tnitted t o the Camp David process" 
89. Asian Recordjer (New Delhi)/ Vol. XXVII, No. 4, 
Jantery 22-28, 1981, p . 15851. 
But the new adminis t ra t ion ' s gesture re f l ec ted t h a t i t gave 
the autonomy ta lks ra ther a low p r i o r i t y . 
Moshe Gammer, n . 26, p . 153. 
CONCLUSION 
The U h i t e d S t a t e s p o l i c y t o w a r d s West A s i a was p r i m a r i l y 
m o t i v a t e d by s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s l i k e t h e t h r u s t t o c o n t a i n 
communism in t h e r e g i o n , t o e x p l o i t t h e Middle E a s t o i l economy* 
and t o s a f e g u a r d t h e s t a t e of I s r a e l a s t h e US n a t u r a l a l l y 
a g a i n s t t h e P a l e s t i n i a n Arabs who were d e p r i v e d of t h e i r l a n d s a s 
a, r e s u l t of t h e p a r t i t i o n p l a n and t h e s u b s e q u e n t c r e a t i o n of 
t h e s t a t e of I s r a e l i n 1947 and 1948 r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
With t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of J e w i s h s t a t e d u r i n g t h e 194Qs 
t h e American f o r e i g n p o l i c y p e r c e p t i o n and a p p r o a c h e s t o w a r d s t h e 
M i d d l e E a s t changed d r a m a t i c a l l y a s t h e s t a t e Depar tment o f f i c i a l s 
g r a d u a l l y e m p h a s i s e d on m a i n t e n a n c e of ha rmonious r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h e 
Arabs f o r two i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n s : f i r s t l y , t h e demand f o r o i l was 
r i s i n g d o m e s t i c a l l y in t h e U i i t e d S t a t e s ; sec<»idly, t h e r e g i o n was 
becoming v i a b l e c o m m e r c i a l l y . The US a u t h o r i t i e s a d a p t e d a p o l i c y 
of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and comprcmlse b o t h w i t h t h e I s r a e l i s and t h e 
Arabs i n l o o k i n g a t t h e P a l e s t i n i a n i s s u e b e c a u s e t h e US n a t i o n a l 
i n t e r e s t s were a l s o i n v o l v e d i n t h e r e g i o n . 
The e n t r a n c e of t h e S o v i e t un ion i n t h e Middle E a s t 
p o l i t i c s a s a f a v o u r a b l e p a r t n e r of Egypt and S y r i a b o t h in p e a c e 
and war ,however# p r o v i d e d an o p p o r t u n i t y f o r t h e S o v i e t p r e s e n c e 
i n t h e r e g i o n . T h u s , b o t h t h e Amer icans and t h e S o v i e t s p r e s e n t e d 
c o n f l i c t i n g s o l u t i o n s t o t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i i s s u e a s t h e y r e m a i n e d 
f a r frcm ccmpromls ing t h e i r n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . 
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After the 19 67 Arab - I s r a e l i war delwicle, in s p i t e of 
the Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser's"war of At t r i t i on" on 
the Suez front , i t yielded no concrete r e s u l t s except t h e cease-
f i r e in the summer of 1970. 
With the assunption of office as the president of Egypt 
following the death of Nasser, president Anwar Al-Sadat, in 
order t o achieve the Arab lands , occv:^ied by I s r ae l during the 
1967 war, sought the "offensive weapons" fron the Soviet union. 
But the Russians' d i s i n t e r e s t t o accelera te any war and her 
quest to continue the process of detente with the united S t a t e s , 
prompted the Soviets t o abstain from s\:^pplying Egypt with the 
weapons which fur ther r e su l t ed in Sadat ' s apathy towards t he 
Soviet union and expulsion of the Soviet technicians from Egypt 
in 1972. At the same time, Sadat ' s expectations fron the US 
Administration was be l l i ed as the Americans themselves did not 
want to take r i sk s of a l iena t ing the most powerful p r o - I s r a e l i 
Jewish lobby and I s r a e l i Government by supplying weapons t o Egypt. 
I t was never imagined tha t a war could be in the offing as the 
Arabs had not been so much strong t o withstand a renewed war 
in the Middle East and a l so when the Soviet posture was not 
congenial . Besides, In view of the process of <;^etente between 
the Soviet union and the Uhited StateS/ the chances of Arab- Is rae l i 
war was qui te remote. But Sadat 's f a i lu re of the "year of 
decision" and his declining p res t ige prompted him t o launch an 
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offensive war alcng with the Syria as a par tner against I s r a e l 
in October 19 73. when the war s t a r t ed , the Soviet union sought 
t o maintain the balance through providing Egypt with cer ta in 
sophis t ica ted weapons as the Russians did not want t o abandon 
the most s igni f icant Arab power in which she had made tremendous 
investment. On the contrary, the united S t a t e s , which had 
already come to rescue I s rae l as a resu l t of the i n i t i a l Arab 
success over the I s r a e l i forces* had t o face new emerging problem 
due t o the war - the o i l embargo. The war led to the imposition 
of the o i l embargo by the organisation of Arab petroleum 
Exporting countr ies (OAPEC) viiich not only affected the United 
States but also cr ippled the world indus t r ies and t r anspor t . 
Consequently, the leaders of the European countries and Japan 
reframed t h e i r pol icy towards the Arab- Is rae l i conf l ic t and 
declared t h e i r simport to Arab cause. 
At the same time, the Nixon Adr in i s t ra t ion had undergone 
a tough t e s t due t o the "V/atergate scandal" a t the domestic front 
and i t conferred the sole author i ty on the US Secretary of S ta te , 
Henry Kissinger t o s e t t l e the Middle East c r i s i s . The war was 
contained through the step-by-step diplcmacy, played by the 
Secretary Kissinger. His pol icy had, however, gone awry in the 
long run which resu l ted in the fragmentation of the Arabs. 
With the conclusion of the October 19 73 war, the Soviet 
influence in the Middle Eas t , pa r t i cu l a r ly in Egypt was reduced 
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as a r e su l t of president Sadat ' s inc l ina t ion towards t h e united 
Sta tes and the Americans' favourable a t t i t u d e towards Egypt which 
eventually became the base for the Russian ex i t from Egypt and 
the Middle East as a whole. In f ac t , the 19 73 war had provided 
an opportunity for the United States t o take Egypt in i t s fold. 
At the same time, the war had costed the Egyptians and the 
I s r a e l i s heavily and President Sadat was making his e f for t s to 
reconst ruct the Egyptian economy and obviously^ the united 
Sta tes seemed t o be the la rges t f inancier and a id giving country 
t o Egypt as compared to the Soviet uriion. Sadat fur ther thought 
t h a t h is t i l t towards the Uhited States would pay r i ch dividends 
t o Egypt as the Egyptian t e r r i t o r i e s could be brought back from 
the I s r a e l i occupation only with the American as s i s t ance . 
After the successful conclusion of the cease- f i re agreement 
between Egypt and Is rae l* the US Adrinis t ra t ion sought t o move 
ahead with the pol icy to solve the Arab- Is rae l i conf l i c t through 
negot ia t ions and in te rna t iona l peace conferences on West Asia. 
The most important and thorny issue which was the crux of the 
whole Arab-Israel i confl ic t was the Pales t in ian problem. The 
Pa les t ine Liberation Or^janisation (PLO) which was declared by 
the Arab Summit in Khartoum as the sole represen ta t ive of the 
Pa les t in ians did not accept the US contention t o scrap t h e PLO'S 
declarat ion of l iqu ida t ing the s t a t e of Israel whereas the US 
Aaninis t ra t ion declined t o modify t h e United Nations Resolution 24 2 
which had t r ea t ed the Palestinians as refugees ins tead of providing 
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t h e i r Right t o Self-detertninatioo. This,according t o t he I s r a e l i s 
only meant t o se t vp a Pales t in ian s t a t e in the occupied West Bank 
and 0aza s t r i p* 
I s r a e l ' s p e r s i s t e n t refusal t o allow the PLO's p a r t i c i p a -
t i on in the in te rna t iona l peace ccnCerence and the differences of 
approach among the Arab countr ies on the one hand and Arabs and 
I s r a e l i s on the other , was f e l t by Sadat as indermining his i n t e -
r e s t t o r e s to re the Sinai peninsula from I s r a e l i s . F ina l ly , 
pres ident Sadat took a h i s t o r i c step to v i s i t I s rae l and to 
demonstrate his i n t e r e s t a l so t o solve the Pa les t in ian Imbroglio. 
His v i s i t shook the Arab world 's confidence in general and the 
Pa les t in ians in p a r t i c u l a r . Sadat ' s v i s i t t o I s r a e l , however, 
was conducive to the Carter Administration t o s t a r t the negot ia -
t ions with both the Arab and I s r a e l i leaders in order t o achieve 
a breakthrough t o solve the Arab- Is rae l i problem amicably. 
After a prolonged and a se r i e s of negot ia t ions , ccndxx:ted 
by the United Sta tes ,Pres ident Carter ul t imately succeeded t o 
frame the Camp David Accords which was signed in 19 78 between 
president Sadat of Egypt and prime Minister Menachem Begin of 
I s r a e l . The two Accords -"The Framework for peace in the Middle 
East" and the "Frameworkfor the t r ea ty of peace between Egypt and 
I s r a e l " was considered to be the tr iunph for both the united 
Sta tes and I s r a e l . President Sadat was vehemently condemned by 
the Arabs as a t r a i t o r and betrayed the Arab cause. Equally, the 
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Soviet au tho r i t i e s condemned him for having negotiated t h e Camp 
David Accords with I s r a e l , The accords which ignored the Syrian 
losses in the October 1973 war, led the Syrians to oppose Camp 
David Accords whereas the PLO strongly condemned and re jec ted i t . 
Both Syria and the PLO fovnd i t contr ibutory to spread the a n t i -
Camp David climate in the West Asian p o l i t i c s in view of the fac t 
t ha t Egypt surpassed the Arabs consensus against the sett lement 
with I s r a e l . 
I t may be pointed out that during the Camp David negot ia-
t ions president Sadat had t o make cer ta in concessions as he sought 
t o achieve a breakthrough in the Arab- I s rae l i conf l ic t and further 
his c r e d i b i l i t y a t the domestic front was at s take . In an 
interview to the Journal of pajLestj.ne St;4difis, Eric Rouleau, the 
Middle East edi tor of l^ e Monde. a French newspaper, expressed 
tha t : "Begin wasn't thireatened if Camp David fa i led on the contrary, 
he could go back and say t o the I s r a e l i s that they were trying to 
force hJm in to a set t lement jeopardising the secur i ty of the s t a t e 
of I s r a e l . And few I s r a e l i s would have then turned against Begin, 
The person who was r ea l l y threatened by the col lapse of Camp David 
was Sadat. He had promised his people t h a t if his i n i t i a t i v e fa i led 
he vould res ign . f a i lu re would have put him in a very d i f f i cu l t 
pos i t i on . And if he did not want t o resign he could have put vjp 
1. D.N. Malik, "Superpower and West Asia : A Geopoli t ical 
Analysis*' in S.A.H. Haqqi (Edited) West As ja Sinc^ Camp 
pfiv^d (Delhit Mittal publ ica t ions , 1988) , p . 89. 
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a show by saying tha t he was now going t o t r y o ther means - in 
other words go back to the Arab fold, t o Syria and t h e PLO and 
especia l ly the a l l i e s of those people/ the Soviet union for 
2 
which he has an a l l e rgy" . 
The most crucial mcnient came in March 1979/ when the 
t r e a t y for peace between Egypt and Israel was concluded, p re -
sident Carter was also a s ignatory as a witness to t h e t reaty* 
The t r e a t y primari ly provided for the recognition of I s rae l by 
Egypt and the r e s t o r a t i o n of I s r a e l i occupied Sinai t o Egypt. 
Massive American aid to both Egypt and Is rae l was promised by 
the Carter Administration as a reward for signing of the t r e a t y . 
The Egypt - I s rae l i peace Treaty generated a world wide reac t ion , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y from the Pales t in ians whose cause were undermined by 
the t r e a t y . The Arab summit Conference passed the resolu t ion for 
the p o l i t i c a l and economic sanctions against Egypt but the 
Conference also exposed the differences between the hardl iners and 
the moderates. F ina l ly , Sadat 's stubborn a t t i t u d e towards the 
Arab States led to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and 
organisat ion of Islamic Conference (OIC) , 
On the contrary, the Soviet unicn s t rongly supported the 
PLO cause in order t o r e -en te r the Middle East region. The Soviets 
2, "Options and Risks a f t e r Camp David:An Interview with Eric 
Rouleau" grflyyi^ at pf fa tg^Un^ §t;u<agg.r Vbl. VIII, No. 2, 
Winter 19 79/ pp. 4 2-43. 
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however,, a lso hsid t o lose t he i r p res t ige in the Middle East as 
a r e s u l t of tVieir intervention in Afghanistan and they could 
not evoke a considerable response due t o the fact tha t the Soviet 
union was an atheism or iented s t a t e and most of the Arab countr ies 
hed inherent xenophobia of such a s t a t e . 
Although, Egypt had succeeded in i t s goal t o achieve the 
Sinai area and the massive economic aid from the United States 
yet , she was the grea tes t loser of her p res t ige in the Arab world 
and she ceased t o be the leader of Arabs as well . After the 
t rea ty* one of the most s igni f icant issues cropped v;^  in the 
midst of the t a lks , was t o grant autonomy t o the Pales t in ians on 
t h e West Bank and Gaza s t r i p . In fac t , the I s r a e l i s were in no 
mood t o grant the full autonomy t o the Palest inians not only 
because they feared a mil icant Pales t in ian Sta te in the West Bank 
and Gaza but they a lso sought t o preserve t h e i r set t lements 
which were being increased by the Begin Government. Apart from 
the Egyptians, the I s r a e l i settlement pol icy a l so perturbed the 
Americans as i t was one of the main obstacles in the way of the 
autonomy ta lks between Egypt and I s r a e l . But the US Aanin is t ra -
t i o n could not step the Government to pursue t he policy of 
set t lements as i t had t o bow t o the p r o - I s r a e l i Jewish lobby 
which not only played a s ignif icant ro le in the US Administration 
but a l so influenced the American mass media and the Socio-economic 
and po l i t i ca l , spheres in tha t country. 
2ce 
Whet r ea l ly lacked in the autcnomy ta lks was that 
the negotiat ions were being conducted between the Egyptians and 
the I s r a e l i s alongwith the Americans but they were not p a r t i c i p a -
t ed by the Pales t inians of the West Bank and Gaza s t r i p who 
never conferred the author i ty on Egyptians t o negot ia te on t h e i r 
behalf. The autonomy t a l k s , however, fa i led to evoke any viable 
r e s u l t s and i t s f a i lu re was due t o the fact tha t the Camp David 
Accords had not adequately provided solut ions t o solve the 
Pa les t in ians i ssue . Further, the I s r a e l i s never cared for the 
set t lement of the Pales t in ian problem but t o lu rk the t a lks 
whereas Egypt's a t t i t u d e was also meak and mild towards the 
solut ion of the Pales t in ian imbroglio, p a r t l y because of her 
desire t o early re ten t ion of the Sinai and the o i l f ie lds and 
p a r t l y to emerge as a champion of Pa les t in ian cause. At the same 
time, the rapprochement between the two countries was i n i t i a t e d 
with ehthxjsiasm and the growing friendship was fur ther strengthened 
by mutual co-operation between Egypt and Israel despi te the f a i l u re 
of the autonomy t a l k s . 
I n i t i a l l y * the Carter Aaministration sought t o achieve 
a comprehensive peace and repudiated the former Secretary of 
Sta te Kiss inger ' s s tep-by-step approach but soon Sadat ' s Jerusalem 
v i s i t and the opposition by the Arab s t a t e s prompted the US 
Administration t o follow step-by-step approach which eventually 
led t o the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and 
I s rae l and i t was in fac t , a separate deal . The United States 
had presuned t h a t the accords and the subsequent peace t r e a ty 
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between Egypt and I s r a e l , would lead t o a permanent peace in the 
region. But the accords were ou t r igh t ly r e j ec ted by the e n t i r e 
Arab world on the ground tha t i t did not build up any premises for 
ensuring the l a s t i ng solut ion to the Pales t in ians nor accorded 
a u t t o r i t y t o the PLO even to demonstrate the r i gh t of se l f -
determination in the West Bank and Gaza s t r i p . The accords, 
however, had contained the war to some extent as 19 73 war was 
the l«"3st Arab-Is rae l i confrontation. 
Egypt was adversely affected both in economic and p o l i t i c a l 
spheres a f te r having signed a separate peace t r e a t y with I s rae l as 
Egypt was i so la ted by the Arabs, economic sanctions were imposed and 
the Egyptian goods were boycotted, apart from condemning Egypt in 
in te rna t iona l forum^ Even some of the Arab chauvanists advocated 
that Egypt should i)e expelled both from the Arab League and organi-
sat ion of Islamic Ccanference (OIC) . In fac t , Egypt-Israel i Peace 
Treaty divided the Arabs and Jeopardised the chances of r es to r ing 
peace in the Middle East as the Arabs ra i sed arms against themselves 
and the US Administration los t i t s c r e d i b i l i t y and p res t ige instead 
of exert ing influence among the Arabs. At the same time, the l e g i -
timacy of the Pales t in ians to crea te a separate s t a t e in the West 
Bank and Gaza s t r i p was recognized by the world community. The 
accords and the subsequent peace t r e a t y assumed the great importance 
from the I s r a e l i viewpoint tha t she got the recognit ion of a 
po ten t ia l Arab Sta te - Egypt and es tabl ished i t s permanent creden-
t i a l s in the region. 
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Pales t in ian issue which i s character ized as t h e bone of 
ccamtention and the crux of the whole Arab-Is rae l i conf l i c t , must 
be solved in order t o reduce the t ens ion in West Asia and cer ta in 
measures may be suggested for the same. 
(a) At the f i r s t ins tance , I s rae l should withdraw from the 
occupied t e r r i t o r i e s of the West Bank and Gaza s t r i p and the UN 
Force should replace the I s r a e l i forces as a prelude t o t he 
Pa les t in ian s t a t e in re turn t o the PLO's commitment t o repudiate 
i t s preamble t o l i qu ida te Is rae l as I s r a e l i existence i s now a 
r e a l i t y . The withdrawal of the I s r a e l i forces was a l so j u s t i f i e d 
by the former US president Richard Nixon, who has expressed in his 
book 199!^  : Victoyy Without Way tha t " . . . the peace pr ocess 
muist focus on the future of the West Bank and t h e r i o t - t o r n Gaza 
s t r i p . . . I s r a e l ' s i n t e r e s t s requi re a peace settlement for the 
land occupied in 1967. If I s r ae l annexes these lands, i t wil l 
become a binat ional garrison s t a t e , with disenfranchised Arabs 
composing about half i t s population. Moreover, given the high 
b i r t h r a t e s of t h e Pales t in ian people, Jewish people wi l l soon 
be a minority in the Jewish s t a t e . If, i t continues i t s mi l i t a ry 
occipation and gradual colonisat ion of these t e r r i t o r i e s , i t will 
eventual ly bring about a Uhited Arab world hos t i l e t o I s r a e l , with 
grea te r opportuni t ies for Moscow t o enter t he region t t a n ever 
before". ^ 
3 . Richard Nixon, 1999 : Victory Without War. (London t sidgwick 
& Jackson, 1988) , pp. 278-279. 
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Both the former US Secretary of s t a t e , Henry Kissinger 
and Cyrus V&nce h«ve expounded t h e similar points in t he i r Joint 
a r t i c l e in Foreign Affa i rs , They pointed out that : " I s rae l 
should not and cannot s tay when i t is in the occupied t e r r i t o r i e s . 
The demographic trends there are running against I s r a e l ; the m i l i -
tancy of a hos t i l e population will increase* radicalism will 
grow in the r e s t of the Arab wor ld . . . The Pales t in ians have 
leg i t imate r igh t s which should be recognized* provided they in 
tu rn unambiguoasly recognize the righb of I s r a e l t o l i v e within 
secure and recognized boundaries . 
(b) Secondly* the Arab States should negot ia te with the 
United States t o persuade the I s r a e l i s for t h e Pales t in ian 
homeland in West Bank and Gaza. In fac t , the United Sta tes i s 
the only country v*iich is p o l i t i c a l l y * economically and m i l i t a -
r i l y close t o Israel and capable of admonishing Tel Aviv to 
accept the legitimacy of Pales t inians in the West Bank and Gaza 
s t r i p . 
(c) The I s r a e l i public opinion should be mobilised through 
the various organisat ions and movements l ike the Peace Now movement 
which aimed t o maintain the public pressure on the I s r a e l i Govern-
ment through urging them "to i n i t i a t e moves* ac t ive ly and constantly" 
4« Henry Kissinger & Cyrus Vance "Bipartisan Objectives 
for American Foreign Policy", Foreign jyffairs* Vbl. 66, 
No. 5, Sumnier 1988* p , 916. 
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5 t o achieve a peace between Is rae l and i t s neighbours. In fact^ 
the Peace Now movement has been playing an important r o l e in 
moulding public opinion in Israel , s ince 1979. I t should further 
p ressur i se the I s r a e l i Government to adopt a pol icy of amicable 
settlement of Pa les t in ian issue. Moreover, i t a l so has the 
support of world Jewry, which in turn can influence the Jewish 
lobby in Anerica. 
(d) In order to solve the Palest inian imbroglio, a l l the 
powers which had been contr ibutory to the c rea t ion of the s t a t e 
of I s rae l should negot ia te with the I s r a e l i s and even use 
pressure t a c t i c s l ike economic, mi l i t a ry and p o l i t i c a l sanct ions , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y by the United S ta t e s . This can only be mater ia l i sed 
i f a l l the Arab States ser iously take i n t e r e s t in quest for the 
Pa le s t in i an solut ion and generate a public opinion a l l over tl>e 
world for convening in ternat ional conference mder the aegis of 
united Nations to e s tab l i sh a separate Pales t in ian State in the 
West Bank and Gaza s t r i p . Unanimous world c^ In ion alone can 
crea te a separate s t a t e for Pales t in ians and thus pave the way 
for r e s t o r a t i o n of peirmanent peace in the Middle East otherwise, 
the Pales t in ian issue would become in t rac tab le and the US Ad:nlnis-
t r a t i o n may always i n s i s t on the Camp David Accords whenever the 
issue is ra i sed at the in terna t ional fora. 
5. Aaron S. Klieman " I s rae l " in Colin Legum ^i<^dle East 
Contemporary Survey, Vol. IV 1978-79 (New York : Holmes 
& Meier publ i shers . I n c . , 1980) , p . 593. 
APPENDIX - I 
CAMP DAVID ACCORDS 
A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THS MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID. 
17 ^E^TEMB f^i 1<>7§ 
Muhammad Alwar-a l -Sadat / p r e s i d e n t of Arab Republic 
of Egypt, and Menachem Begin* prime M i n i s t e r of I s r a e l * met 
w i th Jimmy Cater p r e s i d e n t of t h e m i t e d S t a t e s of Anerica* 
a t Camp David frCm 5 September t o 17 September 19 78, and have 
agreed on t h e following framework for peace i n t h e Middle E a s t . 
They i n v i t e o t h e r p a r t i e s t o t h e A r a b - I s r a e l i c o n f l i c t t o 
adhere t o i t . 
PREAMBLE 
The . search for peace in the Middle East must be guided 
by the followingi 
- The agreed basis for the peaceful sett lement of the 
conf l i c t between I s rae l and i t s neighbours i s United Nations 
Secut i ty Ooxmcil Resolution 242, in a l l i t s p a r t s . 
After four wars during t h i r t y years , despite in tens ive 
hunan e f f o r t s , the Middle East, which i s the cradle of c i v i l i -
zation and the b i r t h place of three great r e l i g i o n s , does not 
yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East 
yearn for peace so t ha t the vast hunan and na tura l resources of 
the region can be turned to the pursu i t s of peace and so tha t 
t h i s area can become a model for co-existence and cooperation 
among na t ions . 
The h i s t o r i c i n i t i a t i v e of president Sadat in v i s i t i n g 
Jerusalem and the reception accorded t o him by the parliament* 
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government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of 
prime Minister Begin to Ismailia/the peace proposals made by 
both leaders/ as well as the warm reception of these missions 
by the peoples of both countries/ have created an unprecendented 
opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation 
and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war. 
The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and 
the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy 
non provided accepted standards for the conduct of relations 
among all states. 
To achieve a relationship of peace/ in the spirit of 
Article 2 of the united Nations Charter, future negotiations 
between Israel and any neighbour prepared to negotiate peace 
and security with it/ are necessary for the purpose of carrying 
out all the provisions and the principles of Resolutions 242 and 
338. 
Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and political independence of every state in the area 
and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized 
boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward 
that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconci-
liation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting 
econanic development/ in maintaining stability, and in assuring 
security. 
Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by 
cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In 
addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can/ 
on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrange-
ments such as demilitarized zones, limiited armaments areas, 
early warning stations, the presence of international forces, 
liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements 
that they agree are useful. 
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fRAMSWORK 
Taking t h e s e f a c t o r s i n t o account , the p a r t i e s a r e 
determined t o r each a j \ i s t# comprehensive* and durab le s e t t l e m e n t 
of t h e Middle East c o n f l i c t through the conclus ion of peace 
t r e a t i e s based on Secu r i t y C o m c i l Reso lu t ion 24 2 and 338 in a l l 
t h e i r p a r t s . T h e i r purpose i s t o ach ieve peace and good n e i g h -
b o r l y r e l a t i o n s . They r ecogn i se t h a t , for peace t o endure, i t 
must deeply a f f e c t e d by t h e c o n f l i c t . They t h e r e f o r e ag ree 
t h a t t h i s framework i s a p p r o p r i a t e i s in tended by them t o c o n s t i -
t u t e a b a s i s for peace not on ly between Egypt and I s r a e l , but 
a l s o betwe^i I s r a e l and each of i t s o the r ne ighbors which i s 
p r e p a r e d t o n e g o t i a t e peace with I s r a e l on t h i s b a s i s , wi th 
t h a t o b j e c t i v e i n mind, t h e y have agreed to proceed as fol lowst 
A. MEST BANK AND GAZA 
1. Egypt, I s r a e l , Jordan and t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e 
P a l e s t i n i a n peop le should p a r t i c i p a t e in negotiat icans on the 
r e s o l u t i o n of t h e P a l e s t i n i a n problem i n a l l i t s a s p e c t s . To 
ach ieve t h a t o b j e c t i v e , n e g o t i a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e West Bank 
and Gaza should proceed in t h r e e s t ages* 
(a) Egypt and I s r a e l agree t h a t , i n order t o ensure a peacefu l 
and o r d e r l y t r a n s f e r of a u t h o r i t y , and tak ing i n t o account t h e 
s e c u r i t y concerns of a l l t h e p a r t i e s , t h e r e should be t r a n s i -
t i o n a l arrangements for t h e West Bank and Gaza for a p e r i o d not 
exceeding f i ve y e a r s . In order t o p rov ide f u l l autonomy t o t h e 
i n h a b i t a n t s , under t h e s e arrangements t h e I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y 
government and i t s c i v i l i a n a d n i n i s t r a t i o n w i l l be withdrawn as 
soon as a s e l f -gove rn ing a u t h o r i t y has been f r e e l y e l e c t e d by 
t h e i n h a b i t a n t s of t h e s e a r ea s t o r e p l a c e t h e e x i s t i n g m i l i t a r y 
government. To n e g o t i a t e t h e d e t a i l s of a t r a n s i t i o n a l a r r a n g e -
ment, t h e Government of Jordan w i l l be i n v i t e d t o j o i n the 
n e g o t i a t i o n s on the b a s i s of t h i s framework. These new a r r a n g e -
ments should g ive due c o n s i d e r a t i o n both t o the p r i n c i p l e of 
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self-government by the inhabi tants of thase t e r r i t o r i e s and to 
t he legi t imate secur i ty concerns of the p a r t i e s involved. 
(b) Egypt/ I s rae l and Jordan wil l agree on the modali t ies for 
es tabl i sh ing the e lected self-governing au tho r i t i e s in the West 
Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may incliide 
Pa les t in ians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Pales t in ians 
as mutually agreed. The p a r t i e s wil l negot ia te an agreement 
which will define the powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the se l f -
governing author i ty t o be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. 
A withdrawal of lacsteli armed forces will take place and the re 
will be a redeployment of the remaining I s r a e l i forces i n to spe-
c i f i e d secur i ty loca t ions . The agreement will a l so include 
arrang^nenta for assuring in te rna l and external secur i ty and 
publ ic order. A strong local pol ice force will be es tabl ished, 
which may include Jordanian c i t i z e n s . In addi t ion , I s r a e l i and 
Jordanian forces wil l pa r t i c ipa t e s in jo in t pa t ro l s and in the 
manning of control posts to assure the secur i ty of the borders. 
(c) When the self-governing author i ty (administrat ive covxi-
c i l ) in the West Bank and Gaza i s es tabl ished and inaugurated, 
the t r a n s i t i o n a l period of five years will begin. As soon as 
possible^ but no l a t e r than th^ t h i r d year a f t e r the beginning 
of the t r a n s i t i o n a l period, negot ia t ions will take place to 
detennine the f ina l s t a tus of the West Bank and Gaza and i t s 
neighbors, and t o conclude a peace t r e a ty between I s rae l and 
Jordan by the end of the t r a n s i t i o n a l per iod. These negot ia t ions 
wi l l be conducted among Egypt, I s r a e l . Jordan,and the e lec ted 
representa t ives of the inhabi tants of the West Bank and Gaza. 
Two separate but r e l a t e d cofrmittees wi l l be convened, one commit-
t e e , consis t ing of representa t ives of the four p a r t i e s which 
wil l negot ia te and agree on t he f inal s t a tus of the West Bank 
and Gaza, and i t s r e l a t ionsh ip with i t s neighbors, and the 
second committee, consis t ing of representa t ives of I s rae l and 
representa t ives of Jordan t o be joined by the e lec ted represen-
t a t i v e s of the inhabi tants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negot ia te 
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the peace t r e a t y between Is rae l and Jordan, taking in to account 
the agreement reached on the f ina l s t a tus of the west Bank and 
Gaza. The negot ia t ions wi l l be based on al 1 the provisions and 
p r inc ip les of UN Security Council Revolution 242. The nego t i a -
t ions will resolve* among other mat te r s , the locat ion of the 
boundaries and the nature of the secur i ty arrangements. The 
solut ion frcro the negot ia t ions must a l so recognize the l e g i t i -
mate r igh t s of the Palest inian people and t h e i r jus t requirements. 
In t h i s way, the Pales t in ians will pa r t i c i pa t e in the determina-
t ion of t h e i r own future through: 
(1) The negot ia t ion among Egypt, I s r a e l , Jordan and the 
representa t ives of the inhabi tants of the West Bank and Gaza 
to agree on the f inal s t a tus of the West Bank and Gaza and other 
outstanding issues by the end of the t r a n s i t i o n a l per iod . 
(2) Submitting t h e i r agreement t o a vote by the e lec ted 
represen ta t ives of the inhabi tants of the west Bank and Gaza. 
(3) providing for the elected representa t ives of the inhabi-
t an t s of the West Bank and Gaza t o decide how they sha l l govern 
themselves cons is ten t with the provisions of t h e i r agreement. 
(4) Par t i c ipa t ing as s t a t ed above in the work of the comm i t t ee 
negot ia t ing the peace t r e a t y between Is rae l and Jordan. 
2* All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made 
t o ass ure the secur i ty of I s rae l and i t s neighbors during the 
t r a n s i t i o n a l period and beyond. To a s s i s t providing such secur i ty , 
a strong loca l pol ice force will be cons t i tu ted by the sel f -
governing au thor i ty . I t will be con^osed of inhabi tants of the 
West Bank and Gaza. The po l ice wil l maintain continuing l i a i son 
on in te rna l secur i ty matters with the designated I s r a e l i , Jorda-
nian, and Egyptian o f f i ce r s . 
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3 . During the t r a n s i t i o n a l period* representa t ives of Egypt, 
I s r a e l , Jordan, and the self-governing author i ty will cons t i t u t e 
a continuing canmittee t o decide by agreement on t he modali t ies 
of admission of persons displaced from West Bank and Gaza in 
1967, together with necessary measures t o prevent disruption 
and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt 
with by t h i s committee. 
4 . Egypt and I s rae l wil l work with each other and with each 
other in te res ted p a r t i e s t o e s t ab l i sh agreed procedures for a 
prompt, jus t and permanent implementation of the reso lu t icn of 
the refugee problem. 
B. EGYPT-ISRAEL 
1 . Egypt and I s r a e l i x ide r t ake n o t t o r e s o r t t o t h e t h r e a t 
o r t h e use of f o r c e t o s e t t l e d i s p u t e s . Any d i s p u t e s h a l l be 
s e t t l e d by p e a c e f u l means i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h A r t i c l e 33 of t h e 
C h a r t e r of t h e u n i t e d N a t i o n s . 
2» In o r d e r t o a c h i e v e p e a c e between them, t h e p a r t i e s a g r e e 
t o n e g o t i a t e i n good f a i t h . With a g o a l of c o n c l u d i n g w i t h i n 
t h r e e months from t h e s i g n i n g of t h i s Framework a p e a c e t r e a t y 
be tween them, w h i l e i n v i t i n g t h e o t h e r p a r t i e s t o t h e c o n f l i c t 
t o p r o c e e d s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t o n e g o t i a t e and c o n c l u d e s i m i l a r 
p e a c e t r e a t i e s w i t h a view t o a c h i e v i n g a c o m p r e h e n s i v e p e a c e i n 
t h e a r e a * The Framework f o r t h e C o n c l u s i o n of a p e a c e T r e a t y 
Between Egypt and I s r a e l w i l l gove rn t h e p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s 
between them. The p a r t i e s w i l l a g r e e on t h e m o d a l i t i e s and t h e 
t i m e t a b l e f o r t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s under t h e 
t r e a t y . 
C. ASSOCIATED PRINCIPLES 
1 . Egypt and I s r a e l s t a t e t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o v i s i o n s 
d e s c r i b e d below s h o u l d a p p l y t o p e a c e t r e a t i e s between I s r a e l and 
e a c h of i t s n e i g h b o r s - Egyp t , J o r d a n , S y r i a and Lebanon, 
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2. Signatories sha l l es tabl ished among themselves re la t ionsh ips 
normal t o s t a t e a t peace with one another. To t his end, they 
should undertake t o abive by a l l the provisions of the Charter of 
t h e united Nations* Steps t o be taken in t h i s respect include: 
(a) ful l recogni t ion; 
(b) abolishing economic boycotts ; 
(c) guaranteeing tha t vnder th i s j u r i sd i c t i on the c i t i zens of 
other p a r t i e s s h a l l enjoy the protect ion of the due 
process of law. 
3 . Signatories should explore p o s s i b i l i t i e s for economic 
development in the context of f ina l peace t r e a t i e s , with the 
object ive of contr ibut ing t o the atmosphere of peace* coopera-
t i on and friendship which i s t h e i r common goal . 
4 . Claims Cotimissions may be es tabl i shed for the mutual 
se t t lement of a l l f inancia l claims. 
5. The united s t a t e s sha l l be inv i ted to p a r t i c i p a t e in the 
t a l k s on matters r e l a t e d t o modali t ies of the implementation of 
the agreements and working out the time t a b l e for the carrying 
out of the obligaticjn of the p a r t i e s . 
6. The United Nations Security Cojncil shal l be requested 
to endorse the peace t r e a t i e s and ensure tha t t h e i r provisions 
s h a l l not be v io la ted . The permanent members of the Security 
Council sha l l be requested t o underwrite the peace t r e a t i e s 
and ensure respect for t h e i r provis ions . They sha l l a lso be 
requested to conform t h e i r po l i c i e s and actions with the 




FRAMEWORK FOR THE CpNCLUSION OF A PEACE BETWEEN EGYpT AND 
ISRAEL, CAMP DAVID 17 SEPTEMBER 1978 
In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and 
Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of con-
cluding within three months of the signing of this 
framework of a peace treaty between them. 
It is agreed that: 
The site of negotiations will be under a United Nations 
flag at a location or locations to be mutally agreed. 
All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply 
in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt. 
Uhless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace 
treaty will be implemented between two and three years after 
the peace treaty is signed. 
The following matters are agreed between the parties: 
(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the 
internationally recognized vorders between Egypt and mandated 
Palestine; 
(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Sinai; 
(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, 
Rafah/ Rasen Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purpose only 
incl-uding possible commercial use by all nations; 
(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the 
Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantino-
ple Convention of 1888 applying to all nations/ the Strait of 
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are internationals waterways to be 
221 
open t o a l l n a t i o n s f o r unimpeded and non s u s p e n d a b l e freedoro 
of n a v i g a t i o n and o v e r f l i g h t ; 
(e) t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of a highway between t h e S i n a i and 
J o r d a n n e a r E l a t h w i t h g u a r a n t e e d f r e e and p e a c e f u l p a s s a g e s 
by Egypt and J o r d a n ; and 
(f) t h e s t a t i o n i n g of m i l i t a r y f o r c e s l i s t e d be low . 
STATIONING OF FORCES 
A. NO more t h a n one d i v i s i o n (mechan ized or i n f a n t r y ) of 
E g y p t i a n armed f o r c e s w i l l be s t a t i o n e d w i t h i n a r e a l y i n g 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 50 k i l o m e t r e s (Km) e a s t of t h e Gulf of Suez and 
t h e Suez C a n a l . 
B. Only U n i t e d N a t i o n s f o r c e s and c i v i l p o l i c e e q u i p p e d w i t h 
l i g h t weapons t o pe r fo rm normal p o l i c e f u n c t i o n s w i l l be s t a -
t i o n e d w i t h i n an a r e a l y i n g West of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o r d e r and 
t h e Gulf of Aqaba, v a r y i n g i n w i d t h from 20 km t o 40 l<m» 
C. I n t h e a r e a w i t h i n 3 Km e a s t of t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o r d e r 
t h e r e w i l l be I s r a e l i l i m i t e d m i l i t a r y f o r c e s n o t t o e x c e e d 
t h r e e b a t t a l i o n s , w i l l supp lement t h e c i v i l p o l i c e i n m a i n t a i -
n i n g o r d e r i n t h e a r e a n o t i n c l u d e d a b o v e . 
The e x a c t d e m a r c a t i o n of t h e above a r e a s w i l l be d e c i d e d 
d u r i n g t h e p e a c e n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
E a r l y warning s t a t i o n s may e x i s t t o i n s u r e c o m p l i a n c e 
w i t h t h e t e r m s of t h e a g r e e m e n t . 
Un i t ed N a t i o n s f o r c e s w i l l be s t a t i o n e d : (a) i n p a r t of 
t h e a r e a i n t h e S i n a i l y i n g w i t h i n a b o u t 2o Km t o t h e M e d i t e r r a -
nean Sea and a d j a c e n t t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l b o r d e r * and (b) i n t h e 
Sharm e l S h e i k h a r e a t o i n s u r e freedom of p a s s a g e t h r o u g h t h e 
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S t r a i t s of Tiran; and these forces will t.ot be removed unless 
such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United 
Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members. 
After a peace t r e a ty i s signed* and afrer the interim 
withdrawal i s complete* normal r e l a t i o n s will be es tabl ished 
betwe^i Egypt and Is rae l* including; full recogni t ion, inc lu -
ding diplomatic, economic and cul tura l r e l a t i o n s ; termination of 
economic boycotts and ba r r i e r s t o the f ree movement of goods and 
people; and mutual pro tec t ion of c i t i z e n s by the due process 
of law, 
INTERIM WITHDRAWAL 
EJetween three months and nine months af ter the signing 
of the peace t r e a t y , a l l I s r a e l i forces will withdraw eas t of a 
l i n e extending frcm a point east of El Arish t o Ras Muhammad, 
the exact locat ion of t h i s l i n e t o be determined by mutual 
agreement. 
Source* fiepart^nei^l; of gt;,ate Bu^,^e;t^p, Vol. LXXVII I , 
NO. 2019, October 19 78, pp . 7-11. 
APPENDIX - I I 
EXCHANGE OF LETTERS 
• • w i K i i B II ii^»—^i^w—^a^w—itf5)Miww<w%i^——— 
All l e t t e r s from p r e s i d e n t Jimmy Car te r a re da ted 22 September 
1978, a l l o the r l e t t e r s from p r e s i d e n t Anwar Al-Sadat and prime 
M i n i s t e r Menachem Begin a r e dated 17 Septenber 1978, 
The p r e s i d e n t 
Camp David 
T h urm on t , Mar yl an d 17 September 19 78 
Dear Mr p r e s i d e n t s 
I have t h e honour t o inform you t h a t during two weeks a f t e r 
my r e t u r n home I w i l l su tmi t a motion before I s r a e l ' s par l iament 
( the Knesset) t o decide on t h e following q u e s t i o n : 
If during t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t o condluce a peace t r e a t y between 
I s r a e l and Egypt a l l ou t s t and ing i s s u e s a r e agreed upon, ' a r e you 
in favour of the removal of t h e I s r a e l i s e t t l e r s from t h e no r the rn 
and Southern S i n a i a r ea s or a r e you in favour of keeping t h e afore-
mentioned s e t t l e r s in t h o s e a r e a s ? ' 
The vote/ Mr, p r e s i d e n t , on t h i s i s s u e w i l l be completely 
f r e e from the usual pa r l i amen ta ry p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e t o the e f f e c t 
t h a t a l though the c o a l i t i o n i s being now suppor ted by 70 manbers 
out of 120, every member of the Knesset , as I b e l i e v e , both of the 
Government and t l ie o p p o s i t i o n benches, w i l l be enabled t o v o t e 
i n accordance wi th h i s own consc ience . 





president of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
Cairo . 
Dear Mr Presidentt 
22 September 19 78 
I transmit terewith a cc^y of a l e t t e r t o me from prime 
Minister Begin se t t ing forth how he proposes t o present the 
issue of the Sinai set t lements to the Knesset for the l e t t e r ' s 
decision. 
In t h i s connection, I understand from your l e t t e r t h a t 
Knesset approval t o withdraw a l l I s r a e l i s e t t l e r s from Sinai 
according to a t imetable within a period specif ied for the imple*-
mentation of the peace t r e a t y i s a p re requ i s i t e to any negot ia-




Let te r from prime Minister Begin 
His Excellency 
Jimmy Carter 
pres ident of the Uhited States 
17 September 19 78 
Dear Mr. presidents 
In connection with the 'Framework for a settlement in 
S i n a i ' to be signed ton ight , I would l ike t o reaffirm the 
pos i t ion of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the 
set t lements* 
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1. All I s r a e l i s e t t l e r s must be wlthdravm from Sinai 
according t o a t imetable within the period specif ied for the 
implementation of the peace t r e a t y . 
2. Agreement by the I s r a e l i Government and i t s c o n s t i t u -
t iona l inst i tvr t ions t o t h i s basic p r inc ip l e i s therefore a 
p re - r equ ia i t e t o s t a r t i n g peace negot ia t ions for concluding a 
peace t reaty* 
3 . If I s rae l f a i l s to meet t h i s commitments the 'framework* 
sha l l be void and inva l id . 
s incere ly , 
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat 
His Excellency 
Menachem Begin 
Prime Minister of I s rae l 
Dear Mr prime Minister; 
22 September 19 78 
I have received your l e t t e r of 17 September 1978, describing 
how you intend t o place the question of the future of I s r a e l i 
set t lements in Sinai before the Knesset for i t s decision. 
Enclosed i s « copy of president Sadat ' s l e t t e r to me on 








pr«sicient of the uni ted States 
17 September 19 78 
Dear Mr Pres ident : 
I am writing you to reaffirm the pos i t ion of the Arab 
Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem. 
1. Arab Jerusalem is an in teg ra l pa r t of the West Bank. 
Legal and h i s t o r i c a l Arab r igh t s in the c i t y must be respected 
and res tored . 
2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty. 
3. The Pales t inian inhabi tants of Arab Jerusalem are 
e n t i t l e d t o exercise t h e i r leg i t imate nat ional r i g h t s , being 
pa r t of the Pales t in ian people in the West Bank. 
4. Relevant Security Council reso lu t ions , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
Resolutions 242 and 267# must be applied with regard t o Jerusalem. 
All the measures taken by Is rae l t o a l t e r the s ta tus of the c i ty 
are nul l and void and should be rescind. 
5. All peoples must have free access to the c i t y and enjoy 
t t e free exercises of worship and the r ight to v i s i t and t r a n s i t 
to the holy places without d i s t inc t ion or discr iminat ion. 
6. The holy places of each f a i t h may be placed uider the 
achiiniatrat ion and control of t he i r r e p r e s a i t a t i v e s . 
7. Essential f a c t i o n s in the c i ty should be undivided and 
a Joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and 
I s r a e l i members can s i ^e rv i se the carrying out of these functions. 
In t h i s way# the c i t y sha l l be undivided. 
Sincerely, 





17 Septonber 19 78 
Dear Mr pres ident : 
I have the honour t o inform you, Mr, pres ident , t ha t on 
28 June 1967 I s r a e l ' s parliament (the Knesset) promulgated and 
adopted a law t o the e f fec t : ' the Government i s empowered by a 
decree t o apply the law, the Ju r i sd i c t ion and aaminis t ra t ion of 
the s t a t e t o any par t of Eretz I s rae l (Land of Is rael Pa l e s t ine ) , 
as s t a t ed in t h a t dec ree ' . 
On the basis oi: t h i s law, the government of I s rae l decreed 
in July 1967 t h a t Jerusalem i s one c i t y i n d i v i s i b l e , the cap i -





president of the Arab Republic of Egypt 
Cairo 
Dear Mr President : 
I have received your l e t t e r of 17 September 19 78, se t t ing 
for th the Egyptian posi t ion on Jerusalem. I am transmit t ing a 
copy of t h a t l e t t e r to Prime Minister Begin for his information, 
The posi t ion of the united States on Jerusalem remains 
as s t a t ed by Ambassador Goldberg in the Ukiited Nations General 
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Assembly 14 Jxjly 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost 
in t h e United Nations Security Comcil on 1 July 1969. 
Sincerely, 
Jtomy Carter . 
His Excellency 
Jimmy Carter 
president of the United Sta tes 
The White House 
Washington, D.C. 
17 September 19 78 
Dear Mr. Pres ident : 
In connection with the 'Framework for peace in the Middle 
E a s t ' , I am writ ing you t h i s l e t t e r to inform you of the pos i t ion 
of the Arab Republic ot Egypt, with respect to t h i s implementation 
of the comprehensive set t lement . 
To ensure the implementation of the , . provisions r e l a t e d 
to the West Bank and Gaza and in order t o safeguard the l e g i t i -
mate r i g h t s of the Pales t in ian people, Egypt wi l l be prepared t o 
assune the Arab ro l e emanating from these provis ions , following 
consul ta t ions with Jordan and the represen ta t ive of the Pales-
t i n i a n people. 
Sincerely, 
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat 
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His Excel lency 
Menachem Begin 
prime Min i s t e r of I s r a e l 
22 September 197Q 
Dear Mr Prime M i n i s t e r ; 
I hereby acknowledge t h a t you have informed me as 
fo l l ows : 
A. In each paragraph of t h e Agreed Framework Document t h e 
e x p r e s s i o n s ' P a l e s t i n i a n s ' or P a l e s t i n i a n peop le a r e being or 
w i l l be cons t rued and tnders tood by you as ' P a l e s t i n i a n A r a b s ' . 
B, In each paragraph in which the express ion 'West Bank* 
appears i t i s l^eing, and wi l l be , understood by the Government 
of I s r a e l as Judea and Samaria. 
S i n c e r e l y , 
Jlxnmy Car te r 
Source : Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough : A pe r sona l ^ c c o m t 
pf the E o v p t - I s r a e l Peace Nego t i a t ions (New Delh i : 
Vikas Pub l i sh ing House, Pv t . L t d . , 1981), p p . 327-331. 
APPENDIX - I I I 
TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND THE 
STATE OF ISRAEL. Wi^HINGTON, 26 MARCH 19 79 
The Government of t h e Arab R e p u b l i c of Egypt and t h e 
Government of t h e s t a t e of I s r a e l ; 
PREAMBLE 
Convinced of the urgent necess i ty of the establishment of 
a j u s t , comprehensive and las t lny peace in the Middle East in 
accordance with the Security Cbuncil Resolution 242 and 338. 
Reaffirming the i r adherence t o the 'Freedom for Peace in 
the Middle East Agreed a t Camp David' , dated 17 September 1978. 
Noting t h a t the aforementioned Framework as appropriate i s 
intended t o cons t i tu t e a basis for peace not only between Egypt 
and I s rae l but a lso between I s rae l and each of i t s other Arab 
neighbors which in prepared to negot ia te peace with i t on t h i s 
bas i s ; 
Desiring t o bring t o an end the s t a t e of war between th^n 
and t o e s t ab l i sh a peace In which every s t a t e in the area can 
l i v e in secur i ty ; 
Convinced that the caic lus lon of a Treaty of Peace between 
Egypt and Is rae l i s an important step in the search for compre-
hensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the s e t t l e -
ment of the Arab- Is rae l i conf l ic t in a n i t s aspect ; 
Invi t ing the other Arab pa r t i e s t o t h i s dispute to join 
the peace process with Is rae l guided by and based on the 
p r inc ip le s of the aforementioned Framework; 
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r)esiriny as well t o develop f r iendly r e l a t i on and 
cooperation between themselves in accordance vdth the United 
Nations Charter and the p r inc ip les of in te rna t iona l law gover-
ning in te rna t iona l r e l a t i o n s in times of peaces-
Agree t o th<} following provisions in the free exercise of 
t h e i r sovereignty, in order to implement the 'Framework for the 
conclusion of « peace Treaty Between Egypt and I s r a e l * . 
ARTICLE I 
1. The s t a t e of war between the p a r t i e s wi l l be terminated and 
peace wil l be es tabl ished betweai them vjpon the exchange of 
ins t runents of r a t i f i c a t i o n of t h i s Treaty; 
2. I s r ae l wil l withdraw a l l i t s forces and c i v i l i a n from the 
Sinai behind the In ternat ional boundary between Egypt and manda-
ted Pa les t ine , as provided for in the annexed protocol 
(Annexure-I) , and Egypt will resume the exercise of i t s fu l l 
sovereignty over the Sinai« 
3 . Ut>on ccrnpletion of the interim withdrawal provided foe 
in Annex I , the par t i es will e s t ab l i sh normal and f r iendly 
r e l a t i o n s , in accordance with Ar t i c l e I I I (3) . 
ARTICLE I I 
The permanent boundary between Egypt and I s rae l i s the 
recognized in ternat ional boiaidary between Egypt and the former 
mandated t e r r i t o r y of Pa les t ine , as shown on the map at Annex I I , 
without prejudice to the issxie of the s t a tus of the Gaza s t r ; ^ . 
The p a r t i e s recognize t h i s boundary as inv io lab le . Each wil l 
respect the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t eg r i t y of the o ther , including t h e i r 
t e r r i t o r i a l waters and a i r space . 
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ARTICLB I I I 
1« The pa r t i e s will apply between them the provisions of the 
Charter of the united Nations and the p r inc ip les of in t e rna -
t i o n a l law governing r e l a t i o n s among s t a t e s in times of peace. 
In p a r t i c u l a r t 
(a) they recognize and wi l l respect each o t h e r ' s sovereignty 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and p o l i t i c a l independence; 
(b) They reoogniste and will respect each o the r ' s r igh t to l i v e 
in peace within the i r secure and recognized boundaries; 
(c) They will r e f ra in from the threa t or use of force, d i rec t ly 
or I n d i r e c t l y , against each other and will s e t t l e a l l disputes 
between there by peaceful meant, 
2« Each par ty undertakes t o ensure t h a t acts or th rea t s of 
be l l igerency, h o s t i l i t y , or violence do not o r ig ina te from 
and are not committed from within i t s t e r r i t o r y , or by any forces 
subject t o i t s control or by any other forces s ta t ioned on i t s 
t e r r i t o r y , against the population, c i t i zens or property of the 
other Par ty . Each Party also undertakes t o r e f r a in from 
organizing, i n s t i g a t i n g , i nc i t i ng , a s s i s t i n g or pa r t i c ipa t ing in 
ac ts or t h r e a t s of bel l igerency, h o s t i l i t y , subversion or voi -
lence againsts the other Party anywhere, and vndertakes t o ensure 
t h a t pe rpe t ra to rs of such ac ts are brought t o j u s t i c e . 
3 , The Par t i es agree tha t the normal re la t ionsh ip es tab l i shed 
between them include ful l recognit ion diplomatic, economic and 
cu l tura l r e l a t i o n s , termination of economic boycotts and d i s c r i -
minatory ba r r i e r s t o the free movement of people and goods, and 
will guarantee the mutual enjoyment of c i t i zens of the due p r o -
cess of law. The process by which they undertake t o achieve such 
a r e l a t ionsh ip p a r a l l e l t o the implementation of other provlsicxis 
of t h i s t r e a t y i s s e t out in the annexed protocol (Annex I I I ) . 
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ARTICLE XV 
1 . In order to provide maximxm secur i ty for both pa r t i e s on 
the basis of r ec ip roc i ty , agreed secur i ty arrangements wi l l be 
es tab l i shed including l imited forces zones in Egyptian and 
I s r a e l i t e r r i t o r y , and united Nations forces and observers, 
described in de ta i l as t o matvire and t r a in ing in Annex I , and 
secur i ty arrangements the p a r t i e s may agree vpon. 
2* The Par t ies agree t o the s t a t ion ing of united Nations 
personnel i s areas described in Annex I . The p a r t i e s agree 
not t o request withdrawal of the united Nations personnel and 
t h a t these personnel wi l l not t o renoved unless such removal i s 
approved by the Securi ty CJouncil of the Uiited Nations, with the 
a f f i rmi t ive vote of the f ive permanent Members, vnless the pa r t i e s 
otherwise agree. 
3* A Join t Canmlssion wil l be es tabl ished to f a c i l i a t e the 
implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex. I . 
4« The secur i ty arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of t h i s Ar t ic le rnay a t the request of e i the r pa r ty be reviewed 
and amended by mutual agreement of the P a r t i e s . 
ARTICLE V 
1• Ships of I s r a e l , and cargoes destined for or coming from 
I s r a e l , sha l l enjoy the r ight of free passage through the Suez 
Canal and i t s approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the 
Mediterranean Sea on the bas is of the Convention of 1888, applying 
t o a l l na t ions . I s r a e l i na t iona l s , vessels and cargoes destined 
for or coming from I s r a e l , sha l l be accorded non-discriminatory 
treatment in a l l matters connected with usage of the canal . 
2« The pa r t i e s consider the s t r a i t of Tiran and the Gulf of 
Aqaba to tje i n t e rna t iona l waterways open t o a i l nat ions for 
vnimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and over f l igh t . 
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Egypt and Israel se t for themselves the goal of completing 
che negotiat ions within one year so t h a t e lec t ions wil l be held 
as expedit iously as possible af ter agreement has been reached 
beti(*een the p a r t i e s . The self-governing author i ty referred t o 
in the 'Framework for peace in the Middle East ' wil l be es tab-
l i shed and inaugurated one month af ter i t has been elected, at 
which time the t r a n s i t i o n a l period of five years will begin. 
Th« I s r a e l i m i l i t a ry government and i t s c iv i l i an administrat ion 
wil l then be withdrawn, t o be replaced by the self-governing 
aut.Jiority, as specif ied in the 'Framework for peace in the Middle 
E a s t ' . A withdr«.vi«l of I s r a e l i armed forces will then take place 
and there will be redeployment of the remaining I s r a e l i forces 
i n t o specif ied secur i ty loca t ions . 
This l e t t e r also confirms our understanding t h a t the United 
Sta tes Government will p a r t i c i p a t e fu l ly in a l l stages of nego-
t i a t i o n s . 
Sincerely yours, 
Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat 
Menachem Begin 
Sources Near E^st Report (Washington, D.C.) , vol . XXIII, 
No. 11, March 28, 1979, p. 64. 
APPENDIX - IV 
LETTER 
Dear p r e s i a e n t C a r t e r , 
This l e t t e r confirros t h a t Egypt and I s r a e l have agreed as 
fol lows I 
The Governments of Egypt and I s r a e l r e c a l l t h a t they con-
c luded a t Catnp David and s igned a t t h e White House on 17 September 
19 78/ t h e annexed documents e n t i t l e d 'A Framework for Peace in 
t h e Middle East Agreed a t Camp David' and Framewcrk for t h e conc lu -
s ion of a Peace Trea ty between Egypt and I s r a e l ' « 
For tVie purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace s e t t l e -
ment in accordance wi th the above-mentioned Framework, Egypt and 
I s r a e l w i l l proceed with the implementation of those p r o v i s i o n s 
r e l a t i n g t o the West Bank and t h e Gaza S t r i p . They have agreed 
t o s t a r t n e g o t i a t i o n s wi th in a month a f t e r t h e exchange of t h e 
i n s t r t m e n t s of r a t i f i c a t i o n of the peace t r e a t y . In accordance 
wi th t h e 'Framework for peace in t h e Middle E a s t ' , t h e Hashemite 
Kingdcm of Jordan la i n v i t e d t o j o in t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s . The 
De l fga t ions of Egypt and Jordan may inc lude P a l e s t i n i a n s from 
t h e West Bank and Gaza S t r i p or o the r P a l e s t i n i a n s a s mutua l ly 
ag reed . 
The p i r p o s e of the n e g o t i a t i o n s h a l l be t o agree p r i o r t o 
t h e e l e c t i o n s on tlKf m o d a l i t i e s for e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e e l e c t e d 
s e l f - g o v e r n i n g a u t h o r i t y (Adfninis t rat ive Covncil) , def ine i t s 
powers and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , and agree upon o the r r e l a t e d i s s u e s . 
I n t h e event Jordan decides not t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s , 
t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s wi l l be he ld by I s r a e l and Egypt. 
The two Governments agree t o n e g o t i a t e con t inuous ly and in 
good f a i t h t o conclude t h e s e n e g o t i a t i o n s a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e 
d a t e . They a l s o agree t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e of the n e g o t i a t i o n s i s 
t h e e s t ab l i shmen t of tlie s e l f -gove rn ing a u t h o r i t y i n t h e West 
Bank and Gaza in order t o p rov ide f u l l autonomy t o the i n h a b i t a n t s . 
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ARTICLE VIII 
The p a r t i e s agree to es tab l i sh a claims commission for the 
mutual settlement of a l l f inancial c laims. 
ARTICLE IX 
1. This Treaty shal l enter in to force ipon exchange of instrch-
ments of r a t i f i c a t i o n . 
2. This Treaty si^ersedes the Agreement between Egypt and 
I s rae l of September, 1975. 
3 . All p ro toco ls , annexes, and maps attached t o th i s Treaty 
sha l l be regarded as an in tegra l par t hereof. 
4 . The Treaty sha l l be communicated to the Secretary General 
of the United Nations for r e g i s t r a t i o n in accordance with the 
provisions of Ar t i c l e 102 of the Charter of the United Natioms. 
Done a t Washington, D.C. t h i s 26th day of March 19 79/ In 
t r i p l i c a t e in the English Arabic and Hebrew language, each t ex t 
being equally au thent ic . In case of any divergence of i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n , the English t e x t shal l p r e v a i l . 
Source* Near East Report (Washington D . C ) , Vol. XXIII, 
NO, 13/ March 28, 19 79, pp . 57-58. 
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Dhe p a r t i e s w i l l r e s p e c t each o t h e r ' s r i g h t t o n a v i g a t i o n and 
o v e r f l i g h t for access t o e i t h e r count ry through t h e S t r a i t of 
T i r a n and t h e Gulf of Aqaba. 
ARTICLE VI 
1, This Treaty doofs not a f f e c t and s h a l l n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d 
a s a f f e c t i n g in any way the r i g h t s and o b l i g a t i o n s of t h e P a r t i e s 
under t h e Char ter of t he un i t ed Nat ions . 
2# The p a f t i e s under take t o f u l f i l i n g ood f a i t h t h e i r o b l i g a -
t i o n s vnder t h i s T r e a t y , without r egard t o a c t i o n o r i n a c t i o n of 
any o t h e r p a r t y and independent ly of any ins t rument e x t e r n a l t o 
thifl T rea ty . 
3# They f u r t h e r under take t o t a k e a l l the necessa ry measures 
fo r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n in t h e i r r e l a t i o n s of the p r o v i s i o n s of t h e 
m u l t i l a t e r a l convent ions to vAtich they a r e p a r t i e s , inc luding t h e 
submission of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e S e c r e t a r y 
General of t he un i t ed Nations and o t h e r d e p o s i t o r i e s of such 
conven t ions , 
4# The P a r t i e n undertake not t o e n t e r i n t o any o b l i g a t i o n in 
c o n f l i c t with t h i s T r e a t y . 
5# Subject o A r t i c l e 103 of t h e United Nat ions Char te r / in t h e 
event of a c o n f l i c t between the o b l i g a t i o n s of the P a r t i e s under 
t h e p r e s e n t Treaty and any of t h e i r o t h e r o b l i g a t i o n s , the 
o b l i g a t i o n s under t h i s Treaty w i l l be binding and implemented. 
ARTZCLl Vl% 
1. Disputes a r i s i n g o u t of the a p p l i c a t i o n o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
of t h i s T rea ty s h a l l be r e so lved be n e g o t i a t i o n s . 
2« Any such d i s p u t e s which cannot be s e t t l e d by n e g o t i a t i o n s 
s h a l l be r e s o l v e d by c o n c i l i a t i o n o r submit ted t o a r b i t r a t i o n . 
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